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Abstract
In this dissertation, I argue and show that foreign direct investment (FDI)
bolsters autocratic rule and hinders democratization. FDI helps to coopt the
regime elite and intensifies the belief of the middle class in the legitimacy
of autocratic rule through its distributional consequences. Because both so-
cietal groups see no reason to act against the incumbent regime on material
grounds, FDI weakens pressures for regime change among the essential mem-
bers of the autocratic support coalition. Consequently, I hypothesize that au-
tocratic regimes are less likely to experience elite coups and popular uprisings
and are, thus, more likely to maintain power. I substantiate this argument
with a detailed empirical analysis. I demonstrate that dictators consciously
choose the level and form of exposure to FDI in line with the preferences of
their support coalition. I also show that the beneficiaries of FDI hold a much
more favorable view of the incumbent regime and are less likely to instigate
public protests than the adversely affected part of the population. Lastly, I find
that FDI lowers the probability of autocratic regime breakdown. In essence,
FDI has not only become the new pacemaker of economic globalization, but
portrays sizable and lasting, but often unintended political consequences.
Kurzzusammenfassung
In dieser Dissertation wird argumentiert und gezeigt, dass ausländische Direk-
tinvestitionen (FDIs) die Überlebenschancen von autokratischen Regimen er-
höhen und Demokratisierung erschweren. Da FDIs ökonomische Verteilungs-
gewinne zugunsten bestimmter sozialer Gruppen der autokratischen Unter-
stützerkoalition hervorrufen, entstehen finanzielle Möglichkeiten, die Regime-
elite zu kooptieren. Gleichzeitig verstärken FDIs den Glauben der Mittelschicht
an die Legitimität autokratischer Herrschaft. Da beide, für den Machterhalt
essentielle, soziale Gruppen geringere materielle Anreize haben, gegen das
amtierende Regime vorzugehen, schwächen FDIs Forderungen nach einem
Regimewechsel. Autokratische Regime sehen sich daher weniger wahrschein-
lich Putschversuchen durch Eliten und Aufständen durch die Mittelklasse aus-
gesetzt und können somit ihre Macht konsolidieren. Dieses Argument wird
mit einer detaillierten empirischen Analyse untermauert. Diktatoren steuern
die Art der Öffnung zu FDIs im Einklang mit den Präferenzen ihrer Unter-
stützerkoalition. Darüber hinaus zeigen weitere statistische Auswertungen,
dass die Gewinner von FDIs autokratischer Herrschaft wohlwollender gegen-
überstehen und weniger häufig gegen das Regime protestieren als die Ver-
lierer aussenwirtschaftlicher Öffnung. Zuletzt wird gezeigt, dass FDIs die
Wahrscheinlichkeit eines autokratischen Regimezusammenbruchs verringern.
Ausländische Direktinvestitionen sind daher nicht nur zum neuen Treiber wirt-
schaftlicher Globalisierung geworden, sondern haben gleichzeitig weitreichen-
de, wenn auch oft unbeabsichtigte, politische Konsequenzen.
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Chapter 1
Autocracies in the Global Economy
Since the end of World War II, openness to the global economy has risen to
unprecedented levels. Over the last decades, more and more goods have been
traded internationally (Milner and Kubota, 2005). The tremendous techno-
logical advances enabled firms to move production abroad and provide ser-
vices from foreign countries (Blinder, 2009). Capital has become much more
mobile and multinational corporations have invested in both long-term and
short-term financial assets in other countries (Pandya, 2016). While democ-
racies have partaken in the global economy early on, autocracies progres-
sively jumped on the internationalization bandwagon (Jensen et al., 2012;
Milner and Mukherjee, 2009). This dissertation investigates the political con-
sequences of international economic openness in autocratic regimes.
In a nutshell, I argue theoretically and demonstrate empirically that
economic globalization – more specifically, foreign direct investment (FDI) –
bolsters autocratic rule. I focus deliberately on FDI, as it has become the new
pacemaker of economic globalization (Pandya, 2016). In terms of actual cap-
ital flows, FDI not only surpasses portfolio investment and development aid,
it is also a crucial driver of international trade integration (Milner, 2014).
Indeed, the annual average inflows of FDI into autocracies roughly quadru-
pled in recent years (see Figure 1.1). Interestingly, this trend is accompanied
by a reduction in the frequency of autocratic regime breakdown. I contend
that these synchronous changes are not just coincidental, but that the two
1
2 FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND AUTOCRATIC SURVIVAL
Note: data from Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) and UNCTAD (2015).
Figure 1.1: FDI Inflows and the Frequency of Autocratic Regime Breakdown
developments are related. To explain this relationship, my theoretical ap-
proach emphasizes two components: the societal structure of autocracies and
the distributional consequences of international investment flows. FDI mostly
benefits those parts of the population that are essential for autocratic power
maintenance – the regime elite and the middle class. Because FDI unfolds both
a legitimacy-enhancing and a cooptation-enabling dynamic, it increases these
groups’ support for the incumbent regime. In contrast, those parts of the pop-
ulation that stand to lose from international openness are unable to initiate
regime change. Consequently, FDI aligns the interests of the most influential
societal groups towards supporting the continuance of autocratic rule.
Because this argument proposes a new mechanism that links FDI with
autocratic regime survival, the empirical analyses provide evidence on several
observable implications. FDI should exhibit sizable distributional effects on
CHAPTER 1: AUTOCRACIES IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 3
the individual-level. These material gains and losses should be linked with
political demands and attitudes towards the legitimacy of the incumbent au-
tocratic regime. Given that FDI shapes political demands, it should also affect
the political process in autocratic regimes by inducing or prohibiting protests.
And exposure of societal groups to FDI should have society-wide consequences
in terms of actual policy-making as well as regime stability. To explore these
relationships, this dissertation incorporates data on different levels of analysis
to give answers to the following questions:
1. Why and how much do autocracies liberalize FDI?
2. How does openness to FDI affect individuals in autocracies materially
and does it shape citizen support for autocratic rule?
3. Do FDI-induced demands and grievances translate into politics via pop-
ular protest?
4. How does FDI affect the survival of autocratic regimes and the prospects
for democratization?
1.1 Existing Research: Economic Globalization and
Democratization
This dissertation is not the first attempt to study autocratic regime trajectories
under conditions of economic openness. A large research agenda investigates
the determinants under which democratic rule emerges more generally (see,
for an overview, Geddes, 1999; Haggard and Kaufman, 2016; Huntington,
1991; Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán, 2014; Przeworski et al., 2000; Teorell,
2010). And although the pioneering work on this topic has focused heavily on
domestic factors to explain why countries democratize, international factors
have gained importance in recent years (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Prid-
ham, 2000; Li and Reuveny, 2003). Whether and how economic globalization
leads to democratization is, however, hotly debated.1
One group of scholars argues that economic globalization and democra-
1 Here, I focus exclusively on research that deals with the connection between economic glob-
alization and political regime trajectories. I will provide details on other facets of autocratic
politics in the empirical chapters.
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tization should go hand in hand (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006; Boix, 2003;
Milner and Kubota, 2005). Hence, these theoretical models hypothesize that
economic globalization undermines autocratic rule and promotes democracy.
To explain this connection, scholars have mainly stressed two mechanisms:
First, based on modernization theory (Lipset, 1959; Przeworski et al.,
2000), scholars argue that economic globalization increases the wealth of na-
tions by generating a well-educated and stable middle class (Eichengreen and
Leblang, 2008; Li and Reuveny, 2003; Lopez-Cordova and Meissner, 2008;
Teorell, 2010). The members of this class become economically independent
from the state. Their improved economic situation implies more time to en-
gage in activities not exclusively dedicated to individual survival. The middle
class is, therefore, able to practice politics, which creates the participatory
foundation for democracy. The diffusion of participatory ideals across borders
reinforces these domestic processes. Ties between democracies and autocra-
cies through trade and investment induce the diffusion of democratic values
through economic channels (Bunce and Wolchik, 2010; Gleditsch and Ward,
2006; Levitsky and Way, 2010). The spread of democratic ideas amplifies
the population’s demand for democracy, which should ultimately result in the
establishment of democratic forms of governance.
Second, redistributivist theories explain changes in political institutions
with distributional conflicts over economic resources (Acemoglu and Robin-
son, 2006; Boix, 2003). The main assumption is that the masses always de-
mand redistribution, because they are better off with a higher income (Meltzer
and Richard, 1981). As the level of redistribution should be higher under
democracy than under autocracy, the masses push for democratization. Yet,
demand for redistribution on the part of the popular masses only leads to
democratization if income inequality is low.2 In this case, the redistributive
impact of democratization decreases, lowering the ratio between benefits and
costs of maintaining an autocratic regime for the elite. Assuming that all
2 The arguments of Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) and Boix (2003) differ to some extent in
this regard. While the latter argues for a linear relationship between inequality and the elite’s
willingness to induce democratization, the former see the biggest chances for democracy at
middling levels of inequality. Given that most autocracies are unequal, the characterization
above should nevertheless also hold in this reduced form (Ansell and Samuels, 2014).
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autocracies are developing countries and the factor-proportions theorem of
international trade is true (Heckscher, Flam, and Ohlin, 1991; Stolper and
Samuelson, 1941), inequality decreases the more a country is open to eco-
nomic globalization. It follows that economic globalization should lead to
democracy (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006; Boix, 2003).
Another group of scholars doubts that economic globalization induces
democratization and argues in favor of an autocracy-stabilizing effect of inter-
national openness (Escribà-Folch, 2017; Im, 1996; O’Donnell, 1978; Özsahin,
2010). These theoretical models distinguish mainly between two mechanisms:
First, dependency theorists argue that resource flows from peripheral
autocratic countries to core democratic countries benefit the latter at the ex-
pense of the former (Foweraker and Landman, 2004; O’Donnell, 1978). In
order to maintain this profitable situation, democracies have no incentive to
promote democratization in autocracies when these countries have strong ties
through international trade and investment. Furthermore, by forming a coali-
tion with multinational corporations, autocratic elites can reap the benefits of
exploiting the disenfranchised masses (Im, 1996; Moran, 1978). As a conse-
quence, economic globalization should not lead to democratization.3
Second, resource curse theories posit that non-tax revenues, stemming
from oil and other natural resources, hinder democracy (Morrison, 2009; Ross,
2001). By generating rents, non-tax revenues enable the autocratic leader to
buy off the regime elite, which decreases the chances of elite defections and,
as a result, contributes to the stabilization of autocratic regimes. To the extent
that trade and investment flows create fungible revenues, international open-
ness opens new avenues to purchase political support (Escribà-Folch, 2017).
Proceeding economic globalization should, thus, contribute to autocratic sta-
bility through its legitimacy-enhancing effect on the part of the regime elite
(Arias, Hollyer, and Rosendorff, 2018; Bak and Moon, 2016).
Mirroring the theoretical dissent, the empirical evidence regarding the
nexus between economic globalization and democratization is similarly am-
biguous. Some studies find evidence in favor of the democracy-facilitating
3 This mechanism is heavily debated in the literature and, if anything, finds only weak empir-
ical support (Bollen, 1983; Escribà-Folch, 2017; Teorell, 2010).
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effect of economic openness (Burkhard and de Soysa, 2003; Eichengreen and
Leblang, 2008; Lopez-Cordova and Meissner, 2008). Other studies demon-
strate that economic globalization in fact hinders democratization (Li and
Reuveny, 2003, 2009; Özsahin, 2010; Rigobon and Rodrik, 2005; Teorell,
2010; Ulfelder, 2008; Yu, 2010). Further empirical investigations argue for
and detect heterogeneous effects. For example, Rudra (2005b) finds a demo-
cracy-hindering effect if social expenditures are low and a democracy-facilita-
ting effect if social expenditures are high. Epstein et al. (2006) not only look
at democratization, but additionally analyze autocratic breakdowns. Their re-
sults suggest that economic globalization stabilizes democratic regimes, but
has no effect on autocratic breakdown. To the contrary, Escribà-Folch (2017)
finds that FDI decreases the probability of democratization, but again does
not affect autocratic breakdown. Looking at financial globalization, Quinn
(2002) finds that capital account liberalization leads to autocratic reversals.
In a qualitative comparison of the Arab spring uprisings, Hinnebusch (2015)
concludes that economic globalization not only bolstered previous autocratic
regimes, but also created a class base unwilling to push for democratization
even in the aftermath of initial regime breakdown. Further studies reveal in-
conclusive results with regard to both trade openness (Milner and Mukherjee,
2009; Papaioannou and Siourounis, 2008) and foreign direct investment (Li
and Reuveny, 2003; Özsahin, 2010; Teorell, 2010).
The jury is, thus, still out on this debate. We have only little conclusive
evidence about how economic interdependencies affect the type of political
regime; least of all why FDI should affect regime breakdown (Escribà-Folch,
2017; Pandya, 2016). Even more, we lack knowledge about the specific mech-
anism that connects developments in the global economy with domestic insti-
tutional changes. Analyzing the impact of economic globalization on democ-
ratization, Teorell (2010, 116) thus diagnoses that this relationship is in fact
much more complex than expected: “In sum, the impetus from abroad at first
seems obvious. But on closer inspection its inner workings appear elusive.”
This is problematic for policy makers. After all, dominant foreign policy
objectives portray the massive increase in economic globalization as a cure
for the lack of voice on the part of the population in autocracies. For exam-
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ple, former US President William J. Clinton stated: “Just as democracy helps
make the world safe for commerce, commerce helps make the world safe for
democracy” (Clinton, 1996, 36). His successor in office, George W. Bush, sang
the same tune: “When we promote open trade, we promote both economic
and political freedom. Societies that open to commerce will one day open
to liberty” (Bush, 2001). Even more, he called upon his fellow citizens that
protectionism prohibits the export of American values of democracy, thereby
making the promotion of trade a “moral imperative” (New York Times, 2001).
In what follows, this dissertation puts the connection between international
economic openness and political regime trajectories under renewed scrutiny.
1.2 The Continuing Significance of Autocratic Regimes
In this dissertation, I depart from the literature’s primary focus on democrati-
zation, and concentrate on the survival of autocratic regimes instead. Hence,
I do not assume that democratization is equal to autocratic regime break-
down. Democratization is defined as the transition from an authoritarian
spell to a democratic spell (Geddes, 2003). This process involves several steps
(O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986): autocratic breakdown, institutionalization
of democracy as well as its consolidation.
Because there are several steps involved, there are differences concern-
ing the impact of specific factors at each stage. “One major source of inde-
terminacy in the length and outcome of the transition lies in the fact that
those factors which were necessary and sufficient for provoking the collapse
or self-transformation of an authoritarian regime may be neither necessary nor
sufficient to ensure the instauration of another regime – least of all, a political
democracy” (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986, 65). It is, thus, reasonable to
assume that the political process leading to autocratic breakdown is different
from the political process leading to democratic institutionalization, which in
turn may account for the inconclusiveness of existing research. By putting
autocratic regimes at the center of attention, my approach reduces the risk to
conflate these processes. Yet, what are autocratic regimes and why should we
care about them?
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Note: data from Boix, Miller, and Rosato (2013). Dark gray = country has been autocratic for
at least one year between 1970 and 2010; light gray = country has always been democratic.
Figure 1.2: Countries under Autocratic Rule between 1970 and 2010
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Between 1970 and 2010 autocratic rule has been an omnipresent fea-
ture of world politics. To identify autocratic rule, I rely on a negative defini-
tion of autocracy, i.e. regimes that do not fulfill a minimalist and procedural
definition of democracy in terms of electoral participation and contestation
(Coppedge, 2012; Dahl, 1971; Schumpeter, 1950).4 Because both dimensions
are necessary conditions for democracy, autocratic rule is present if either free
and fair elections are not the only means by which political leaders are chosen
or multi-party competition for political office is seriously hampered.5 The un-
interrupted period in which this is the case is defined as an authoritarian spell
(Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, 2014).6
Given this sharp distinction between autocratic and democratic spells,
only 60 countries have been consistently democratic between 1970 and 2010.
The remaining 132 (out of 192) countries have experienced at least one au-
thoritarian spell during this period. Figure 1.2 depicts the prevalence of the
‘dark side of politics’ around the globe. While Western Europe and Northern
America were largely untroubled by dictatorial rule, the majority of coun-
tries in other regions were not. Almost all countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin
America have been autocratic at least once between 1970 and 2010. This is
the universe of cases, on which I build my argument and empirical analyses.
Nevertheless, democracies are on the rise. While a majority of about
70% of all countries were autocratic back in the 1970s, the ‘third wave of
democratization’ (Huntington, 1991) turned the ratio upside down (see Figure
4 Svolik (2012, 24) argues that “the difference between dictatorship and democracy is de-
cidedly one of kind before it is one of degree.” This stance is part of an ongoing debate
in the literature on regime types. Consider for example research on ‘autocracies with ad-
jectives’ (Linz, 2000, 34) such as hybrid regimes (Brownlee, 2009; Diamond, 2002), semi-
authoritarianism (Ottaway, 2003), electoral authoritarianism (Schedler, 2006), competitive
authoritarianism (Howard and Roessler, 2006; Levitsky and Way, 2010), and similar re-
search on defective democracies (Merkel, 2004). I stick with this sharp distinction, because
it is plausible to assume that democracies and autocracies fundamentally differ from each
other with regard to the environment in which politics takes place. While the exertion of
political violence and repression is impossible in democracies, it is a permanent threat in
autocracies (Svolik, 2012).
5 Consider from an empirical perspective Alvarez et al. (1996), Boix (2003), Boix, Miller, and
Rosato (2013), Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010), and Przeworski et al. (2000). I
explicitly do not take more encompassing definitions of democracy into account – for exam-
ple, an all-embracing guarantee of civil or social rights (Schmitter and Karl, 1991; Zakaria,
1997).
6 In addition, I do not take into account time periods, in which a country was under foreign
intervention, warlordism, or a provisional government was in place.
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Note: data from Boix, Miller, and Rosato (2013).
Figure 1.3: Share of Democracies and Autocracies between 1970 and 2010
1.3). Since 1990, nearly 60% of all countries are democratic. Yet, more than
half of the global population, inhabiting about 40% of all countries, still lives
under autocratic rule. Hence, autocratic rule is normality in many places.
Countries even autocratized in the last years; for instance the Central African
Republic in 2003, Peru in 1992, Russia in 1993, and Venezuela in 2005. And
autocratic reversals in a couple of countries – including Hungary, Poland, and
Turkey – may be just around the corner.
Importantly, this dissertation does not stop at the distinction between
democratic and autocratic spells, as the resulting focus on democratization
falls short of taking into account fine-grained differences in the way auto-
cratic rule is actually executed. The focus on spells alone loses sight of the
fact that dictatorships come in very different facets and show very different
faces. One way to further disentangle spells is to focus on political regimes. A
political regime is “a set of basic formal and informal rules for choosing leaders
and policies” (Geddes, 1999, 116). Thus, autocratic breakdown does not im-
ply democratization, but simply means that there is some form of institutional
change. A look at the data substantiates this notion. There is tremendous vari-
ation in the number of autocratic regimes within authoritarian spells. About
50% of all authoritarian spells contain more than one autocratic regime and,
therefore, have faced at least one regime breakdown (Geddes, Wright, and
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Frantz, 2014). Focusing only on democratization neglects that there are in
fact much more instances of political instability.
Consequently, the explanandum of this dissertation is autocratic regime
survival, i.e. the time until an authoritarian regime falls apart. Geddes,
Wright, and Frantz (2014, 314) identify autocratic breakdowns as instances
“when basic rules about the identity of the leadership group change”. Break-
downs are caused either by changes in the ruling coalition or by changes in
the rules to attain power. Leadership turnover is not a sufficient condition for
autocratic breakdown, however. While individual dictators have frequently
come and gone, a considerable number of autocratic regimes have shown re-
markable persistence. A prominent example in this regard is the rule of the
Communist Party in Cuba. Fidel Castro left office in 2008, but power re-
mained in the hand of the party, which replaced him with his brother Raul
Castro; the leadership’s identity did not change. In contrast, Fidel Castro’s
seizure of power after the Communist Revolution of 1959 is considered an au-
tocratic regime breakdown. Castro ousted the military junta led by Fulgencio
Batista and replaced it with a party-based regime (BTI, 2014).
In light of this conceptualization, new data reveals a total number of
223 autocratic regime breakdowns (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, 2014). And
despite the fact that breakdowns tend to cluster at some specific time points,
regime breakdowns occur essentially every year. Investigating the mode of
breakdown additionally reveals an interesting picture (see Figure 1.4). Con-
trary to popular belief, regime breakdown due to mass mobilization is rather
uncommon and even less frequent than autocratic failure in the aftermath of
lost elections. Instead, elite ousting is the most frequent way autocracies break
down. Nonetheless, this implies that threats to the regime’s hold on power
emanate from the population as well as from within the regime itself. With
regard to the latter, it is also not surprising that less than half of all regime
transitions actually led to democracy. The majority of breakdowns results in
a subsequent autocratic government, making autocratic regimes and regime
breakdown an omnipresent property of world politics.7
7 In the following, I use the terms ‘autocracy’, ‘autocratic regime’, and ‘authoritarian regime’
interchangeably.
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Note: data from Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014).
Figure 1.4: Mode of Breakdown and Subsequent Regime Type
1.3 How FDI Impedes Autocratic Regime Breakdown
How does foreign direct investment affect autocratic regime survival and break-
down? In line with previous approaches, I propose a society-centered theo-
retical model of autocratic politics. Autocratic rule depends on support of
societal groups (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Wintrobe, 1998). Groups
that are crucial for autocratic power maintenance gain significant influence in
autocratic decision-making. This is the case for the regime elite as well as the
middle class, albeit autocracies differ according to the extent to which these
groups are politically powerful. For incumbent regimes to survive, societal
groups must continuously believe in the legitimacy of autocratic rule.
Foreign direct investment, in turn, alters beliefs in output-legitimacy
through its distributional consequences. Some groups benefit in material
terms, while others stand to lose (Baccini, Pinto, and Weymouth, 2017; Help-
man, Itshoki, and Redding, 2010; Palmtag, Rommel, and Walter, 2018; Walter,
2017). Because FDI is an influential component of economic globalization in
developing countries and exhibits stark distributional effects through is long-
CHAPTER 1: AUTOCRACIES IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 13
standing nature (Pandya, 2016), it should directly and lastingly affect the po-
litical demands and interests of societal groups. I contend that FDI facilitates
autocratic survival via two channels:
First, FDI enables cooptation on the part of the regime elite. With re-
gard to the material consequences, attracting FDI may not pay off for the elite
across the board (Aitken and Harrison, 1999; Haskel, Pereira, and Slaughter,
2007; Pandya, 2014a). While some members are able to reap the benefits
of investment-induced growth opportunities, large business and land owners
may also lose out through direct competition or marginalization. In addition,
uncertainty about future gains increase in a completely open economy. As a
consequence, members of the regime elite prefer partial and sector-specific lib-
eralization of FDI. Fine-tuning economic openness not only ensures that elites
profit directly, but also allows that overall gains from FDI are redistributed to
them. By dampening both the motive-based reasons as well as the potential
number of plotters, FDI makes elite coups against the regime less likely.
Second, FDI enhances the material well-being on the part of the middle
class. The middle class comprises of skilled workers as well as owners of small
businesses (Ansell and Samuels, 2014). FDI directly favors skilled workers
by increasing wage levels and decreasing economic insecurity through more
employment opportunities at multinational corporations (Feenstra and Han-
son, 1997; Walter, 2017). Rising demands for goods due to increasing mar-
ket income also spills over to small business owners (Görg and Seric, 2013).
These material developments amplify the perceived performance of autocratic
rule and, in turn, enhance the output-legitimacy of the incumbent autocratic
regime. In addition, FDI not only leads to more favorable views of the incum-
bent regime, it also prohibits popular protest against autocratic rule (Palmtag,
Rommel, and Walter, 2018). For individuals to participate in protests, they
need motive (Gurr, 1970). As FDI dampens grievance-based motives among
the middle class, protests become less likely. And even though a sizable por-
tion of the population may stand to lose from FDI, they face collective ac-
tion problems to organize political protests. In essence, FDI cuts off the poor
masses’ catalyst to act against the regime by rendering the middle class loyal.
This argument provides an alternative mechanism that helps to under-
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stand why autocracies liberalize FDI as well as how autocracies fare in times of
economic globalization. I explain both phenomena with a combination of the
societal structure of autocratic regimes and the distributional consequences
of FDI. The regime elite should prefer partial liberalization and pressures the
dictator to safeguard some economic sectors. The middle class should prefer
large-scale economic openness. Due to conflicting demands, the exact form of
FDI liberalization is thus contingent on the societal make-up of the autocratic
regime. Even more, FDI disincentives engagement in moves to overthrow the
incumbent regime. It decreases the probability of both regime elite coups and
middle class uprisings. As a consequence, foreign direct investment bolsters
autocratic rule and simultaneously obstructs the prospects of democratization.
This theoretical mechanism sheds new light on the connection between
economic globalization and institutional change in autocracies. Building on
ground-breaking work on the individual-level consequences of economic glob-
alization in democracies (Jensen, Quinn, and Weymouth, 2017; Walter, 2010,
2017), I apply insights from the literature on trade and multinational produc-
tion to come up with a better understanding of the distributional impact of FDI
in autocracies. Modernization theories have pioneered the study of democra-
tization in that they argue that economic change leads to political change
(Lipset, 1959). Nevertheless, simply arguing that economic globalization has
positive effects for the society as a whole misses out on the fact that only
some parts of the population benefit, while others stand to lose. Even though
redistributivist arguments go a long way in reconciling this shortcoming by
incorporating globalization’s distributional effects (Acemoglu and Robinson,
2006; Boix, 2003), their characterization of the distributional effects of in-
ternational openness rests on economic models that are outdated and do not
conform with real-world dynamics (Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2007; McCaig and
Pavcnik, 2015). The distributional consequences of FDI are more complex and
can be explained with a combination of models of multinational production
and newest advances in trade theory. Whether an individual or group of actors
gains or loses out is contingent on both the level of productivity and the actual
exposure to the global economy.
Given the distributional consequences of FDI, my theoretical mecha-
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nism further departs from the assumption that increasing income brings about
demands for democracy. This assumption is the centerpiece of both modern-
ization and redistributivist arguments (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006; Boix,
2003; Li and Reuveny, 2003). While I concur that increasing income may lead
to a more favorable image of democratic governance, I question whether it
simultaneously reinforces pressure for democracy at the same rate. For one,
democratization involves costs and pushing for democracy implies sacrificing
economic gains. Hence, there is a trade-off between current economic payoffs
and democratic participation rights. While this trade-off might go either way,
increasing income is also a sign of output-legitimacy of the autocratic regime
(Bellin, 2002, 2010; Chen and Lu, 2011; Wintrobe, 1998). Given that the
gains of political participation are uncertain and afar, I assert that increasing
income contributes to political complacence, rather than instilling the need
for political transformation. My theoretical argument, therefore, complements
dependency and resource curse theories. FDI not only presents an opportunity
for the dictator to keep the regime elite under control, but attracting FDI is a
powerful tool to garner support from the middle class, as well.
Finally, I explicitly incorporate autocracies’ decisions to open up their
economies to international competition into the theoretical model. Both the
modernization as well as the redistributivist approaches fall short of explain-
ing why dictators open up the domestic economy in the first place, given that
such a move would endanger their hold on power (Acemoglu and Robinson,
2006; Boix, 2003). The decision to open up to the global economy is es-
sentially a domestic one. In this sense, economic globalization is hardly a
simple structural factor that – as portrayed by both approaches – is imposed
on autocratic regimes. Dictators consciously choose the level and form of FDI
liberalization with regard to domestic power maintenance.
1.4 The Empirical Contribution of this Dissertation
To explore the impact of FDI on autocratic regime survival as well as shed light
on the causal mechanism, this dissertation is organized in five main chapters.
Chapter 2 discusses the theoretical argument in detail. The subsequent four
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chapters present empirical evidence on different levels of analysis to substan-
tiate the theoretical argument.
Chapter 3 investigates the domestic sources of foreign direct investment
liberalization. Scholars agree that the type of authoritarian rule matters for
economic outcomes. However, we do not know much about attractiveness
of autocratic regimes for FDI. Instead of focusing on international investors,
I approach this problem from the perspective of the domestic politics of FDI
liberalization. In combining models on multinational production and new new
trade theory, I argue that regime elites and the middle class have opposing
demands with regard to FDI openness. Variation in FDI liberalization is thus
due to the political power of the respective societal group. Entry restrictions
for multinational corporations increase the more influential the regime elite
is, but decrease in political influence of the middle class.
I then provide empirical evidence for the argument that societal groups
affect FDI openness. I construct two indexes measuring the political power
of both groups. Using panel regressions with country and time fixed effects,
I test the hypotheses on a sample of up to 93 autocracies between 1970 and
2010. The results support my argument and suggest that demands of soci-
etal groups have high impact on decision-making in autocracies, especially
when dictators are confronted with contested policy issues. Autocracies that
depend more on the support of the middle class are comparatively more open
to FDI than autocracies that depend heavily on the support of the regime elite.
Here, openness is sector-specific and tailored towards complementing domes-
tic business. The major insight of this chapter is that the political power of
societal groups varies widely between autocratic regimes and that this form
of autocratic diversity has direct consequences for policy-making. Given their
position in the autocratic society, societal groups are able to get what they
want. FDI openness, thus, serves as an essential tool to satisfy the material
needs of the members of the autocratic support coalition.
Chapter 4 turns to the individual level and investigates how exposure to
FDI affects citizen support for autocratic rule. Mass attitudes generally impact
autocratic survival. Yet, we do not know much about how FDI alters citizen
support for autocratic rule. I argue that low-skilled individuals face downward
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pressure on their economic well-being the more they are exposed to foreign in-
vestment. Hence, they experience higher economic risks that make them more
likely to oppose autocratic rule and support democratization. Essentially, they
have a lot to gain from democratization, since this form of institutional change
could open the door for redistribution. In contrast, highly skilled individuals’
wage levels and job security increase when they work for multinational com-
panies. This leads the beneficiaries of FDI to support authoritarian rule. They
should value current economic gains more than prospective gains from demo-
cratic participation, especially because such gains are highly uncertain.
I present two empirical studies that corroborate these hypotheses. The
first study utilizes survey data from 16 autocratic regimes in 2007, the sec-
ond complements this analysis with longitudinal survey data from the Rus-
sian Federation between 2004 and 2013. I focus on a multitude of depen-
dent variables. To show the direct economic consequences of FDI on the
individual-level, I take survey items into account that capture individual eco-
nomic grievances. To show that these grievances materialize in political de-
mands, I concentrate on questions that capture evaluations of autocratic per-
formance, perceived regime legitimacy, and preferences for democratization.
I find that FDI heightens economic grievances for poorly skilled citizens, but
amplifies economic security among well-educated members of the autocratic
society. Even more, I show that these material consequences translate into
political preferences. While highly aggrieved individuals call for democrati-
zation, the beneficiaries of FDI develop beliefs in the legitimacy of autocratic
rule. The findings call into question the notion that economic globalization
increases demand for democracy on the part of the population as a whole.
Rather, the middle class supports the continuance of autocratic rule.
Chapter 5 explores political reactions to economic grievances induced
by FDI. It pays specific attention to the question, in what way FDI affects
the political process in autocracies via popular protest. This chapter relies
on joint work with Tabea Palmtag and Stefanie Walter (Palmtag, Rommel,
and Walter, 2018). We argue that exposure to globalization generates eco-
nomic grievances that translate into protest only where poorly educated losers
of FDI predominate. In contrast, FDI reduces the number of protests where
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most workers benefit. Thus, the sub-national context is crucial to understand
protest participation. These protests are confined to grassroots economic is-
sues, however, and do not transcend into large-scale opposition protests. For
one, losers concentrate primarily in remote areas where protesting against the
regime loses its appeal. In addition, the costs of engaging in protests aimed at
overthrowing the incumbent regime are extraordinarily high.
We examine this argument focusing on Russia, an autocratic emerging
market economy with large regional variation in globalization exposure and
protest. Using negative binomial regression models on data from 2007 to
2012, we find that regional education levels condition the effect of FDI on
protest. FDI improves welfare in regions with a well-educated workforce,
but deteriorates economic conditions in regions with lower education lev-
els. Moreover, poorly educated individuals express economic grievances when
they live in regions exposed to FDI, whereas exposure reduces grievances
among well educated individuals. While FDI generally affects economic pro-
test, it does not induce mass mobilization that threatens the incumbent regime.
Finally, Chapter 6 looks at the overall effect of FDI on autocratic sur-
vival. The previous findings indicate that the middle class benefits from for-
eign direct investment and thus supports autocratic rule on material grounds
(see Chapter 4). While autocratic elites may not benefit from foreign invest-
ment across the board, they can effectively push the autocratic leader to fine-
tune economic openness to their advantage (see Chapter 3). Although the
poor are mostly adversely affected, they are not able to pose a credible threat
on the regime (see Chapter 5). Thus, I expect that FDI increases the proba-
bility of regime survival. Beyond that, societal groups play a crucial role and
condition the effect of FDI. The more an autocratic regime relies on either the
regime elite or the middle class, the more does FDI liberalization embody the
respective group’s demands. The autocracy-preserving impact of FDI is thus
even stronger the more powerful either societal group is.
To test these hypotheses, I employ Cox survival models on a sample
of 182 autocratic regimes. My results suggest that foreign direct investment
increases the duration of autocratic rule. Because access of the middle class
and the regime elite to political decision-making varies, the impact of foreign
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direct investment is further conditional on the power of societal groups in
autocracies. The more powerful the regime elite, the lower is the probability
of regime failure. FDI reinforces this effect. Interestingly, while strong middle
classes are generally conducive to democratic change in closed autocracies,
FDI reverses this effect. The more an autocracy is exposed to FDI, the more
autocracy-preserving is the effect of middle class power.
In summary, this dissertation argues that FDI helps autocratic regimes
survive. This hypothesis is at odds with prominent foreign policy objectives
that advocate that globalization and democracy go hand in hand. At the
same time, this argument both deviates and complements existing research
on the connection between economic globalization and democratization. I
provide evidence for the overall effect as well as the several steps of the causal
mechanism. Due to this encompassing empirical approach, my dissertation
contributes to our understanding of autocratic politics in times of economic
globalization in a number of ways:
To begin with, I provide an in-depth analysis on the impact of FDI on
autocratic survival. I specifically focus on authoritarian regimes, instead of the
literature’s previous focus on democratization. We learn that FDI increases the
survival prospects of autocracies. This insight contrasts with modernization-
type and redistributivist arguments that posit that proceeding economic glob-
alization results in democratization, but complements dependency and re-
source curse theories that mainly focus on the regime elite in explaining the
autocracy-stabilizing effect of international openness.
Relatedly, I propose a new theoretical mechanism that connects FDI and
autocratic regime survival. Societal groups are the primary link to understand
autocratic power maintenance, because FDI directly affects the material and
political preferences of these groups of actors. We learn that societal groups
are important to understand autocratic politics. The institutional turn in the
study of autocracies did go along with a focus on how authoritarian institu-
tions affect the interplay between the dictator and the elite (Pepinsky, 2014).
Implicit in these models is that elites always possess great political power
(Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). I argue and show that this need not be the
case, but that in a non-neglectable number of autocracies, the middle class
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forms a decisive group of actors.
Building on ground-breaking work on the impact of economic global-
ization on individual risk and attitudes (Walter, 2010, 2017), I extend the em-
pirical scope of theories of international competition, most notably new new
trade theory, to autocratic countries (see also, Palmtag, Rommel, and Walter,
2018). We learn that the distributional consequences of FDI not only affect
material well-being and interests of citizens in autocracies, but transcend into
concrete political demands and action. These results reinforce the notion that
economic globalization plays a crucial role in autocratic countries’ economic
and political development. It does so, however, in more nuanced ways than
previous approaches have assumed.
Lastly, this is the first study that comprehensively analyzes the impact of
FDI on domestic politics in autocracies on multiple levels of analysis to trace
the potency of the theoretical mechanism. To test various steps of the theoret-
ical mechanism, I use data on the on the individual level, the regional level,
and the country level. We learn that FDI shapes autocratic politics on all di-
mensions. On the individual level, it affects citizen support for autocratic rule.
On the regional level, it determines political protest and social unrest. And on
the country level, FDI contributes to autocratic power maintenance. Overall,
this dissertation underscores the importance of foreign direct investment for
autocratic regimes. Integration into the global economy has not only become
a crucial part of autocracies’ economic prosperity, but has decisive and lasting
political ramifications.
Chapter 2
Theoretical Argument
In this chapter, I provide the theoretical foundation for the main hypothesis
of this dissertation. I argue that FDI increases the likelihood of survival of
autocratic regimes. Apart from that, the causal mechanism of the argument
suggests several other observable implications, which I will spell out more
clearly in the empirical chapters. As outlined in the introduction, we lack a
coherent framework that is able to connect any form of economic globalization
with political developments in autocratic regimes on multiple levels. I posit
that societal groups are the primary link between FDI and autocratic power
maintenance. Attracting FDI produces sizable and lasting distributional ef-
fects. Some societal groups benefit in material terms increasing their support
for autocratic rule, others face serious pressure on their economic well-being.
Even though the legitimacy of autocratic rule does not increase for all mem-
bers of the regime, autocratic leaders are able to tailor and fine-tune economic
openness in a way that reinforces support on the part of those groups that are
essential for holding on to power.
The argument is organized as follows: In a first step, I present a society-
centered model of autocratic politics that explains why some groups of ac-
tors – the regime elite and the middle class – possess relatively more, but
varying political power to shape autocratic politics than the majority of the
autocratic society – the masses. Next, I combine economic models on multina-
tional production and newest advances in trade theory to arrive at theoretical
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predictions regarding the distributional impact of FDI. These distributional
consequences do not only manifest in material well-being and economic inter-
ests, but translate into political preferences. Lastly, I combine the two lines of
reasoning and contend that the political power of societal groups conditions
their ability to voice FDI-induced political preferences in autocratic regimes.
The combination of the societal structure of autocratic regimes and the dis-
tributional consequences of FDI allows me to explain political developments
in autocracies on several dimensions: why autocracies liberalize FDI (effect
on policy), in what way FDI shapes political preferences and the expression
of demands in popular protests (effect on politics), and how FDI ultimately
affects autocratic regime stability (effect on polity).
2.1 A Society-Centered View on Autocratic Politics
Autocracies possess enormous power over their people. Autocratic rulers fre-
quently deprive citizens of material gains, threaten individual livelihoods, or
repress society with brute force (Arendt, 1951; Wintrobe, 1998; Robertson,
2010), but also distribute economic perks and political concessions (Bueno
de Mesquita et al., 2003; Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007; Gandhi, 2008). In
other words, autocratic regimes regulate everyday life with both small-scale
and wide-ranging decisions that are binding for the population. Challenging
autocracy – or at least the allocative impact of authoritarian decisions – needs
more effort than merely voting for another party (and hoping to become the
median voter). As orderly mechanisms for power transition usually do not
exist, political violence is an ever-present option (Svolik, 2012). I argue that
specific groups of actors nonetheless have critical leeway to shape autocratic
politics. Dictatorial rule is hardly unopposed, but is significantly contested
and influenced by societal groups.
2.1.1 Legitimacy and the Need for Support Coalitions
Why are societal groups able to influence political developments in autocra-
cies? To approach this question, I start from the assumption that political
leaders do not rule in vacuum. Their rule is contingent on continuous support
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by essential members of society over which they rule (Wintrobe, 1998; Bueno
de Mesquita et al., 2003). Ruling entails the de jure power to fulfill the most
basic function of the state: exercise the monopoly on the use of force (We-
ber, 1919). Doing so, gives political leaders the ability to make decisions that
apply to and affect society as a whole. Holding on to political power means
being able to use force continuously (Olson, 1993). In that sense, politics is
both conflict over the ability to make use of power as well as consensus on
who actually is in power (Lipset, 1960).
The center of power, i.e. the state’s entity that de facto makes bind-
ing decisions, is the political regime. In its most basic conception, a political
regime is defined as “the rules that identify the group from which leaders can
come and determine who influences leadership choice and policy” (Geddes,
Wright, and Frantz, 2014, 314). The type of political regime thus regulates
who can potentially be in charge of exercising the monopoly on the use of
force. Although a political regime is entitled to use force, it is dependent on
society’s belief in its de facto legitimacy to do so. Legitimacy, defined as the
general level of acceptance of the regime (Lipset, 1960), is thus an important
condition for regime survival.1 In democracies, legitimacy arises from the in-
stitutional design. Guaranteed rights to participate in free and fair elections
that allow political contestation ensure that every member of society can po-
tentially come to power and constrain the use of power on the part of the
leader (Schumpeter, 1950; Dahl, 1971; Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán, 2014).
The picture looks vastly different in autocracies. There are severe re-
strictions on who can in principle be a member of the regime’s support coali-
tion. Voting is either completely prohibited or essentially meaningless. Cit-
izens thus do not possess quasi-automatic membership in support coalitions
and do not represent a constant constraint on state action. Yet, autocratic rule
is equally dependent on legitimacy (Lipset, 1960). In order to stay in power,
autocratic regimes need the support of a critical mass of the autocratic soci-
ety. In line with the concept of the winning coalition, developed by Bueno de
Mesquita et al. (2003, 8), I define the support coalition as the “set of people
1 Wintrobe (1998) and Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) make a similar argument, but usually
refer to the concept of loyalty instead of legitimacy in this context.
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who control enough instruments of power to keep the leader in office.” If
an autocracy’s legitimacy among a sufficient number of the members of the
support coalition declines, the chance for regime breakdown increases. A po-
tential challenging regime might offer better conditions and attract enough
followers to actually initiate regime change.
The autocratic regime’s desire for holding on to power exhibits a flip-
side that generates influence of societal groups in autocratic decision-making.
Although “the dictator may have a formal monopoly with regard to political
power, the policies pursued on all matters is conditioned by constraints which
arise both from the behavior of other actors [...] and from the extent of sup-
port or opposition from the dictator’s subjects” (Wintrobe, 1998, 4). Dictators
simply cannot rule against all members of society. Hence, societal groups’
power to influence authoritarian decision-making arises from their member-
ship in autocratic support coalitions. The precondition for potential member-
ship in the support coalition is the group’s ability to pose a credible threat to
the power of the regime. Hence, only some parts of the population can pos-
sibly enter an authoritarian support coalition. As a consequence, the looming
fear to lose legitimacy makes dictators susceptible to the material needs and
political demands of some actors, but not others.
Although confronting autocracy is a high-risk strategy, actual challenges
to the power of the autocratic regime do exist and have several domestic
sources (Wintrobe, 1998; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Haggard and Kauf-
man, 2016).2 Coups and uprisings feature most prominently in this regard.
Coups are small-scale and targeted actions against a sitting dictator, usu-
ally initiated by competing forces within the regime elite (Powell and Thyne,
2011). Uprisings include larger parts of the population and need mass mobi-
lization and strategic interaction among well-organized actors (Haggard and
Kaufman, 2016). Both types of action on behalf of societal groups are, albeit
to a different degree, feasible options to challenge the regime. And the occur-
rence of either one constitutes a failure on the part of the regime to properly
2 Additionally, autocratic rule can also be challenged by international sources. Direct interna-
tional sources for example include foreign military engagement (Berger et al., 2013). Indi-
rect international sources include, inter alia, economic sanctions (Escribà-Folch and Wright,
2010) and foreign aid provision (Faye and Niehaus, 2012)
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deal with the problems of authoritarian control, which concerns the conflict
between the authoritarian leader and the population that is excluded from
power, and authoritarian power-sharing, which centers around the interplay
between a dictator and his or her regime elite (Svolik, 2012).
The focus on societal groups in autocracies is not new. Scholarly work
in the social forces tradition has long been stressing the role of classes as de-
cisive and powerful actors in autocratic politics (Clarke, 2017). For instance,
Lipset (1959) puts the growing size of the middle class at the center of at-
tention to explain the repudiation of autocratic rule. Moore (1966) argues
that the bourgeoisie occupies a privileged position to initiate regime change.
Rueschemeyer, Huber Stephens, and Stephens (1992) see high prospects for
democratization when the working class is sizable. Bueno de Mesquita et al.
(2003) generalize these thoughts into a common framework. Although they
are somewhat agnostic about the specific idea of class composition, they ex-
plain decision-making in autocracies by means of the size of the winning coali-
tion. Their argument rests on the notion that larger winning coalitions not
only include the regime elite, which they assume to be a powerful actor in any
case, but also larger parts of the middle class. As a consequence, autocratic
leaders make policy decisions that are less concentrated on and less targeted
to the regime elite if the winning coalition is large.
Although my argument is similar, it extends this notion on two impor-
tant dimensions: On the one hand, I argue that the size of the societal group
does not matter in itself to gain influence in autocratic politics. The sheer size
of a group does not determine the effectiveness to transport political demands
into politics. Group size may even be negatively related to the probability to
overcome problems of collective action (Olson, 1965). Political power origi-
nates from associational resources, instead. Because attempts to overthrow an
autocratic regime require decisive and concerted action and involve high costs,
groups of actors need to be cohesive and collectively strong enough to pose a
credible threat to the power of the regime and initiate actions to overthrow
the incumbent regime. The ability of societal groups to threaten autocratic
regimes thus hinges on the associational capacity, which involves the pooling
of resources, facilitates that information cascades among members of the re-
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spective group, and provides an insurance mechanism against one-sided and
indiscriminate oppressive action (Haggard and Kaufman, 2016). Only associ-
ational resources help groups to overcome initial collective action problems as
well as to sustain a constant threat over a long timespan.
On the other hand, I do not assume that the regime elite always pos-
sesses the highest relative political power in autocracies, which contrasts with
the argument of Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003). In fact, autocracies do
break down due to popular uprisings, which suggests that some parts of the
population are able to threaten autocratic rule, provided this group possesses
associational resources. While I do not doubt that autocratic regimes need
support from the regime elite, I explicitly allow for the possibility that leaders
consciously seek support from other segments of society as well.
2.1.2 Autocratic Diversity and Political Power of Societal Groups
The argument so far delivers two crucial insights. First, in order to survive
autocratic regimes have to accumulate legitimacy among their subjects. For
this purpose, autocratic rulers build a support coalition. Inclusion into the
support coalition makes sure that societal groups have a higher probability
to get what they want, which increases the performance legitimacy. Second,
associational resources determine whether societal groups are able to pose a
credible threat to the power of the autocratic regime and are thus able to enter
the support coalition. As support goes along with less decision-making auton-
omy, there are trade-offs involved. Furthermore, regimes are limited in the
way they can manage societal groups, for instance by budgetary constraints
(Wintrobe, 1998). Autocratic regimes, thus, do not seek support from all so-
cietal groups at once, but strategically build their support coalition in order to
secure power. The bigger the threat to power of the regime elite, the higher
the likelihood that elites have a crucial say in the support coalition and influ-
ence decision-making. Yet, some regimes might consider exchanging support
from the elite for support from other societal groups, provided that the latter
present a bigger danger to the regime.
This implies that autocratic regimes come in very different forms and
shapes. Diversity arises from differences in the extent to which autocratic
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regimes incorporate societal groups. I argue that autocratic regimes manage
the composition of the support coalition by regulating the associational re-
sources they allocate to societal groups. Several instruments affect the avail-
ability of associational resources and are able to reduce societal groups’ ability
to pose a credible threat to some extent. I assume that dictators behave ratio-
nally in the sense that they choose a stable support coalition that they believe
exhibits the highest probability to stay in power (Bueno de Mesquita et al.,
2003; Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, 2014). This characterization has two im-
portant qualifications: First, assuming rationality is not equal to assuming per-
fect information. Dictators make miscalculations due to information deficits
(Wintrobe, 1998). After all, deceit on the part of the regime elite or misrep-
resentation of support on the part of the population might be effective ways
to get what these groups want (Svolik, 2012). Second, the assumption of ra-
tional behavior does not rule out that dictators might have other goals, for
example personal gains. However, I contend that such goals are subordinate,
because the realization of other goals is tied to occupying the dictatorial office.
In the following, I distinguish between the three most important groups
in autocracies (Ansell and Samuels, 2014): the regime elite, the middle class,
and the disenfranchised masses. Although this categorization comprises of
very large groups, these are actors that feature prominently in the literature on
autocratic politics and democratization (e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006;
Boix, 2003; Haggard and Kaufman, 2016; Lipset, 1959; Rueschemeyer, Huber
Stephens, and Stephens, 1992). Moreover, attempts to challenge the regime
via coups and uprisings can be particularly attributed to the regime elite and
the middle class. Although the masses are a large group in terms of size,
they mostly lack associational resources (Olson, 1965; Haggard and Kaufman,
2016; Pearlman, 2016). Without interference on the part of the autocratic
regime, regime elites and the middle class threaten autocratic rule more. This
implies that only regime elites and the members of the middle class have the
potential to become part of the support coalition.
Autocratic regimes differ with regard to the support they seek from ei-
ther one of these groups. To manage the support coalition, autocratic regimes
are able to make use of several tools that affect the amount of associational
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resources of societal groups. These instruments can be grouped into two cat-
egories: repression and organizational capacity.
The strategy most commonly referred to when it comes to autocracies
is repression. Repression instills fear and diminishes the incentives to engage
in collective action (Davenport, 1995; Carey, 2006). Nevertheless, large-scale
repression may backfire. For instance, repression works well for a targeted set
of the population. Yet, once repression levels get too high, uncertainty about
the targets of repressive action increases to a point where even the represser
might fear to become the repressed (Wintrobe, 1998). This means that relying
exclusively on large-scale and wide-spread repression is probably an inferior
strategy to manage the composition of the support coalition.
Apart from repression, there are tools to manage organizational ca-
pacities, with which regimes regulate the associational resources of societal
groups. Such instruments directly affect the ways a societal group can lever-
age its power resources. Organizational capacities amplify the chances that
demands transcend into politics by amplifying turnout, facilitating horizontal
coordination, and forming collective identities (Haggard and Kaufman, 2016).
Yet, by granting organizational capacities, the autocratic regime strips itself of
a good deal of autonomy, because it amplifies self-imposed political constraints
to decision-making. As both strategies – repression and organizational capaci-
ties – have diminishing marginal returns, it is impossible to neglect the regime
elite as well as the middle class entirely. It is thus likely that both groups have
influence in autocratic decision-making to some extent. In the following, I
detail for each societal group, which baseline power the respective group pos-
sesses as well as which specific instruments the autocratic regime has at its
disposal to manage the political power of the respective group.
The Regime Elite Who belongs to the regime elite? Although autocratic
regime leaders formally occupy the highest office in autocracies, they do not
govern alone. Dictators are surrounded by an inner circle of people that help
govern the country. Inter alia, this in-group comprises of party officials, mili-
tary officers, state bureaucrats, or revolution comrades. Or in other words, a
set of political actors who make authoritarian rule possible in the first place
and, consequently, facilitate the desire of dictators to stay in office (Svolik,
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2012). Apart from colluding with political elites, dictators build coalitions
with other high-ranking segments of society. Economic elites are important be-
cause of their wealth and their control over the means of production. Whereas
some dictators focus more on land-owning elites (Albertus, 2015), others
build on the support of industrialists and owners of other large businesses
(Wood, 2001). Even though economic elites may not belong to the innermost
governing circle, they nevertheless contribute to the regime by means of fi-
nancing. Taken together, members of the regime elite are thus actors that,
from the start, occupy a privileged position in the autocratic society.
Dictators frequently include politically and economically important fig-
ures in their support coalitions. Elites become insiders to the regime, which
entails privileged access and agenda-setting power (Brownlee, 2007). Yet, the
important precondition is that the members of the regime elite get institution-
alized access to the dictator. For instance, authoritarian parties are built to
incorporate and coopt regime insiders (Magaloni, 2006; Gehlbach and Keefer,
2011). They serve the purpose of channeling common interests, which adds
authority to the elite’s claims. At the same time, aggregating interests is an
insurance device against indiscriminate repression. If elites’ had to bring their
claims forward individually, it would be easier for the regime to single out
individual offenders. Establishing regime parties thus binds regime elites into
the support coalition, yet simultaneously gives them political power. Because
they can transport their demands better, the chances of getting their preferred
policies increases. Dominant parties, and therefore a highly capable and insti-
tutionalized regime elite, push the dictator towards focusing on narrow inter-
ests that specifically cater towards their material needs.
Nevertheless, dependency on elites’ support involves trade-offs on the
part of the autocratic leadership. The more influence dictators allow, the
higher are their constraints in terms of decision-making. On the flip-side,
refusing elites the opportunity to exert influence may result in elite defection,
which leads to the destabilization of the regime. Limiting elite power goes
along with depriving institutionalized access by weakening the power of the
regime party. Given this trade-off, dictators consciously decide the level of
influence of the regime elite. Essentially, they calculate how much influence
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elites need to continuously support the incumbent regime, conditional on the
dictator’s willingness to resort to support from other parts of society. As a
consequence, political power of the regime elite should vary widely between
autocratic regimes.
Taken together, regime elites come from a strata of the autocratic so-
ciety that already occupies a privileged position in the sense that they have
enough financial and political assets at their disposal to pose a credible threat
to the power of the leader. Nevertheless, autocratic regimes can still regulate
the amount of access and political power of the regime elite by granting or
denying associational resources. The most important instrument in this re-
gard are regime parties. This argument does not imply that regime elites have
their political power handed on a silver platter. After all, regime parties are
absent in a considerable number of autocratic regimes. I contend that this is
due to the fact that the elite is not the only decisive societal group in autocratic
regimes. In order to implement the most effective power maintenance strat-
egy, autocratic regimes might also empower the middle class at the expense of
the regime elite.
The Middle Class Who belongs to the middle class? Previous accounts con-
ceive of members of the middle class as the bourgeoisie (Moore, 1966), the
working class (Rueschemeyer, Huber Stephens, and Stephens, 1992), urban
citizens (Huntington, 1991), well-educated citizens (Welzel, 2013), or people
with above-average income (Bellin, 2010). Although these definitions dis-
agree substantially, they have the notion in common that the members of the
middle class similarly occupy a somewhat privileged position in society. Eco-
nomically, the middle class belongs to the upper strata of the population and
usually has a rather steady income, which is higher than the income of the
median society member (Ansell and Samuels, 2014). Members of the middle
class are above the level of subsistence and can – in a Weberian sense – afford
a higher level of consumption. Small business owners (Greenwood, 2008) and
workers living in urban areas (Bellin, 2002) are the most important parts of
this group of actors. Although they do not possess direct access to the auto-
cratic leadership, the members of the middle class are essential in the sense
that they contribute to the economic development of autocracies by applying
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their productive assets and skills.
Beyond economic resources, the middle class owns political assets with
regard to overcoming problems of collective action. Broadly speaking, mem-
bers of the middle class can afford political action (Lipset, 1959), because
they do not live from hand to mouth. The middle class has relatively low costs
to organize political action, since its members do not live in geographically
remote areas. Finally, their social environment is usually large enough to al-
low for political discourse and deliberation. Because members of the middle
class do not directly occupy the inner circle of autocratic regimes, they are
oftentimes assumed to have little political influence. This assumption disre-
gards the fact that these citizens have specific demands. Neglecting specific
demands disproportionately increases the risk of popular uprisings. As such,
the members of the middle class have the necessary economic, political, and
cognitive resources to initiate actions to overthrow an autocratic regime.
The chance of leveraging these resources hinges on associational re-
sources, however, which can be influenced and managed by the autocratic
regime. The two most important instruments are organizational capacities
and repression. In order to pose a credible threat, members of the middle
class need organizational capacities to overcome collective action problems
and organize (Rosenfeld, 2017). “The many acquire power primarily through
organization” (Rueschemeyer, Huber Stephens, and Stephens, 1992, 66). Or-
ganizational capacities arise mainly from the ability to form and organize in
civil society organizations (Bernhard et al., 2017). Civil society organization
help to build a united front, especially in terms of transporting political de-
mands, and facilitate deliberation. Granting organizational resources thus
increases the middle class’ ability to participate in autocratic politics.
Nevertheless, a dictator can choose to hold middle class influence at
a minimum. Curbing civil society organizations strips the middle class of its
essential political resources. Furthermore, repression oftentimes serves as an
instrument to curtail influence. Because the middle class is nevertheless a
rather numerous group, compared to the regime elite, repression takes on
more subtle means. For instance, economic repression through employment
in state-owned enterprises or denying the right to own property weakens the
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economic resources members of the middle class can bring to the table (Ansell
and Samuels, 2014). Yet, suppressing political opposition entails diminish-
ing marginal returns, while disproportionately undermining legitimacy (Win-
trobe, 1998). The middle class is thus never completely out of power.
In summary, the middle class consists of members of the autocratic so-
ciety that, in principal, have the necessary resources to influence autocratic
politics. Yet, the middle class does not occupy the inner circle of autocratic
rule. Without any interference from the autocratic regime, it is thus likely that
the influence of the middle class is comparatively weaker than the influence
of the regime elite. Nonetheless, an autocratic regime possesses instruments
to deliberately strengthen or weaken middle class influence, depending on the
relative threat they pose to autocratic rule in comparison to the regime elite.
The Disenfranchised Masses Although the masses are the largest group
in autocracies, their influence is most limited. The disenfranchised masses
predominantly include rural peasants, tenant farmers, and unskilled workers
(Ansell and Samuels, 2014). Although some economic sectors may be depen-
dent on their (wo)manpower, the members of this societal group are easily
replaceable, as they typically possess non-specific production factors. Addi-
tionally, they lack the necessary associational resources to organize and pose
a credible threat to the power of the autocratic regime (Olson, 1965). They
stay behind with regard to economic resources and income. They live from
hand to mouth, which means that their primary concern is to secure living.
Apart from this, the masses lack political resources as well (Collier,
1999). Although they may be highly aggrieved, they are geographically dis-
persed, which complicates the formation of common interests that can be
voiced. Some scholars even doubt that the disenfranchised masses are able
to formulate consistent demands, for example regarding redistribution (Ansell
and Samuels, 2014; Slater, 2010). And even if they have the ability to protest,
the masses do so mostly on economic grounds to better their dire situation,
which usually does not cascade into large-scale political uprisings. Whereas
the masses have a critical say in democracies, because they have the right to
vote, I argue that their role is negligible for autocratic power maintenance.
As such, the disenfranchised members of the autocratic society do not be-
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come members of the support coalition and do not gain influence in autocratic
decision-making.
In summary, dictatorial rule is backed up by a support coalition that
lends legitimacy to the autocratic regime. Dictators choose the level of support
from both the regime elite and the middle class. These groups are important,
because they can pose a credible threat to the power of the dictator. In turn,
this makes the dictator susceptible to their demands, thereby increasing the
decision-making power of the respective group.
2.2 Distributional Consequences of Foreign Direct
Investment
Up to this point, we know that the middle class and the regime elite are
the decisive societal actors, whose preferences and demands the autocratic
regime has to take into account in order to survive. In the following part, I
argue that FDI influences the economic situation of both groups. Countries
are able to realize aggregate welfare gains by opening up to international in-
vestment (De Mello, 1997; Borensztein, De Gregorio, and Lee, 1998; Hansen
and Rand, 2006). But an aggregate perspective does not take stock of the dis-
tributional effects of FDI. FDI not only shapes economic development in the
aggregate, but affects individuals differently. While scholars generally agree
that economic openness creates both risks and opportunities within the econ-
omy (Feenstra and Hanson, 1997; Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple, 2004; Walter,
2010, 2017), the distinct form of the distributional effects on wages and em-
ployment are contested.
A large research program has engaged in identifying these distributive
effects of economic globalization on individuals (for an overview, see Kuo and
Naoi, 2015). Economic models that pinpoint winners and losers of interna-
tional openness have largely focused either on differences in the relative pro-
ductivity between sectors or industries – i.e., sectoral trade models (Frieden
and Rogowski, 1996; Ricardo, 1817) – or on differences in the relative endow-
ment with different production factors – i.e., factoral trade models (Heckscher,
Flam, and Ohlin, 1991; Stolper and Samuelson, 1941). Following the latter,
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either capital or labor receives increasing returns in an open economy, de-
pending on its comparative advantage. Since most autocracies are developing
countries, labor is the abundant production factor in these economies. Be-
cause the comparative advantage of autocracies is in labor-intensive goods,
this production factor receives higher earnings. Hence, international economic
openness creates increasing income for production workers and decreases in-
come inequality (Ahlquist and Wibbels, 2012; Li and Reuveny, 2003).3
Yet, in empirical terms, the inequality-decreasing effect does not materi-
alize; if anything, inequality rises (Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2007). Furthermore,
both trade models do not incorporate intra-industry trade, which has become
even more prominent in recent years (Helpman, 2014). Because these mod-
els fail to explain empirical regularities that paint a more complex picture of
globalization’s effects, a new generation of models – the so-called ‘new new
trade theory’ – has emerged that is better able to explain the heterogeneous
effects of globalization (Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple, 2004; Melitz, 2003).
These models suggest that international openness increases inequality among
individuals exposed to international competition, whereas there is much less
divergence among those working in parts of the economy that are sheltered
from international competition (Helpman, Itshoki, and Redding, 2010; Palm-
tag, Rommel, and Walter, 2018; Walter, 2010, 2017).
These models are mostly tailored towards the distributional effects of
international trade, however. FDI exhibits even stronger effects, as it affects
national economies in two ways (Helpman, 2014): First, it directly and im-
mediately reallocates economic resources between domestic firms and foreign
multinationals (effect on competition) as well as between domestic firms (ef-
fect on the supply chain). Second and partly a consequence of this, foreign
investment raises the share of firms in the tradables sector that are competi-
tive in world markets. Hence, in addition to its resource-reallocating impact
on local business, foreign investment also affects large parts of the citizens. In
the following, I combine the insights from trade theory and research on the
impact of multinational corporations on intra-industry reallocations to arrive
at theoretical predictions on who wins and who loses from FDI.
3 This line of reasoning is central in Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) and Boix (2003).
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2.2.1 FDI and Domestic Business
Multinational corporations enter foreign markets to increase their return on
capital and, as a consequence, their profits. In order to do so, they make
use of location advantages in host countries that either increase their overall
market share or give them access to specific resources (Dunning, 1993, 2001;
Jensen, 2006). Business in autocracies is oftentimes not competitive in world
markets; and low competitiveness leads to a major reallocation of domes-
tic market shares if highly productive foreign companies enter the domestic
economy. Hence, domestic firms that have to compete directly with foreign
firms face stark adverse effects on their revenues and, in turn, may need to lay
off workers (Pandya, 2014a; Aitken and Harrison, 1999).
On the other hand, domestic firms benefit from foreign direct invest-
ment in three ways: First, they may enter the supply chain of multinational
corporations. If the overall supply of capital increases due to FDI, so does de-
mand for production inputs. This widens the market share of domestic firms’
products resulting in higher profits (Pepinsky, 2009). Second, because foreign
investors provide capital that is oftentimes scarce in autocracies, they form the
basis for new firms to emerge by creating alternative funding opportunities for
businesses. Third, foreign investors incentivize (Haskel, Pereira, and Slaugh-
ter, 2007; Javorcik, 2004) or force (Godart and Görg, 2013) technology and
knowledge spillovers. Those spillovers in turn increase the productivity of do-
mestic firms, especially if they are able to act as suppliers to foreign companies
(Görg and Seric, 2013; Moran, 2014).
Table 2.1 summarizes the direct effects of FDI. There are both winners
and losers. Domestic firms that compete directly with foreign investors are
on average worse off than other firms. Yet, this effect is weakened if domestic
firms are able to enter the supply chain of multinational corporations, notwith-
standing elevated competition. Firms benefit most from foreign investment if
they do not face direct competition and simultaneously act as suppliers. In this
situation, revenues increase most. Yet, even those firms that cannot increase
their market share benefit from the presence of multinational corporations
due to technological spillovers that amplify their overall productivity level.
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Table 2.1: Distributional Consequences of FDI for Domestic Business
Supply Chain
No Yes
Competition
High – – –
Low + ++
+ = higher revenues; – = lower revenues.
2.2.2 FDI and Domestic Workers
As a consequence, foreign direct investment also affects a large share of the
working-age population. Given the fact that only a fraction of firms in each
industry actually engages in export, new-new trade theory specifically focuses
on firm-level heterogeneity in productivity to assess the effects of economic
openness. Melitz (2003) argues that trade openness partitions domestic firms
into three types: First, the most productive firms export. Due to their high
productivity, they are able to compete with other firms for market shares in
foreign economies. Both foreign multinationals and domestic firms that act
as suppliers belong into this category. Second, although firms with a median
productivity level are not able to compete internationally, they still have the
capacity to serve the domestic market. Yet, because the size of the domestic
market is fixed, they cannot reap the benefits of exporting. Third, competition
for firms with a nonproductive labor force is highest forcing them to shut
down their business. Such firm-level sorting happens both in case of large-
scale trade liberalization and in case of gradual trade expansion.
Helpman, Itshoki, and Redding (2010) apply the logic of the Melitz
(2003) model to come up with individual-level predictions about the impact
of trade. They assume that the initial productivity level of firms is the sum of
the individual productivity levels of the workforce. Given that firms partition
under trade, they have incentives to strengthen their market position. They
do so by means of screening to improve the composition of their workforce ac-
cording to their needs. Because individual productivity is not directly observ-
able, screening to overcome search frictions is a costly process that enhances
the bargaining position of workers. Consequently, firms in the tradables sector
not only seek highly productive workers, but also pay higher wages resulting
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in intra-industry wage inequality (see also, Walter, 2010).
In summary, multinational corporations systematically demand workers
with higher productivity levels compared to domestic firms that face direct
competition or do not have the opportunity to act as suppliers. They do so be-
cause they rely on the production of goods that require a skill-intensive labor
force. This results in even higher wages for high-skilled individuals work-
ing in exposed sectors (Feenstra and Hanson, 1997). Additionally, even local
firms producing in sectors exposed to foreign investment increase the wages
of their workers in order to either compete with foreign companies (Lipsey,
2004) or to be able to serve as their suppliers (Görg and Seric, 2013). New
new trade theory thus suggests that well-educated individuals who are ex-
posed to the global economy benefit most from globalization (Baccini, Pinto,
and Weymouth, 2017; Walter, 2017). These individuals are more likely to
work in the most productive firms that benefit from global exchange. As the
international competitiveness of these firms depends on the high-quality work
provided by their well-educated workforce, economic openness increases the
demand for such workers by exporting and multinational firms. This bolsters
these workers’ bargaining power, which results in higher wages and lower em-
ployment risks (Bernard et al., 2007; Osgood, 2016; Wagner, 2007). FDI thus
benefits well-educated workers most, but in contrast to factoral models, this
only applies to well-educated workers exposed to globalization and not those
working in industries that are sheltered from global competition.
Conversely, poorly educated workers who face international competi-
tion lose out. Reallocation of resources in the domestic economy forces some
firms to only serve the domestic market or even to shut down their business
entirely. Because those workers have lower average productivity-levels they
face downward pressure on their wages and higher job insecurity relative to
workers in exposed sectors. They lack the skills to be employed by interna-
tionally competitive firms. In turn, they are more likely to work for firms
that cannot compete with the more productive, internationally active firms
or multinational corporations, and their jobs pay lower wages. Additionally,
their risk of unemployment is higher, as their employers are more likely to be
driven out of business, and their chances for reemployment are lower in an
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open economy, in which they are not able to meet the recruitment prerequi-
sites of thriving firms. Importantly, these labor market risks are much higher
than those of workers with equally low education levels working in industries
with low levels of FDI. Less educated workers exposed to international com-
petition are therefore the main losers of FDI and the group of individuals with
the largest grievances with respect to globalization.
These insights suggest that the effect of foreign investment on individ-
ual market income and perceived economic security is conditional on both
exposure to foreign investment and individual skill-levels, as is shown in Ta-
ble 2.2.4 On average, workers with high productivity levels earn higher wages
than nonproductive workers. Exposure to foreign investment further increases
the wedge between workers. Highly productive workers earn even higher
wages when working for multinational corporations. Contrarily, less produc-
tive workers in exposed firms face the highest probability of getting laid-off.5
Table 2.2: Distributional Consequences of FDI for Domestic Workers
FDI Exposure
Low High
Skill-Level
Low – – –
High + + +
+ = higher income; – = lower income.
Taken together, exposure to foreign direct investment induces both eco-
nomic risks and opportunities and, thus, shapes perceived feelings of eco-
nomic insecurity. High-skilled individuals should be less likely to show feelings
of job insecurity due to wage developments compared to low-skilled individu-
als. The gap between both should further increase, the more these individuals
are exposed to foreign direct investment.
4 This contrasts with the predictions of factoral Heckscher-Ohlin and Stolper-Samuelson mod-
els of trade, which suggest that the effect of trade is uniform for all individuals within a
certain skill-group or factor of production.
5 In line with these predictions, empirical evidence suggests that the distribution of economic
gains is indeed dependent on individual productivity levels. High-skilled individuals earn
higher wages and have more job opportunities regardless of the country’s level of economic
development (Pflüger et al., 2013; Rudra, 2005a). And contrary to factoral or sectoral trade
models, wage inequality in developing countries increases rather than decreases under trade
(Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2007; McCaig and Pavcnik, 2015).
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2.3 Societal Group Power and FDI Openness
In a next step, I argue that the combination of the societal structure of au-
tocratic rule and the FDI-related economic interests of societal groups jointly
determine the form and degree of FDI openness. Societal groups directly im-
pact autocratic decision-making. FDI openness comprises two distinct levels.
The first level concerns the domestic regulatory regime to liberalize or restrict
access of multinational corporations. The second level concerns the attractive-
ness of a country for international investors and thus relates to the willingness
of multinational corporations to supply FDI.
2.3.1 FDI Restrictions
I define FDI restrictiveness as the regulatory quality of policies that either
prevent multinational corporations (MNCs) from entering domestic markets
or weaken MNCs’ control over firm-specific assets (Pandya, 2014b). The range
of domestic political restrictions to foreign investment includes complete bans
on foreign investment, the prohibition of FDI in specific sectors or industries,
joint ownership rules, national content requirements, or informal screening
barriers. As such, the level of FDI restrictiveness is a proxy for the effort of
autocratic governments to fine-tune economic openness in a globalized world.
I contend that autocratic governments are able and willing to fine-tune
economic opening and, therefore, choose the level of restrictiveness strategi-
cally. The potential distributional effects of FDI suggest a sharp divide between
the preferences of the regime elite and the middle class. The regime elite owns
large parts of domestic business. As such, the members of this group do not
benefit from FDI across the board. While some business owners win if they
are able to supply multinational corporations with production inputs, indus-
trialists that face direct competition with foreign investors are likely to lose
revenues. The regime elite thus prefers a restrictive policy framework to reg-
ulate entry of FDI. They favor the partial abolishment of entry restriction for
specific sectors and a regulatory environment that weakens the autonomy of
multinational corporations in those sectors where they themselves own assets.
Nevertheless, elites do not want to ban international investors entirely.
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The middle class on the other hand mostly benefits from FDI. On av-
erage, middle class workers are better educated and possess skills that are
sought after by MNCs and, thus, earn higher wages than the comparatively
poorly educated masses. Exposure to foreign investment further increases
their market income. Highly productive workers earn even higher wages
when working for multinational corporations.6 Given that international in-
vestors provide additional jobs, a larger portion of the middle class is able to
work in productive firms, which not only increases wage levels, but reduces
job insecurity at the same time. The middle class thus supports large-scale
and far-reaching foreign direct investment liberalization and a loose regula-
tory regime.
I argue that these demands expand into politics. Societal groups not
only shape autocratic decision-making, but dictators enact policies that cater
towards the needs of their support coalition. Because the preferences of so-
cietal groups are constant across autocracies, the differences in the degree of
FDI restrictiveness can be traced back to differences in their relative political
power. Autocratic governments, in turn, are able and willing to fine-tune eco-
nomic opening and, therefore, choose the level of FDI restrictiveness strategi-
cally in accordance with the interests of the societal group that is most likely
to pose a credible threat on their power. The more powerful the middle class,
the fewer entry restrictions. Conversely, the more powerful the regime elite,
the more entry restrictions.
2.3.2 FDI Attractiveness
As opposed to the domestic regulatory regime, I define FDI attractiveness as
the acquisition of physical capital by a foreign individual or legal entity in the
domestic economy via acquisitions or joint ventures, i.e. FDI inflows (Jensen,
2006; UNCTAD, 2009). I exclude the acquisition of physical capital by domes-
tic legal entities in foreign countries, i.e. FDI outflows, since they most likely
capture exit restrictions instead of a country’s attractiveness for foreign direct
investment.
6 In line with this argument, Pandya (2010) finds that highly skilled individuals demand more
foreign investment than low-skilled individuals.
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Obviously, FDI restrictiveness and attractiveness are correlated. As a
matter of fact, entry restrictions should decrease FDI stocks (Pandya, 2014b).
However, assuming that every autocratic regime has a specific baseline de-
mand for foreign capital, because the level of private investment is usually
lower than in democracies (Stasavage, 2002), and dictatorial leaders have to
find alternative sources of investment,7 high restrictions are not a sufficient
condition for little foreign investment. Empirically, there is variation both in
terms of FDI restrictiveness and attractiveness across autocracies and time.
Some autocratic regimes have high restrictions, but at the same time high FDI
inflows, whereas others do not regulate foreign investment, but still are not
very attractive for multinational corporations.
Differences in the regulatory environment of foreign direct investment
thus only partly explain a country’s attractiveness for FDI. Importantly, the
decision to invest remains in the hands of multinational corporations. Be-
cause MNCs want to increase their return on investment, governments’ only
means to attract FDI is to incentivize via location advantages (Dunning, 1993).
Whereas such advantages oftentimes stem from abundance in specific produc-
tion factors that cannot be altered by political decisions – such as natural
resources – tax incentives and political guarantees relating to expropriation
are subject to politics (Li, 2006; Li and Resnick, 2003).
Because location advantages for MNCs are subject to politics, the power
of societal groups also affects FDI inflows. Governments reneging on invest-
ment deals due to time inconsistencies are the primary problem of interna-
tional investors (Büthe and Milner, 2008). Investors thus seek insurance for
their physical capital. Politically powerful societal groups, which favor foreign
direct investment, work as a credible commitment device of the dictator to sig-
nal policy stability to potential investors (Bastiaens, 2016; Chandra and Rudra,
2015). Reneging on investment deals on the part of the dictator violates the
demands of the middle class. A powerful middle class thus functions as a
brake pad on possible policies that negatively affect international investors.
The same argument holds in case of the regime elite. Although pow-
7 This assumption is correct in empirical terms, because almost all autocracies have liberalized
foreign investment regulations in the past decades. Even very closed regimes, such as Cuba,
liberalized foreign investment laws in recent years (Feinberg, 2013; BTI, 2014).
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erful elites prefer fine-tuning FDI openness, which decreases the number of
fully liberalized economic sectors, investment in those sectors that are in fact
liberalized complements domestic investment. Stable investment is advanta-
geous, as it increases revenues that can be used to buy off parts of the regime
elite. Consequently, investment in uncompetitive sectors is in the interest of
the regime elite. Even more than that, societal accord between the regime
elite and middle class should further facilitate a stable investment regime for
multinational investors. Hence, the political power of either societal group in-
creases actual FDI inflows. Yet, this effect is substantially weaker if the regime
elite is relatively more powerful than the middle class, because higher entry
restrictions allow FDI only in a selected number of sectors.
2.4 FDI and Citizen Support for Autocratic Rule
Given that autocratic regimes liberalize FDI strategically, I argue in a next
step that exposure to FDI translates into regime support – or the lack thereof,
respectively. Hence, I assume that economic self-interest is a major driver
of policy preferences, for instance regarding attitudes towards liberalization
or compensatory policies (see, e.g., Meltzer and Richard, 1981; Iversen and
Soskice, 2001; Moene and Wallerstein, 2001).8 In democracies, research has
shown that globalization-induced policy preferences have direct consequences
in the form political demands and vote choice. Individuals who are nega-
tively affected by FDI, perceive their labor market situation as more precarious
(Scheve and Slaughter, 2004; Walter, 2010). In turn, they prefer protectionist
and/or compensatory policies that shelter them from these pressures and im-
prove their material welfare. In contrast, globalization winners are much less
interested in such policies (Hays, Ehrlich, and Peinhardt, 2005; Mayda and
Rodrik, 2005; Scheve and Slaughter, 2004; Walter, 2017).
In autocracies, the individual-level effects of foreign direct investment
similarly affect the way in which citizens assess the incumbent regime. There
is, however, considerable disagreement as to how FDI shapes regime support.
8 Although this notion is to some extent disputed when analyzing rich democracies (see, for
example, Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2006; Mansfield and Mutz, 2009), I stick with this as-
sumption, since material self-interest should be decisive in less developed countries.
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The modernization view contends that FDI leads to increasing income, which
strengthens demands for democracy, for instance by enhancing education lev-
els (Lipset, 1959; Sanborn and Thyne, 2014) or by reinforcing self-expression
or emancipatory values (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005; Welzel, 2007). In the fol-
lowing, I argue against this view and contend that FDI increases economic per-
formance, which amplifies citizen’s belief in the legitimacy of current rule and
induces preferences for political stability (Bellin, 2010; Chen and Lu, 2011;
Treisman, 2011; Wintrobe, 1998). I distinguish between three dimensions of
individual support for the incumbent regime: satisfaction with the govern-
ment, perceived legitimacy of the functionality of political institutions, and
support for autocratic rule as opposed to democratization.
2.4.1 Regime Satisfaction
Individuals that benefit from foreign direct investment support continuing or
even deepening economic openness, including the abolishment of foreign en-
try restrictions or trade barriers. Consequently, highly skilled individuals are
most prone to demand even more far-reaching liberalization policies, espe-
cially if they work in exposed jobs (Pandya, 2010). Foreign direct investment
should also affect preferences for redistribution. Unskilled labor is most at
risk of losing market income. As redistribution and social security expendi-
tures usually raise individuals’ disposable income, low-skilled exposed citizens
should welcome redistribution as a measure that compensates for the risks ad-
versely affected citizens bear.
If individual demands are met by government policies, people’s satisfac-
tion with the economic performance of the government or leader increases on
material grounds. Conversely, if an authoritarian leader fails to provide eco-
nomic welfare, citizens become increasingly dissatisfied. Applying a simple
Meltzer and Richard (1981) logic suggests that especially low-skilled exposed
citizens should be highly dissatisfied. They lose out from international com-
petition and, thus, develop demands for protection. Due to the lack of free
and fair elections, autocratic governments are on average not responsive to
these demands and, as a consequence, not willing to provide universal and
large-scale compensation. The high-skilled exposed are, on the other hand,
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much more satisfied. They can reap the benefits of openness without having
to carry the tax burden that comes along with redistribution (Ross, 2001).
2.4.2 Legitimacy and Regime Preferences
Government satisfaction should further manifest itself in perceptions of legiti-
macy. If the economic performance of the government is congruent with indi-
vidual preferences, citizens develop beliefs in the legitimacy of the regime in
place (Almond and Verba, 1963; Eckstein, 1966; Welzel and Inglehart, 2009).
This is not confined to economic considerations alone, but is relevant for polit-
ical institutions in general. As such, economic satisfaction also translates into
institutional support. If losers from foreign direct investment, however, start
to dis-belief that authoritarian rule is legitimate, because they suffer econom-
ically, they put the blame on the functionality of political institutions. Broadly
speaking, they hold the lack of political participation and curtailed civil lib-
erties responsible for their dire situation. As such, low-skilled exposed in-
dividuals most likely show high discrepancies between the perception of how
political institutions should work and the assessment how political institutions
de facto operate.
Apart from government satisfaction and institutional support, foreign
investment also affects people’s support for autocratic rule. Under the assump-
tion that actors have real and feasible preferences about political regime types
(Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán, 2014), individuals compare the current polit-
ical situation to all possible alternative regimes, including democracy. Low-
skilled individuals fare worse under autocratic rule. They lose out in material
terms. Given that they directly blame the government for their adverse situ-
ation and they lose faith in the performance of autocratic rule, they demand
democratization. Under this alternative regime type, the masses would be the
decisive actor and had the opportunity to push for redistribution (Meltzer and
Richard, 1981). Exactly because low-skilled individuals lose out and demand
redistribution, they prefer democratization, even at the expense of short-term
political and economic turmoil (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006; Boix, 2003).
As for the well-educated winners of FDI, it is certainly possible that
these individuals generally have a more favorable view of democracy as they
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receive a higher market income. Nevertheless, I doubt that a favorable im-
age simultaneously amplifies their demand for democracy at the same rate.
For one, regime change includes direct costs to overthrow the current regime.
Pushing for democracy thus implies immediate costs to act against the regime
as well as sacrificing current economic gains. Furthermore, there is large un-
certainty whether economic gains are equally large under alternative regimes.
After all, democracy might not be the regime type with the highest revenues
for the beneficiaries of FDI. Ansell and Samuels (2014) show that the middle
class in autocracies is already better off than the median citizen and would
lose revenues due to higher tax rates if they supported democratization. On
purely material grounds, the winners from foreign direct investment should
thus support autocratic stability and sacrifice the chance to obtain participa-
tion rights, especially with regard to democratization.
Summing up, the distributional consequences of FDI help to understand
how citizens assess autocratic rule. My argument predicts that foreign invest-
ment increases satisfaction with the incumbent regime for high-skilled indi-
viduals. In contrast, foreign investment intensifies calls for redistribution on
the part of the poorly educated. Based on these political demands, foreign
direct investment shapes citizen support for autocratic rule. The beneficiaries
of FDI value stability over participation rights and thus support the incumbent
regime. In contrast, the adversely affected part of the population demand
democratization as a means to better themselves economically.
2.5 FDI and Public Protest
Given that foreign direct investment affects political preferences, the next step
of the argument relates to the question if and how individuals express these
preferences in the political process. Due to the lack of democratic institutions,
such as free and fair elections, the transmission of individual demands into
the political sphere is more constrained in autocratic regimes. The expression
of grievances thus takes on other forms. To voice their demands and make
their grievances visible, individuals need to engage in protest.
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2.5.1 Public Protest
To understand how FDI affects protest behavior,9 I again take stock of its dis-
tributional effects. FDI creates winners and losers within societies, who either
benefit from exposure to the international economy or are harmed and face
increasing economic insecurity. The beneficiaries of FDI should feel no reason
to protest on material grounds. They are better off with increasing FDI and
belong to the middle class, which facilitates that their preferences for open-
ness are indeed heard by the autocratic regime. However, a large group of the
population is actually worse off. For this group, economic grievances pile up.
Yet, grievances do not translate in protest behavior automatically. These
individual-level effects only translate into wider societal effects when they ac-
cumulate. The effect of FDI on protest behavior is thus context-dependent on
the sub-national level (Palmtag, Rommel, and Walter, 2018). Conditional on
the prevalence of highly and poorly educated individuals in regions and the
average exposure to FDI, some regions benefit more from multinational in-
vestors than others. In regions with a high share of FDI winners, for example,
average wages are likely to be higher and unemployment is likely to be lower,
leading to greater prosperity. In contrast, regions in which exposure to FDI is
high, but consist of a rather poorly educated workforce, are likely to see lower
average wages, more unemployment, and less prosperity. Thus, the effects
of FDI on the regional economy depend on the interaction between exposure
and the average level of education in the regional workforce.
Figure 2.1 illustrates these regional distributional effects. It shows four
different scenarios, based on whether a region is sheltered from or exposed
to FDI and whether its workforce comprises a relatively high or low share of
well educated people. Within these regions the ratio of winners, losers, and
those sheltered from FDI varies considerably. Regions 1 and 3 are relatively
sheltered from FDI. Only few people in these regions are exposed to global
competition, which means that the share of both FDI winners and losers is rel-
atively small, even though the regions differ in how educated their workforce
is. As a result, those regions’ economic welfare mainly depends on factors
9 This part of the argument is based on joint work with and has benefited greatly from the
intellectual contributions of Tabea Palmtag and Stefanie Walter.
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Note: graph is taken from Palmtag, Rommel, and Walter (2018).
Figure 2.1: Regional Impact of Foreign Direct Investment
other than FDI. In contrast, regions 2 and 4 are more exposed to FDI. In re-
gion 2, well educated workers dominate, which results in a sizable group of
FDI beneficiaries, relative to a much smaller group of FDI losers. As a result,
the region’s overall economy is likely to benefit from FDI openness, showcas-
ing higher average wages and lower unemployment. Region 4, in contrast, is
a region in which a large share of the population is poorly educated. Here,
FDI exhibits more negative than positive effects. People that are adversely af-
fected make up a large share of the population, whereas only a small fraction
of inhabitants is able to reap the benefits. As a result, FDI is likely to have a
negative effect on the regional economy, depressing wages and increasing job
loss. This generates widespread economic grievances in these regions.
How are these regional consequences of FDI related to social unrest and
protests? Again, I start from the assumption that people care about their mate-
rial situation and form individual policy preferences accordingly (Lake, 2009).
This suggests that individuals’ education levels and exposure to globalization
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should influence the types of policies they prefer. In democratic contexts, such
individual policy preferences are brought into politics through elections. Yet,
these channels are not effective in translating policy demands into actual pol-
icy outputs in autocracies.
Grievances can only be effectively voiced in elections if parties and can-
didates compete and promise to alleviate these economic grievances. How-
ever, citizens’ ability to choose from a large menu of options is curtailed. Even
if autocratic regimes allow elections, they prove ineffective because they only
take place relatively seldom. Several years can pass between the emergence
of grievances and the possibility to express them at the ballot box. Finally,
in addition to being frequently tampered with (Schedler, 2002), voting is a
binary decision that forces voters to bundle many political demands. As such,
voting does not allow aggrieved individuals to publicly showcase their specific
grievances. As a result, the ability to vote does not allow individuals with
economic grievances to satisfactorily voice their demands.
Aggrieved individuals, thus, have to resort to other strategies to ex-
press their demands and dissatisfaction with the economic situation. Under
these circumstances, people are more likely to protest. Not surprisingly, a
number of studies indicate that grievances increase the likelihood that an in-
dividual will participate in protest (Bernburg, 2015; Grasso and Giugni, 2016;
Kern, Marien, and Hooghe, 2015). After all, protesting ensures timeliness and
public visibility of demands. In general, I would thus expect that economic
grievances increase the likelihood of public protest and social unrest.
Yet not every aggrieved individual protests publicly. Protesting is costly.
People have to mobilize, spend time preparing and protesting, and face re-
pression and punishment for protest behavior (Carey, 2006; Davenport, 1995;
Robertson, 2010). The decision to engage in protest thus depends on an in-
dividual calculation of the costs and benefits of becoming active. Protesting
may benefit an individual by allowing him or her to publicly express his or her
grievances and by increasing the chances to bring about change to an undesir-
able situation. Nonetheless, payoffs are not always large and may fall behind
the costs. Therefore, it is not only vital that people have motives to protest,
but it also matters in which circumstances they are mobilized (Tarrow, 2011).
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Based on Palmtag, Rommel, and Walter (2018), I argue that individuals
protest when they feel that their grievances are not just an individual problem,
suggesting that it may be their own fault, but when a considerable number of
other individuals share the same grievances. The costs of participation for
individuals decrease the more similarly aggrieved individuals join the protest
activity. This implies that the number of potential protesters – that is, other
individuals with similar concerns – in close proximity matters, turning the
sub-national situation into an important context.
What does this imply for the question of how FDI affects protest behav-
ior? As discussed above, there is likely to be significant regional variation in
the ratio of winners and losers of FDI, as well as in the exposure to FDI. In re-
gions in which FDI plays only a negligible role (regions 1 and 3 in Figure 2.1),
the groups of FDI winners and losers are small. This suggests that the fraction
of people with FDI-induced grievances is low. For most people, motives for
protest are not associated with FDI.
FDI plays a much more decisive role in regions that are highly exposed,
especially when the regional workforce is on average poorly educated (region
4 in Figure 2.1). These regions comprise a large share of FDI losers and only
few winners, which means that people experience economic grievances and
thus have a motive for engaging in protest. As the overall welfare of the re-
gion declines simultaneously with the economic well-being of the majority of
its citizens, compensation is unlikely. Whereas a small group of highly edu-
cated individuals gains from economic openness, the masses lose out. This
is a hazardous situation, as comparison to a few that are better off tends
to increase economic grievances and instigate protest (Gurr, 1970). Hence,
these are the regions where the expression of economic grievances via public
protest is most likely. The more exposed to FDI regions with a poorly educated
workforce are, the more protests occur in that region (Palmtag, Rommel, and
Walter, 2018).
Finally, protests should be least likely to occur in regions with a large
group of FDI winners, that is regions with a highly educated workforce and
high exposure to the global economy (region 2 in Figure 2.1). As the group
of less educated FDI losers is relatively small, there are few potential fellow
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protesters with whom to engage in protest activities. Moreover, given that
these are regions that are doing well economically, these groups may even
be compensated for their FDI-induced grievances through spillovers of the
overall increase in regional welfare. In these regions, incentives for protest
are therefore attenuated for the losers of FDI. This suggests that a growing
regional exposure to international trade and FDI should have a pacifying effect
on protest behavior in regions with a well-educated workforce.
2.5.2 Popular Uprisings
While regional protest is, thus, a characteristic part of autocratic politics, rev-
olutions and popular uprisings are rare events. This seems surprising, since a
large part of the population in autocratic regimes is fiercely harmed by FDI.
Yet, it takes tremendous efforts to organize collective action that aims at politi-
cal upheaval. This implies that regional grassroots protests only rarely cascade
and spread into full-force popular uprisings. Protests are a vehicle to voice dis-
tinct grievances. As they serve the purpose of raising specific issues, they are
limited in their scope, however.
In order for protest to disseminate into social unrest and popular upris-
ings, they have to be political in nature, not focus on economic issues alone,
and need a critical mass of the population to participate. The disenfranchised
masses are the societal group that should show the highest likelihood of par-
ticipating in protests that threaten the regime. However, the masses are at the
same time equipped with the lowest amount of associational resources. They
do not possess the necessary political power to push for regime change; all
the while economic grievances pile up. Masses typically participate in popular
uprisings when wide-spread unrest is already taking place; they respond to,
but not initiate large-scale protest (Pearlman, 2016).
This puts the middle class at the center of attention. Its members have
the associational resources as well as the political ability to initiate popular
uprisings. Grassroots protests rely to a large extent on common grievances.
Revolutionary movements, on the other hand, depend further on the mobi-
lization of pre-existing ties that need not necessarily be connected with shared
concerns (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, 2009; McCarthy and Zald, 1977; Tar-
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row, 2011). Although the middle class possesses the latter, they do not face
the same grievances as the masses. In other words, if exposed to FDI, the
middle class does not have an incentive to engage in protests. By decreasing
the middle class’ willingness to protest, inducing a lack of motive, FDI strips
the masses’ catalyst to act against the autocratic regime. In sum, although FDI
may spark regional economic protest, it does not increase the likelihood of
popular uprisings that aim at bringing down the incumbent regime.
2.6 FDI and Autocratic Regime Survival
In the last step of the argument, I tie up the individual pieces of the theoret-
ical mechanism and explain how foreign direct investment affects autocratic
regime survival. Regime breakdown occurs for two reasons: either members
of the regime’s inner circle oust the dictator or parts of the population force the
dictator to step down (Svolik, 2012). Societal forces, thus, have the ability to
pose a credible threat to the power of the autocratic regime. As a consequence,
autocratic rule depends on a support coalition that consists of members of
the regime elite as well as the middle class. I argue that FDI increases the
chances of autocratic survival, because it unfolds both a legitimacy-enhancing
and a cooptation-enabling effect. Although FDI also induces risks and eco-
nomic hardship for the masses, its benefits accrue mostly to those groups of
actors that are indispensable for regime survival. Since it aligns the interests
the regime elite and the middle class towards supporting autocratic rule, at-
tracting FDI is as effective strategy for the regime to extend and prolong its
rule.
The Regime Elite Foreign direct investment exhibits substantial distribu-
tional effects within the regime elite (see Section 2.2). For one, domestic
business is substantially hurt by major reallocations of market shares if highly
productive foreign companies enter the domestic economy. In contrast, do-
mestic firms benefit from increasing foreign investment through increases in
the overall supply of capital, which boosts demand for production inputs, and
through technology and knowledge spillovers to domestic firms, which raise
the productivity of domestic firms. Thus, members of the regime elite do not
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benefit from FDI across the board.
In addition, economic risk for large business intensifies as FDI increases.
Firms operating in specific sectors that have not yet been exposed to compe-
tition emanating from foreign companies, but rather benefit from spillover
effects, adapt their expectations about future exposure to multinational cor-
porations. Once fully liberalized, these firms might come under severe pres-
sure. Higher risk should in turn decrease support for the autocratic regime
and, taken to the extreme, lead to elite defections.
Nonetheless, there are two mechanisms that counterbalance this effect.
First, even though political elites may not benefit from foreign investment
across the board as well as face increasing risks, they have a comparative ad-
vantage with regards to access to political decision-making (see Section 2.1).
Elites have the ability to fine-tune economic openness towards their needs
(Hong and Park, 2016). If elites are powerful, autocratic regimes shield those
sectors where domestic business makes most of their revenues (see Section
2.3). Doing so, increases the elites’ profits, thereby enhancing the perceived
economic performance of autocratic rule, which increases the belief in the le-
gitimacy of the autocratic regime on the part of the elite (see the upper part
of Figure 2.2).
Figure 2.2: Foreign Direct Investment and the Regime Elite
Second, attracting FDI amplifies the financial means to meet the elite’s
demands, which allows the autocratic regime to offset the increasing insecu-
rity among the regime elite. As a higher share of the population gains em-
ployment and consumption rates increase, the tax base gets larger resulting
in higher tax and tariff revenues. The dictator does not even have to raise tax
rates. Increasing revenues bolster the dictator’s fungible budget without neg-
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ative repercussions on the elite’s perceived legitimacy of authoritarian rule
(Ross, 2001; Arias, Hollyer, and Rosendorff, 2018). And the dictator can
use these revenues to supply compensatory policy concessions, for example
through cash benefits or public employment (Nooruddin and Rudra, 2014), to
secure the support of the members of his support coalition (see the lower part
of Figure 2.2). Taken together, FDI lowers the incentives of the regime elite to
act against the dictator (Bak and Moon, 2016), which amplifies the survival
prospects of the autocratic regime.
The Middle Class Apart from the regime elite, the middle class is often-
times part of the support coalition. Many theoretical approaches character-
ize the members of this group as the driving forces of autocratic breakdown
(Lipset, 1959; Moore, 1966; Rueschemeyer, Huber Stephens, and Stephens,
1992). Given the distributional effects of FDI, my argument suggests the op-
posite, however. Multinational corporations systematically demand workers
with higher skill-levels compared to local firms. This results in higher wages
for high-skilled individuals working in exposed sectors (Feenstra and Han-
son, 1997). Additionally, even local firms producing in the exporting sector
increase the wages of their workers after the entry of multinational corpora-
tions. On average, the members of the middle class are thus better off when
exposure to FDI is high (see Section 2.2).
Yet, FDI not only boosts the middle class’ economic well-being, it also
changes their political preferences (see Section 2.4). Members of the middle
class show higher satisfaction with the policy performance of the autocratic
government, which increases the belief in the legitimacy of autocratic rule.
Because they value political stability and are less aggrieved, the middle class
has no incentive to initiate popular uprisings that aims at overthrowing the
current regime (see Section 2.5).
FDI-related market income thus strengthens the support of the middle
class for autocratic rule. What is more, the middle class does not become
economically independent from the state. Economic well-being of the middle
class is crucially dependent on the authoritarian regime (Bellin, 2000; Tang
and Woods, 2014). Their economic situation improves because the autocratic
leadership chooses policies, such as liberalizing FDI, that benefit them. In this
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Figure 2.3: Foreign Direct Investment and the Middle Class
sense, output-legitimacy generated by foreign direct investment represents a
substitute for the lack of input-legitimacy (Kim and Gandhi, 2010). Mem-
bers of the middle class become “the allies of authoritarianism rather than the
agents of democratic reform” (Bellin, 2002) and “trade the right to rule for the
right to make money” (Ansell and Samuels, 2014, 46). Put together, I argue
that preferences of the members of this group converge towards opting for
stability and, thus, supporting the authoritarian regime in power (see Figure
2.3).
The Disenfranchised Masses While FDI benefits both the regime elite and
the middle class, the disenfranchised masses lose out and do, on average,
not make profit from foreign direct investment (see Section 2.2). The masses
mostly possess skills that are not sought after by multinational firms and/or
live in geographically remote areas where exposure to foreign direct invest-
ment is generally low. Given that domestic firms that either compete with
foreign multinationals or supply these companies with inputs that are depen-
dent on high-quality work, unskilled labor is most at risk of losing market
income. Not surprisingly, the masses see only little virtue in autocratic rule
and thus favor democratization (see Section 2.4). Although this group might
have economic interests to pressure for democratization, they lack the power
to push for political change (see Section 2.5). The masses are economically
marginalized, unlikely to overcome problems of collective action, and do not
have systematic access to power (Olson, 1965; Rudra, 2005a).
Summing up, the regime elite might not benefit from foreign invest-
ment as a whole, but has the political power to fine-tune economic openness
to their advantage. The middle class benefits economically and supports sta-
bility on material grounds. The disenfranchised masses are not able to voice
their regime preferences and do not represent a credible threat to dictatorial
rule. Attracting FDI is thus a power maintenance strategy that simultaneously
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appeases all members of the support coalition. Regime elites as well as the
middle class “are particularly loyal because the risk and cost of exclusion if
the challenger comes to power are high.” (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003,
8). As a consequence, the higher the inflow of foreign direct investment, the
longer is the duration of an autocratic regime.
Autocratic Diversity How does the diversity of autocratic support coalitions
affect the regime-stabilizing effect of foreign direct investment? Autocracies
vary with regards to the policy responsiveness, as societal groups are granted
different levels of access to political decision-making and influence on power
maintenance (see Section 2.1). One integral part of the argument is that
autocratic regimes tailor FDI openness to the needs of their support coalition.
Nonetheless, these groups of actors might still face insecurity as the dictator
can always renege on policy concessions. For instance, research has shown
that dictators sometimes use strategic expropriation to weaken the influence
of some parts of the elite in order to signal exclusive reliance on other parts of
the elite (Albertus and Menaldo, 2012).
Scholars stress the role of political institutions as devices to share power
politically. Because class struggles exist, autocratic leaders create political in-
stitutions to incorporate specific groups of actors (Gandhi, 2008; Gandhi and
Przeworski, 2007; Kim and Gandhi, 2010; Wright and Escriba-Folch, 2012).
Two mechanisms explain the stabilizing effect of power-sharing agreements:
First, political institutions are rather persistent, which works as an insurance
device by signaling credible commitment on the side of dictators to live up to
their policy concessions. Second, institutions in autocracies serve the purpose
of regulating access to power and influence on policies. According to my argu-
ment, building support coalitions involves institutions, such as regime parties
or civil society organizations. Relying on such power-sharing agreements thus
serves as a credible commitment device to mitigate insecurity. Furthermore,
they make it easier to provide certain goods, like guaranteed property rights
(Wantchekon, 2000), allow the use of redistribution channels and institutional
cooptation (Bader, 2015; Escribà-Folch, 2012), and are usually large enough
to comprise groups of actors from diverse economic sectors (Steinberg and
Malhotra, 2014).
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This implies that the power of societal groups conditions the effect of
FDI on autocratic survival. Elevated political power not only guarantees a pol-
icy environment that caters more to the needs of the respective societal group,
a lot of influence in the autocratic support coalition also implies that the costs
of reneging on such political concessions are high for the autocratic regime.
As a consequence, the higher the relative power of either societal group, and
thus the power concentration within the autocratic support coalition, the more
does FDI secure the survival of autocratic regimes.
Autocratic Breakdown How do autocratic regimes ultimately break down
in a globalized world? While the argument so far suggests that openness
to foreign direct investment stabilizes autocratic regimes, this strategy also
poses risks concerning autocratic survival. One particular risk is a sudden
stop of FDI, due to developments outside the domain of the dictator. For
instance, the Global Economic Crisis of 2008/2009 has seen a substantial drop
in FDI inflows from industrialized democracies to autocracies. Although not
directly affected, autocratic regimes’ economies thus suffered from indirect
consequences (Pepinsky, 2012). Under such conditions, autocratic regimes
lose their ability to manage and fine-tune foreign direct investment.
As a reaction to sudden divestment shocks, the autocratic regime has
to react with specific policies, like cuts in spending, introducing tariffs, or
contractionary fiscal policies. Such adjustment policies induce distributional
conflicts, however, which likely draw a dividing line within the support coali-
tion (see Pepinsky (2009) for an application of this argument in case of fi-
nancial crises). Because large-scale withdrawals of foreign direct investment
occur instantaneously, the type of adjustment strategy depends on the societal
foundation of autocratic rule. Shocks induced by foreign investment draw a
dividing line between the regime elite and the middle class. In essence, the
autocratic regime is between a rock and a hard place in deciding, which soci-
etal group to shield. Favoring the regime elite over the middle class increases
the probability of popular uprisings, because the latter now not only have the
resources, but also the motive to act against the dictator. Favoring the middle
class over the regime elite, in contrast, increases the chance of elite coups. The
bottom line is, while attracting FDI is typically a successful strategy to main-
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tain power, it makes autocratic regimes vulnerable to sudden foreign direct
investment stops.
In essence, my theoretical argument presents a new theoretical mecha-
nism that connects foreign direct investment with autocratic politics. My ex-
planation for why FDI facilitates autocratic regime survival – in normal times
– rests on a combination of the societal structure of autocratic rule and the
distributional consequences of international openness. The following chap-
ters set out to test this argument against the data. I do not only test the main
hypothesis, but several observable implications of the theoretical mechanism.

Chapter 3
Societal Group Power and FDI Openness
The first empirical chapter of this dissertation examines the question: Why
and how much do autocracies liberalize foreign direct investment? If one
wants to understand the impact of FDI on autocratic regime survival, it is nec-
essary to look at the sources of foreign direct investment openness first. After
all, liberalization of FDI constitutes a strategic move on the part of the dicta-
tor to reinforce domestic support for autocratic rule. The modernization and
redistributivist approaches to autocracies in the global economy neglect this
channel and do not provide a rationale regarding the sources of FDI openness.
Rather, they see economic globalization as a structural factor to which autoc-
racies have to adapt. I argue that both the regulatory environment regarding
the mode of entry of multinational corporations as well as the overall amount
of FDI inflows are subject to domestic politics.
While initially very wary of foreign direct investment, autocratic coun-
tries have undertaken tremendous efforts to liberalize access to and of inter-
national capital. A considerable number of countries now welcomes FDI as
essential means to compensate for the lack of domestic investment (Pandya,
2014a; Stasavage, 2002). Not surprisingly, FDI has thus contributed to the
overall improvement of economic conditions in autocratic developing coun-
tries (De Mello, 1997; Borensztein, De Gregorio, and Lee, 1998; Hansen and
Rand, 2006). Notwithstanding its positive effects, some autocracies have how-
ever defied the trend to liberalize FDI. Hence, there is variation among auto-
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cratic regimes with regard to the extent of FDI openness. Additionally, au-
tocracies not only vary with regard to the regulatory environment for FDI,
they are also different when it comes to the actual attractiveness for foreign
investors.
3.1 FDI Openness in the Literature
Research that aims at investigating the domestic sources of FDI openness
has so far concentrated on the connection between FDI flows and political
regime types, especially with regard to the distinction between autocracies
and democracies. Political regimes should play a decisive role when it comes
to the level and form of international economic openness, because they affect
the way decisions are made. Allegedly, democracies are more likely to liberal-
ize FDI, as democratic institutions give voice to the potential beneficiaries of
FDI (Pandya, 2014a). Additionally, democratic institutions create a stable po-
litical environment, which provides multinational corporations with incentives
to invest (Jensen, 2003). The empirical results are mixed, however. Some
studies indeed point to a democracy-advantage (Busse and Hefeker, 2007;
Jakobsen and de Soysa, 2006; Jensen, 2003, 2006), others find mixed results
or even an autocracy-advantage (Li and Resnick, 2003; Oneal, 1994; Resnick,
2001; Zheng, 2011). In a meta-analysis comprising 41 studies that examine
the effect of democracy on FDI, Li, Owen, and Mitchell (2018, 36) come to
the conclusion that “there is no clear and compelling evidence supporting the
claim of the democratic advantage in attracting FDI.”
In response, scholars of comparative politics are quick at arguing that
these inconclusive results are due to the extraordinary institutional diversity
of autocratic regimes, in contrast to relatively homogeneous democracies. Au-
tocratic regimes differ as much from each other as they differ from democracy
(Geddes, 1999; Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, 2014). Follow-up studies thus
point to the effect different autocratic regime types have on a country’s attrac-
tiveness for international investors. Yet, they too arrive at strikingly different
conclusions. Frantz and Ezrow (2011) argue that international investors pre-
fer policy stability. Due to fewer veto points, personalist autocracies therefore
CHAPTER 3: SOCIETAL GROUP POWER AND FDI OPENNESS 61
receive only little foreign direct investment compared to single-party and mili-
tary dictatorships. Knutsen and Fjelde (2012) stress the role of property rights
as an insurance device for multinational corporations. In line with this view,
they hypothesize and find that party-based regimes as well as monarchies are
most successful in attracting FDI, whereas military regimes fare worst. Wright
and Zhu (2018) further take differences between foreign investors into ac-
count. According to their analysis, personalist regimes provide a profitable
investment environment for fixed asset investors. By decreasing political risk,
party-based regimes on the other hand make themselves especially appealing
for mobile-asset investors.
Research has thus concentrated on two aspects regarding the nexus be-
tween political regimes and FDI openness. For one, most studies focus on
differences between political regime types using broad and aggregate mea-
sures of political regime types. Although these studies differ with regard to
the precise causal mechanism, they furthermore share one common denomi-
nator: they stress the role of domestic institutions in shaping investment de-
cisions made by multinational corporations. That is, research has investigated
actual inflows of FDI as opposed to the domestic regulatory regime for FDI.
I take a different perspective and contend that, before foreign multinationals
can even consider investing, countries have to liberalize foreign direct invest-
ment. Hence, it is necessary to look at national policies to measure and ex-
plain differences in international economic openness. Empirical studies that
investigate the de facto regulatory regime of FDI openness are rare. In a first
attempt, Pandya (2014a) finds that democratization spurs FDI liberalization.
Pond (2017) shows that this effect comes about because democratic institu-
tions facilitate decision-makers’ responsiveness to workers’ demands for FDI.
Yet, both studies leave differences between autocracies unattended.
3.2 Observable Implications of the Argument
To understand the variation in FDI openness in autocratic countries, I argue
that variation in the level and form of FDI openness is subject to domestic pol-
itics. Autocratic regimes care about domestic power maintenance first, about
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international investors second. To hold on to power, dictators rely on societal
groups for support, which in turn gives these groups influence in decision-
making. The decision to liberalize FDI is thus a function of the power of dif-
ferent societal groups in conjunction with their respective material interests.
Potential exposure to foreign investment induces distributional effects
that shape political preferences in two ways: First, it directly and immediately
reallocates economic resources between domestic firms and foreign multina-
tionals (effect on competition) as well as between domestic firms (effect on
the supply chain). Domestic firms that compete directly with foreign firms
face stark adverse effects on their revenues. However, domestic firms may
also benefit from increasing foreign investment if they are part of the supply
chain of multinational corporations. Taken together, the regime elite may not
win across the board and prefers fine-tuning FDI openness to their advantage.
Second, foreign investment raises the share of firms in the tradables
sector that are competitive in world markets. Multinational investors system-
atically demand workers with higher productivity levels. This results in higher
wages for highly-skilled individuals working in exposed sectors. Additionally,
even local firms increase the wages of their workers to be able to serve as sup-
pliers. On the downside, reallocation of resources in the domestic economy
forces some firms to serve the domestic market only or shut down their busi-
ness entirely. Because those workers have lower average productivity-levels
they face downward pressure on their wages and higher job insecurity. Never-
theless, the better part of the middle class, i.e. productive workers and small
business owners, especially in urban areas, prefers economic openness.
Going a step further, I argue that the interests of these societal groups
shape political demands and thus expand into political decisions, even in au-
tocratic regimes. Yet, autocracies differ markedly with regard to the power
such groups have in the policy-making process. If the middle class can ef-
fectively raise their demands, dictators choose to lower entry restrictions and
allow FDI in a multitude of economic sectors. In contrast, if the middle class
cannot pose a credible threat to the power of the dictator, the dictator’s poli-
cies regarding openness to FDI cater towards the needs of the elite. In line
with this argument, I hypothesize:
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H3.1: The more powerful the middle class, the less entry restrictions for multi-
national investors. Conversely, the more powerful the regime elite, the more
entry restrictions.
Apart from entry restrictions, I argue that the political power of soci-
etal groups similarly shapes the attractiveness of autocracies for multinational
corporations. Foreign direct investment is a long-term investment in physical
capital in another country (Jensen, 2003). Because such capital is immobile in
the short run, investors seek to safeguard their investment from expropriation.
Politically powerful societal groups work as a credible commitment device of
the autocratic regime to signal policy stability to international investors, as
reneging on FDI openness violates the demands of those societal groups that
are essential for autocratic survival. Hence, I hypothesize:
H3.2: Political power of either societal group increases actual FDI inflows. Yet,
the effect of regime elite power on FDI inflows is substantially smaller than the
effect middle class power.
3.3 Measuring the Societal Base of Modern Autocracies
Not only do societal groups in autocracies prefer different forms and levels of
FDI openness, they have varying political power, depending on their inclusion
in autocratic support coalitions. This section deals with measuring their po-
litical power. I build two separate indexes for regime elite and middle class
power. In what follows, I discuss the the dimensions and indicators used for
the construction of the indexes. Building on this, I present the main insights
and discuss the concept validity of the measurement.
Autocratic regimes manage the strength of their support base by grant-
ing or denying associational resources. Associational resources help societal
groups to organize and form demands, overcome problems of collective ac-
tion to voice those demands, and additionally provide an insurance mecha-
nism against indiscriminate repression. On the part of the regime elite, I focus
on party-based institutional resources and distinguish between party monop-
olization within the autocratic regime and dominance within the regime party
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itself. Furthermore, I also take interest heterogeneity among the regime elite
into account. On the part of the middle class, I distinguish between three as-
sociational resources: the formation of civil society organizations, the costs of
organization via economic repression, and the scope of policy deliberation.
3.3.1 Index Construction
I use data provided by the Varieties of Democracy project to measure the in-
fluence societal groups have on autocratic decision-making. V-Dem gathers
data on several hundred political characteristics of countries utilizing rat-
ings by more than 2500 experts (Coppedge et al., 2015). With the help of
Bayesian item response models, the individual expert codings are combined
into country-year scores that resemble both the coding itself as well as the
uncertainty across multiple country experts (Pemstein et al., 2015). Data is
available for almost all autocratic country-years between 1970 and 2010.1
Given the broad data availability and the diversity of indicators, V-Dem has an
edge over other data sources. For reasons of comparability, I rely exclusively
on this data source.
Both indexes consist of three dimensions, each of which are measured
using several indicators. To arrive at the final index values, I proceed in several
steps: First, I use the relative scale from the V-Dem measurement model to
make sure that indicators with unequal numbers of response categories are
comparable (Pemstein et al., 2015). Second, I standardize each indicator to a
continuous measure with a range between 0 and 1. Third, I take the mean of
the respective number of indicators for each dimension. To arrive at the final
index, I take the mean across the three dimensions.
I perform this procedure for the power of the regime elite and the mid-
dle class. In case of the middle class, all indicators are originally coded such
that higher values point into the direction of a stronger middle class. In case
of the regime elite, all indicators are originally coded such that higher values
point into the direction of a weaker regime elite. Thus, I reverse the scale of
1 Because data on FDI is only available from 1970 onwards, I limit the time period of the
power indexes accordingly. There are four autocratic countries, for which data on FDI is
available, but the V-Dem dataset (version 6.2) does not (yet) provide information: Kuwait,
Oman, Singapore, and United Arab Emirates.
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this index. The two resulting indexes have a theoretical range between 0 and
1. Higher values imply more power in autocratic decision-making. For reasons
of interpretation, I also provide an index that is standardized to a mean of 0
and a standard deviation of 1. As the index construction is confined to auto-
cratic regimes, a positive (negative) score implies that the respective power is
higher (lower) than the overall average in all autocracies.
3.3.2 Power of the Regime Elite: Dimensions and Indicators
To measure the political power of the regime elite, I focus on three dimen-
sions: the monopolization of party power within the regime, the concentra-
tion of power within the party, and the social stratification within society. The
first two indicators specifically address the strength of regime parties to mea-
sure elites’ power in autocracies. It is rather implausible that individual elites
are able pose a credible threat to the power of the dictator. Power to influence
policy arises from institutionalized access (Gehlbach and Keefer, 2011; Mag-
aloni, 2006). Thus, regime parties increase the associational resources of the
regime elite. They accumulate diverse interests and help formulate political
demands. At the same time, institutionalized access serves as an insurance
device against indiscriminate repression, which makes replacing elites much
more difficult (Albertus and Menaldo, 2012). In addition, parties solve col-
lective action problems on the part of the elite, as they provide a forum for
deliberation. The opportunities of regime elites to fine-tune policies thus in-
crease if they are incorporated in regime parties. I focus on two dimensions of
regime party strength: monopolization of party power within the autocratic
regime and concentration of power within the regime party.2 The third dimen-
sion addresses the homogeneity of interests among the members of the regime
elite. Voicing policy demands should be more credible when spoken with one
voice. Assuming that the cohesion of political demands is greater within so-
2 V-Dem provides a party system institutionalization index. However, this index does not mea-
sure the power of the dominant regime party, but rather the institutionalization of the party
system (Coppedge et al., 2015, 61). This index may thus assign high values to countries
where a dominant party forms the party system as well as where multiple parties jointly
make up the party system. In addition, Bizzarro et al. (2018) construct a party strength
index using multiple V-Dem indicators. Yet, this index captures the strength of the influence
of political parties in general, regardless of their number or dominance.
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cial or ethnic groups than across, interest homogeneity should enhance regime
elite power.
The first dimension – monopolization of within-regime party power – is
measured with three indicators. First, the indicator party bans (v2psparban)
captures: “Are any parties banned?” (Coppedge et al., 2015, 123). An-
swers are coded on a 5-point scale ranging from ‘all parties except the state-
sponsored party’ to ‘no parties’. Second, the indicator barriers to parties
(v2psbantar) captures: “How restrictive are the barriers to forming a party?”
(Coppedge et al., 2015, 124). Answers are coded on a 5-point scale ranging
from ‘parties are not allowed’ to ‘no substantial barriers’. Third, the indicator
opposition party autonomy (v2psoppaut) captures: “Are opposition parties in-
dependent and autonomous from the ruling regime?” (Coppedge et al., 2015,
125). Answers are coded on a 5-point scale ranging from ‘opposition parties
are not allowed’ to ‘all parties are autonomous’. These indicators directly re-
late to the associational resources of the regime elite. Lower indicator ratings
imply that one party monopolizes power within the autocratic regime. When
monopolization is high, regime elites have an edge in accessing the dictator,
which increases their political power.
The second dimension – concentration of within-party power – is mea-
sured with two indicators. First, the indicator party linkages (v2psprlnks)
captures: “Among the major parties, what is the main or most common form
of linkage to their constituents?” (Coppedge et al., 2015, 126). Answers are
coded on a 5-point scale ranging from ‘clientelistic’ to ‘policy/programmatic’.
Second, the indicator candidate selection (v2pscnslnl) captures: “How cen-
tralized is legislative candidate selection with the parties?” (Coppedge et al.,
2015, 127). Answers are coded on a 6-point scale ranging from ‘selected
exclusively by national party leaders’ to ‘chosen by constituent groups or di-
rect primaries’. Lower indicator ratings mirror high concentration of power
within the regime party. Recruitment is highly centralized and focuses more
on distributing economic perks. Power concentration increases elites’ political
power, because it eases the way particularistic demands can be transported
towards the autocratic regime.
The third dimension – homogeneity of interests – is measured with two
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indicators. The first indicator relates to the homogeneity of socioeconomic po-
sitions (v2pepwrses) and captures: “Is political power distributed according to
socioeconomic position?” (Coppedge et al., 2015, 249). Answers are coded
on a 5-point scale ranging from ‘wealthy people enjoy a virtual monopoly on
political power’ to ‘wealthy people have no more political power than those
whose economic status is average or poor.’ The second indicator relates to
the homogeneity of the social position (v2pepwrsoc) and captures: “Is polit-
ical power distributed according to social groups?” (Coppedge et al., 2015,
250). Answers are coded on a 5-point scale ranging from ‘political power is
monopolized and institutionalized by one social group comprising a minor-
ity of the population’ to ‘all social groups have roughly equal power.’ Lower
indicator ratings conform to less interest heterogeneity, which amplifies the
associational resources of the regime elite.
3.3.3 Power of the Middle Class: Dimensions and Indicators
To measure the political power of the middle class, I focus on three dimensions
that capture the extent of associational resources to pose a credible threat to
the power of the autocratic regime: the ability to form civil society organiza-
tion (CSOs), the potential economic costs of participating in collective action,
and the possibility to deliberate on policies. The first dimension captures if
interest groups are generally allowed and thus refers to the capacity of the
middle class to overcome collective actions problems in formulating their de-
mands (Kim and Gandhi, 2010). The second dimension captures how costly
it is for the middle class to engage in such activities. High economic depen-
dency on the state should generally deter people from organizing, because
they still have to make a living (Bellin, 2002).3 The third dimension concerns
the ability of the population for deliberation. More deliberation not only goes
along with more opportunities to voice specific demands, but also facilitates
negotiations among members of the society (Chandra and Rudra, 2015).
The first dimension – the ability to form civil society organization –
3 V-Dem provides a core civil society index. However, this index only measures the de jure
ability of the middle class to organize, but excludes to costs of participating (Coppedge et al.,
2015, 56); see also Bernhard et al. (2017).
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is measured with three indicators. First, the indicator CSO entry and exit
(v2cseeorgs) captures: “To what extent does the government achieve control
over entry and exit by civil society organizations into public life?” (Coppedge
et al., 2015, 235). Answers are coded on a 5-point scale ranging from ‘mo-
nopolistic control’ to ‘unconstrained.’ Second, the indicator CSO repression
(v2csreprss) captures: “Does the government attempt to repress civil society
organizations?” (Coppedge et al., 2015, 236). Answers are coded on a 5-point
scale ranging from ‘severely’ to ‘no repression.’ Third, the indicator CSO par-
ticipatory environment (v2csprtcpt) captures: “Which of these best describes
the involvement of the public in civil society organization?” (Coppedge et al.,
2015, 238). Answers are coded on a 4-point scale ranging from ‘most asso-
ciations are state-sponsored’ to ‘many diverse CSOs.’ Higher indicator ratings
not only imply that members of the middle class can join forces in making de-
mands. More opportunities to make use of organizational capacities increase
the associational resources of the middle class.
The second dimension – the costs of organizing – is measured with two
indicators. First, the indicator state ownership of the economy (v2clstown)
captures: “Does the state own or directly control important sectors of the
economy?” (Coppedge et al., 2015, 220). The answers are coded on a 5-point
scale ranging from ‘virtually all valuable capital belongs to the state’ to ‘very
little valuable capital belongs to the state.’ Second, the indicator property
rights (v2xcl_prpty) captures: “Do citizens enjoy the right to private property”
(Coppedge et al., 2015, 222). The answers are coded on a 6-point scale rang-
ing from ‘virtually no one’ to ‘virtually all citizens.’ Higher indicator ratings
resemble that the state controls only little of a country’s production factors,
which makes the use of economic repression more difficult. Because less re-
pression capabilities make the members of the middle class immune, the costs
of collective action are smaller, which facilitates middle class power.
The third dimension – the scope of policy deliberation – is measured
with two indicators. First, the indicator CSO consultation (v2cscnsult) cap-
tures: “Are major civil society organizations routinely consulted by policymak-
ers on policies relevant to their members?” (Coppedge et al., 2015, 237).
The answers are coded on a 3-point scale ranging from ‘high degree of insula-
CHAPTER 3: SOCIETAL GROUP POWER AND FDI OPENNESS 69
tion of the government from CSO input’ to ‘important CSOs are recognized as
stakeholders in important policy areas and given voice.’ Second, the indicator
engaged society (v2dlengage) captures: “When important policy changes are
being considered, how wide and how independent are public deliberations?”
(Coppedge et al., 2015, 195). The answers are coded on a 6-point scale rang-
ing from ‘public deliberation is almost never allowed’ to ‘large numbers of
non-elite groups as well as ordinary people tend to discuss major policies.’
Higher indicator ratings show higher potential for policy deliberation among
the middle class, which increases their associational resources.
3.3.4 Comparing and Validating Societal Group Power
What do these indexes say about the power of societal groups in autocracies
and autocratic diversity? To begin with, the resulting measures do not consti-
tute a regime typology. As of now, there are several widely used regime typolo-
gies. For instance, Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) distinguish between
party-based, military, personalist and monarchic regimes. Cheibub, Gandhi,
and Vreeland (2010) categorize autocracies into civilian, military, and royal
dictatorships. The regime typology of Wahman, Teorell, and Hadenius (2013)
comprises of military regimes, monarchies, as well as no-party, one-party, and
multi-party regimes. All of these typologies assume that “different kinds of
authoritarianism differ from each other as much as they differ from democ-
racy” (Geddes, 1999, 121), which makes it impossible to order regimes on one
or more dimensions.4 In contrast to this view, Howard and Roessler (2006)
provide an institutional typology that centers on the dimension of electoral
competition. Regimes without elections are closed autocracies. Regimes that
hold uncontested elections belong to the category of hegemonic autocracies.
Finally, competitive authoritarian regimes hold contested elections that are,
however, not free and fair. If elections are additionally free and fair, regimes
become democratic. I depart from these typologies and assume that autocratic
diversity revolves around two distinct dimensions.
My measurement is confined to autocratic regimes, thus following the
4 Roller (2013) provides an excellent overview of the differences between these regime ty-
pologies.
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logic to organize political regimes as a difference in kind (democracy versus
autocracy), before one of degree (Svolik, 2012). Measuring autocratic diver-
sity in such a way offers several advantages: First, it goes beyond the catego-
rization of autocratic regimes into broad autocratic regime types. Differences
between autocratic rule emanate from differences in the autocratic support
coalition, but are much more fine-grained than broad regime typologies have
assumed. Second, I measure two distinct dimensions – the influence of the
elite and the influence of the middle class – which allows more variation and
does not assume that one societal group always possesses high political power.
To make this notion more tangible, I present the findings split by the type of
autocratic regime, utilizing the most widely used typology of Geddes, Wright,
and Frantz (2014).5
Figure 3.1a presents the distribution of regime elite power in different
autocratic regimes. Here, I use the standardized power index. Because I re-
strict the construction of the index to autocratic regimes and standardize it
to a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1, the resulting scores are eas-
ily interpretable. A positive (negative) score implies that the influence of the
regime elite is higher (lower) than the overall average in all autocracies. First
of all, there is variation with regard to regime elite power across autocratic
regime types. While the regime elite is most powerful in personalist (mean =
.14) and least powerful in military (mean = –.11) regimes, party-based au-
tocracies occupy a middle ground (mean = –.07). More importantly, variation
of regime elite power is higher within autocratic regime types than between
different types of authoritarianism. For every political regime type, there are
regimes where elite power is either high or low. Among contemporary party-
based regimes, elite power is highest in North Korea, but lowest in Namibia.
In case of military regimes, the regime elite has had substantial influence in
Chile under Augusto Pinochet, but influence was almost negligible in Pakistan
under Pervez Musharraf. As for personalist or monarchic regimes, the regime
elite is less able to influence politics in Belarus, as opposed to Saudi Arabia.
Figure 3.1b on the other hand shows the distribution of middle class
5 In line with the earlier measurement by Geddes (1999), I subsume personalist and monar-
chic regimes. This is due to the fact that the number of monarchic country-years is limited.
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(b) Middle Class Power in Autocratic Regimes
Figure 3.1: Societal Group Influence in Autocratic Regimes
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power in different autocratic regimes. Again, positive (negative) scores imply
above (below) average decision-making influence. Military (mean = .20) and
personalist (mean = .27) regimes hand over more decision-making power
to the middle class than party-based regimes (mean = –.25). A look a the
within-regime type variation reveals once more that authoritarian regimes are
not nearly as cohesive as previously assumed. Rather, there is high variation
within different types of dictatorship, but less variation between them. Be-
tween 1970 and 2010, North Korea (a party-based regime), Myanmar (a mil-
itary dictatorship), and Libya (a personalist autocracy) have actively limited
the power of the middle class. On the other side of the spectrum, middle class
influence is strong in party-based Botswana, military Pakistan, and personal-
ist Armenia. Thus, strong as well as weak middle classes exist in otherwise
vastly different autocratic regimes. Taken together, differentiating only be-
tween types of dictatorship underestimates the influence societal groups have
on policy-decisions made by the autocratic regime.
How valid are these measures in capturing differences in the societal
make-up of autocracies? As comparable two-dimensional indexes do not exist,
concept validity is not readily testable. Nevertheless, my argument suggests
some observable implications that we should see in the data if the indexes
really measured what they were supposed to measure. For one, both indexes
should be correlated negatively. Dictators choose their coalition by maximiz-
ing support under the constraint of holding the general level of societal group
influence at a minimum. This indicates that there is a trade-off between dif-
ferent societal groups and autocratic regimes generally rely on the support of
the regime elite or the middle class or a mixture of the two groups. Figure
3.2 plots the joint distribution of the societal group power indexes. The cor-
relation between political power of the regime elite and political power of the
middle class is evidently negative (r = –.54). The measures, thus, show the
expected trade-off.
Furthermore, the regime elite should be, on average, more powerful
than the middle class, because their baseline access to the autocratic regime is
higher. Focusing on the absolute power index that is bound between 0 and 1,
this is indeed the case. The power of the elite (mean = .56) is much greater
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Table 3.1: Political Power of Societal Groups in Autocracies
Middle Class Power
Low High Total
Regime Elite Power
High
1370 655 2025
(45.42%) (21.72%) (67.14%)
Low
114 877 991
(3.78%) (29.08%) (32.86%)
Total
1484 1532 3016
(49.20%) (50.80%) (100.00%)
Note: Cells depict the number of autocratic country years.
‘low’ implies index <= .5; ‘high’ implies index > .5.
than the power of the middle class (mean = .47). Relatedly, only a negligible
number of dictators should have no power base in society, whereas some dic-
tators might rely on the support of more than one group. Therefore, at least
one group should be part of the support coalition. I test this by subdividing
the data into four groups – low and high elite power as well as low and high
middle class power. Table 3.1 shows the results, where the cutoff point is the
theoretical mean of the distribution (cutoff = .5). Again, autocratic leaders
rely more heavily on the regime elite. Two in three autocratic country-years
are marked by high regime elite power. In contrast, middle class power is al-
most evenly divided. Importantly, less than 4% of all autocratic country-years
are marked by low power of either societal group.
Lastly, middle class power should correlate with the democratic quality
of political institutions. After all, some dimensions between these concepts
overlap. For instance, the autocratic regime with the highest score on the
middle class power index, Botswana, nowadays fulfills many requirements of
democratic governance and is sometimes already coded as democracy (Boix,
Miller, and Rosato, 2013). Using the combined scores of Polity IV and Free-
dom House, the correlation between middle class power and democracy is
fairly strong (r = .55). Although this may seem high, continuous democracy
indicators are usually correlated to a much higher degree. For example, the
Polity IV and Freedom House indicators are correlated at a degree of r = .9.
The large discrepancy between these correlations increases my confidence that
the index of middle class power measures something other than democracy.
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3.4 Research Strategy
In this section, I investigate whether societal groups are able to influence au-
tocracies’ openness to FDI. This test serves a double purpose. To begin with,
it helps to understand why and how dictators open up to international invest-
ment. On top of that, it probes whether the notion to conceptualize autocratic
regimes in terms of the societal groups is more appropriate than focusing on
broad regime types, especially when the interests of different groups of actors
are not in accord. I test the hypotheses in a cross-sectional time-series setting
on a sample of up to 92 autocratic regimes between 1970 and 2010.
3.4.1 Dependent Variables
My argument distinguishes between two components of FDI openness: en-
try regulations for multinational corporations and actual FDI attractiveness.
In the following analysis, two dependent variables measure the first compo-
nent, i.e. the domestic regulatory regime for international investors. On the
one hand, I use data from the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrange-
ments and Exchange Restrictions database. Over the period between 2000
and 2010, this database contains different capital account restrictions, for ex-
ample inward FDI restrictions. Hence, the dependent variable is coded 1 if a
representative multinational corporation faces difficulties and restrictions to
move capital into a country (IMF, 2017; Pond, 2017). According to this data
source about 69% of all countries had put up restrictions for international in-
vestors. Given the ongoing trend in FDI liberalization, this number seems very
high. However, this is due to the fact that the IMF codes any restrictions on
FDI, regardless of their severity or the scope of these restrictions. Thus, even if
coded 1 – i.e. restrictions are in place – a country must not restrict FDI entirely.
This rather speaks to a country’s willingness to fine-tune FDI openness.
Because this indicator covers only a short time period, I additionally
include data on sectoral entry restrictions for FDI. This variable captures the
national-level regulatory environment of foreign capital and connects more
closely with the theoretical argument in the sense that autocratic regimes
might restrict foreign ownership only in specific sectors. Autocratic govern-
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ments have a variety of tools at their disposal to regulate the entry of multi-
national corporations. For example, foreign firms may be completely banned
from investing. Or, countries may put up limits on the equity share of foreign
multinationals. That is, MNCs have to built joint ventures with local firms in
order to invest and are not allowed to hold a majority share. Based on two
US government publications – the Overseas Business Report and the National
Trade Barrier Estimates – Pandya (2014b) codes for each industry in the Inter-
national Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC Rev. 3) whether US compa-
nies face entry restrictions. By aggregating to the level of country-years, this
dependent variable measures the yearly share of industries in each country
that are sheltered from foreign ownership via regulatory policies.
The 1970s initially saw a sharp overall increase in entry restrictions
(see Figure 3.3). By the end of this century countries had put up entry restric-
tions in about 30% of all industries. The following two decades were marked
by a gradual decrease in foreign entry restrictions, which implies that more
and more countries started to liberalize FDI entirely or turned away from re-
stricting access to certain economic sectors. As of 2000, countries shelter an
average of 10% of all industries from foreign ownership.
Figure 3.3: Sectoral Entry Restriction in Autocratic Regimes
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In addition to entry restrictions, I also examine the second component
of FDI openness: a country’s attractiveness for multinational corporations. I
focus on FDI inflows, which represent the acquisition of physical capital by a
foreign individual or legal entity in the domestic economy via acquisitions or
joint ventures (Jensen, 2006; UNCTAD, 2009). I exclude FDI outflows, i.e. the
acquisition of physical capital by domestic legal entities in foreign countries,
since they most likely capture exit restrictions. To reflect how important in-
flows are for the national economy, and thus how open a country is to FDI, I
measure FDI inflows as the share of GDP (Li, Owen, and Mitchell, 2018). Be-
cause FDI flows are right-skewed, I log-transform this variable. One obstacle
in this regard is that negative FDI inflows would be omitted. To overcome this
caveat, I use the log-transformation proposed by Busse and Hefeker (2007) in
Equation 3.1, which is applicable to negative values.
(3.1) lnFDIit “ ln
ˆ
FDIit `
b
pFDI2it ` 1q
˙
Figure 3.4 shows the astounding rise of FDI inflows in autocratic regimes.
Beginning in the early 1990s, FDI openness skyrocketed. Importantly, this
trend coincides with the gradual abolishment of entry restrictions.
Figure 3.4: FDI Inflows in Autocratic Regimes
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Taken together, the three dependent variables capture related but dif-
ferent dimensions of FDI openness. Overall investment restrictions and sec-
toral entry restrictions focus on domestic policies. These variables are thus
uniquely able to test how societal groups shape political decisions regarding
foreign direct investment liberalization. Yet, entry restrictions do not allow
to examine the actual attractiveness of a country for foreign multinationals
and, thus, capture only de jure FDI openness. FDI inflows on the other hand
measure de facto openness. They additionally include investment decisions by
multinational corporations that are not solely contingent on the willingness of
a country to liberalize FDI, but also on location advantages.
3.4.2 Model Specification
The main independent variables are the political power indexes of societal
groups in autocratic politics. Following the discussion in the previous section,
I distinguish between the influence of the middle class and the influence of
the regime elite. In line with my argument, I expect the middle class to push
for greater openness to FDI. As such, a stronger and more incorporated mid-
dle class should be negatively correlated with entry restrictions, but positively
associated with actual FDI openness. To the contrary, regime elites should be
much more wary about direct competition with foreign investors, thus work-
ing towards a more encompassing regulatory environment, exemplified by a
positive effect on entry restrictions. In include both measures simultaneously
to account for relative shifts in the political power of societal groups. Thus,
the results show the effect of a change in regime elite (middle class) power,
holding constant the political power of the middle class (regime elite).
In the baseline specifications, I control for other explanations of FDI
openness (see, Jensen, 2003; Pandya, 2014a). My argument suggests that so-
cietal groups can, through their power to shape autocratic decisions, provide
additional location advantages by contributing to a stable policy environment.
Therefore, I want to hold other sources of location advantages constant. The
size of the population in billion and the level of economic development mea-
sured in trillion real GDP per capita are proxies for the size of the domestic
economy (data from Heston, Summers, and Aten (2012), unless indicated
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otherwise). As such, they directly capture location advantages for multina-
tional corporations. Furthermore, natural resources are highly attractive and
scarce resources for international investors. Thus, I additionally include oil
production in million metric tons (Ross and Mahdavi, 2015). In addition to
controlling for location advantages, I include two variables that proxy for a
country’s need to attract FDI as a substitute for the shortage of domestic in-
vestment. On the one hand, I include the growth rate of GDP. Low growth is
oftentimes caused by a lack of investment. On the other hand, countries might
choose to resort to international investment in order to uphold the consump-
tion expenditures of the government. Furthermore, I include trade openness,
defined as the sum of imports and exports over GDP, to control for the gen-
eral openness of a country to the global economy. Lastly, I include lagged FDI
inflows to account for the fact that FDI is a long-term investment. To check
the robustness of these models, I include autocratic regime types using the
typology of Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) to directly contrast the effect
of societal groups with the effect of broad regime typologies. Moreover, I in-
clude a continuous democracy indicator that combines scores from Polity IV
and Freedom House. Because middle class power is correlated with democ-
racy, doing so tests whether societal groups make a difference, even if the level
of democracy is held constant. All control variables are lagged by one year.
My preferred model specifications are cross-sectional time-series regres-
sion models including time fixed effects. In case of dichotomous investment
restrictions, I use a probit model with country-level random effects. Because
sectoral entry restrictions are by definition bound between 0 and 1, but not
dichotomous, I use fractional probit models that include country dummies.6
As for actual FDI openness, I rely on an OLS model with country-level fixed
effects. Standard errors are clustered on the country level in each model.
3.5 Empirical Evidence
I provide two sets of evidence in support of the argument that societal groups
are able to influence overall and sectoral entry restrictions. Models 1 to 4
6 The results are generally robust to a fixed effects OLS model.
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in Table 3.2 investigate overall investment restrictions obtained from the IMF
(2017) and include 585 observations, nested in 63 autocracies between 2000
and 2010. Models 1 to 4 in Table 3.3 investigate sectoral investment restric-
tion using data from Pandya (2014a) and cover a maximum of 910 obser-
vations, nested in 59 autocratic regimes between 1970 and 2000. For both
dependent variables, model 1 reports the baseline specification. Model 2 adds
the type of autocratic regime. Model 3 includes lagged FDI inflows. Model 4
adds the combined Freedom House/Polity IV democracy indicator.
The political power of societal groups shows a consistent pattern across
both dependent variables and all model specifications. In line with my argu-
ment, increasing political power of the middle class goes along with decreas-
ing overall as well as sector-specific investment restrictions. The negative coef-
ficient of middle class power is statistically significant across the board. Apart
from its statistical significance, the effect is also substantial in size. Holding
the control variables at the mean, a one standard deviation increase in mid-
dle class power, reduces the probability that autocratic regimes put up overall
restrictions to foreign direct investment by 5.9 percentage points. The effect
is even bigger when it comes to sectoral entry barriers. Here, a one standard
deviation increase in middle class power is associated with a 6.8 percentage
point decrease in entry restrictions. This corresponds to a sizeable effect of
four additional domestic sectors that are open to FDI.
In contrast, the effect of regime elite power is positive and statistically
significant. The more politically powerful the regime elite, the higher are entry
barriers for multinational investors. A one standard deviation increase in elite
power increases the probability of overall investment restriction by 14.7 per-
centage points. Although this effect is consistent across all models, it is some-
what weaker for sectoral barriers on multinational corporations. Especially
when compared to the power of the middle class, is the effect substantially
smaller. If the power of the regime elite increases by one standard deviation,
roughly one domestic sector gets sheltered from direct competition emanating
from multinational corporations. Nonetheless, both results strongly support
Hypothesis H3.1. Societal groups are able to make a decisive difference in
autocratic policy-making, provided they have sufficient political power.
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Table 3.2: Societal Groups and Overall Investment Restrictions
Investment Restrictions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Middle class power –14.706** –15.184** –15.510* –15.971**
(6.84) (7.49) (8.35) (6.70)
Regime elite power 16.064** 20.075* 15.061** 21.118**
(8.10) (10.54) (7.34) (9.71)
Population size –11.452 –11.506 –26.184 –7.895
(61.96) (49.10) (129.60) (55.86)
Economic development 4.054 2.677 5.296 1.161
(13.74) (11.27) (43.11) (8.97)
Economic growth 0.027 0.027 0.049 0.050
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Trade openness 0.001 –0.000 –0.004 –0.005
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Government consumption 0.405 0.382 0.382 0.392*
(0.25) (0.25) (0.27) (0.21)
Oil production 0.099 0.063 0.121 0.098
(0.12) (0.08) (0.14) (0.09)
Party-based autocracy
baseline
Military autocracy 1.604
(1.71)
Personalist autocracy –3.548*
(1.93)
Lagged FDI inflows 0.423
(0.35)
Freedom House/Polity IV 0.620
(0.45)
Constant 0.894 2.549* 1.146 –0.985
(2.19) (1.49) (1.67) (1.93)
# of observations 585 585 585 585
# of autocracies 63 63 63 63
Log likelihood –109.70 –107.47 –107.64 –106.81
AIC 261.39 260.95 259.28 257.62
Prob > Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y
Probit regressions with country-level random effects.
Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Significance levels: *** pă0.01, ** pă0.05, * pă0.1.
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Table 3.3: Societal Groups and Sectoral Entry Restrictions
Sectoral Entry Restrictions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Middle class power –4.709** –5.232** –4.584** –3.512*
(2.13) (2.17) (2.21) (2.00)
Regime elite power 0.715* 0.506* 1.492** –2.233
(0.39) (0.30) (0.69) (3.00)
Population size 24.413** 23.829** 22.742* 25.007**
(11.61) (11.51) (12.49) (11.86)
Economic development –1.313 –1.334 –1.245 –1.465
(1.02) (0.99) (1.12) (1.08)
Economic growth 0.005 –0.000 0.008 0.009
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Trade openness –0.022** –0.023*** –0.022** –0.023**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Government consumption 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Oil production –0.004 –0.002 –0.005 –0.005
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Party-based autocracy
baseline
Military autocracy –1.097*
(0.66)
Personalist autocracy –0.701
(0.87)
Lagged FDI inflows –0.177**
(0.08)
Freedom House/Polity IV –0.121
(0.09)
Constant 2.430* 2.894** –0.113 1.144
(1.24) (1.24) (0.57) (0.71)
# of observations 910 910 871 847
# of autocracies 59 59 59 59
Log likelihood –188.74 –186.16 –178.52 –171.04
AIC 493.48 490.33 471.04 460.07
Prob > Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y
Fractional probit regressions with country-level fixed effects.
Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Significance levels: *** pă0.01, ** pă0.05, * pă0.1.
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As for the control variables, the results do not reveal a clear-cut pattern.
In case of overall investment restrictions, none of the control variables is statis-
tically significant. In case of sectoral entry restriction, however, some patterns
emerge. A smaller population and higher trade openness are conducive to FDI
liberalization. Furthermore, already receiving foreign direct investment seems
to set incentives to liberalize the economy further. More importantly, I do not
find consistent effects of the autocratic regime types. Whereas personalist au-
tocracies have the lowest overall investment restrictions, sectoral barriers are
lowest in military regimes. Even more, the impact of societal groups on auto-
cratic regimes’ choice to open up to FDI seems to be even greater when con-
trolling for broad institutional characteristics of autocratic rule. In extended
model specifications, I also interact the regime type with both middle class
and regime elite power. This approach allows to differentiate the effects of
societal groups in different institutional settings. As expected, there are no
statistically significant differences. These findings reinforce the notion that
regime typologies do not necessarily capture autocratic diversity in a mean-
ingful way, but that the political power of societal groups explains autocratic
decision-making better.
In a next step, I examine whether societal groups not only have the abil-
ity to shape the domestic policy environment of FDI openness, but whether
they can additionally influence the attractiveness of autocracies for interna-
tional investors. Table 3.4 thus shifts the attention to actual FDI inflows as
the dependent variable. Here, I expect middle class power as well as regime
elite power to exhibit an investment-attracting effect, which should be consid-
erably weaker in case of the latter. To make the comparison of the coefficients
possible, I use the normalized measures of societal group power in this analy-
sis. I present three models. Model 1 uses the standard set of controls. Model
2 additionally controls for the type of autocratic regime. Model 3 further in-
cludes a continuous democracy measure, which has been the most prominent
explanation for FDI openness (Li, Owen, and Mitchell, 2018). As opposed to
the analysis of the domestic regulatory regime, all models include lagged FDI
inflows. This analysis covers a maximum of 2103 country-years, nested in 93
autocracies over the period from 1970 to 2010.
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Table 3.4: Societal Groups and Actual FDI Openness
Logged FDI Inflows (in % of GDP)
(1) (2) (3)
Middle class power 0.284*** 0.293*** 0.327***
(0.09) (0.09) (0.10)
Regime elite power 0.111*** 0.113*** 0.116***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Population size 6.009*** 6.215*** 5.926***
(1.50) (1.54) (1.51)
Economic development –0.252*** –0.255*** –0.250***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Economic growth –0.000 –0.000 –0.001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Trade openness –0.001 –0.001 –0.001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Government consumption –1.094** –1.046* –1.055***
(0.52) (0.53) (0.36)
Oil production 2.249** 2.214** 2.299**
(0.89) (0.96) (0.94)
Lagged FDI inflows 0.456*** 0.455*** 0.469***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Party-based autocracy
baseline
Military autocracy –0.031
(0.08)
Personalist autocracy 0.089
(0.09)
Freedom House/Polity IV –0.017
(0.02)
Constant 0.126 0.095 0.270**
(0.18) (0.17) (0.13)
# of observations 2103 2103 1949
# of autocracies 93 93 93
R-squared (within) 0.35 0.35 0.36
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000
Year fixed effects Y Y Y
OLS regressions with country-level fixed effects.
Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Significance levels: *** pă0.01, ** pă0.05, * pă0.1.
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Across all models, FDI inflows increase in political power of the middle
class and the regime elite. As expected, the effect of middle class power is sub-
stantially larger; almost three times as large compared to the effect of regime
elite power. These effects are in line with Hypothesis H3.2. I interpret this
as a sign that societal checks on the dictators power give rise to international
investors’ confidence in greater policy stability. Given that autocracies, where
the influence of the regime elite is high, have a much tighter grip on multina-
tional corporations, regime elite power cannot unfold the same attractiveness
for foreign direct investment as middle class power, however.
As for the control variables, a bigger domestic market, lower economic
development, less government expenditures, and the production of oil in-
crease FDI inflows. Moreover, international investment is path dependent,
as exemplified by the positive and statistically significant effect of lagged FDI
inflows. Again, the type of autocratic regime does not seem to make a differ-
ence. In line with previous studies, the democratic quality of political institu-
tions similarly does not affect FDI, despite the fact that this variable is to some
extent correlated with middle class power.
Taken together, these results strongly support my argument about the
influence of societal demands on FDI liberalization in autocracies. The middle
class prefers openness and is able to translate their demands into policies the
higher their political power is. To the contrary, regime elites favor fine-tuning
or even banning FDI. Again, dictators are more responsive to such demands
the more their political survival depends on the regime elite. The fact that
power of either group is conducive to attracting investment from multina-
tional corporations, gives rise to the notion that international investors per-
ceive strong societal checks on autocratic rule as an insurance device.
3.6 Implications for Autocratic Regime Survival
What implications do these findings have for the argument of this dissertation?
This chapter provides two crucial insights to understand why foreign direct in-
vestment increases the probability of autocratic regime survival. First, I show
that autocratic support coalitions include different groups of actors. Autocratic
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support coalitions vary with regard to the influence the regime elite and the
middle class have on autocratic politics. These societal groups matter for au-
tocratic decision-making, especially when the interests of the regime elite and
the middle class are not in accord. Under such circumstances, broad institu-
tionalist measures of autocratic rule, which do not rest on a two-dimensional
understanding of autocratic politics, are not capable to add to our knowledge.
Second, I show that this distinction matters for the way autocracies reg-
ulate FDI openness. Openness to FDI is hardly a structural factor that is im-
posed on autocratic regimes. Autocratic regimes consciously and strategically
choose the level and form of FDI openness. Regime elites demand fine-tuning
or even restricting international investment. The middle class prefers greater
openness for multinational corporations. Depending on their political power,
these groups are able to get what they want. An influential middle class is
conducive to large-scale FDI liberalization, strong regime elites pressure dic-
tators into entry restrictions on foreign capital. The level and form of opening
up to FDI, thus, adds another tool to autocratic regimes’ survival kit.
Apart from adding to our understanding of autocratic power mainte-
nance, the results have wider implications for the literature on autocratic di-
versity. First, party-based autocracies are oftentimes assumed to encompass
the broadest ruling coalition (e.g., Knutsen and Fjelde, 2012). Yet, the de-
scriptive analysis in this chapter shows that this is not the case. On average,
party-based regimes do not necessarily rely on the middle class for support.
Second, previous research argues that strong parties facilitate international
investment (e.g., Gehlbach and Keefer, 2011). While this might be true if
liberalization has already taken place, my analysis shows that regime elites
operating through powerful regime parties are not conducive to a lax regula-
tory investment environment for multinational corporations in the first place.
Third, the political power of different societal groups varies widely within, but
less so across autocratic regime types, casting doubt on how useful these cate-
gories are in explaining economic and political outcomes in autocratic regimes
in general.
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Appendix
Table 3.5: Descriptive Statistics (Analysis of FDI Openness)
N Mean SD Min Max
Overall restrictions 617 0.69 0.46 0.00 1.00
Sectoral entry restrictions 885 0.24 0.40 0.00 1.00
FDI inflows (in % GDP, ln) 2249 0.96 1.06 –3.48 5.15
Regime elite power 2249 0.55 0.14 0.20 0.83
Middle class power 2249 0.53 0.14 0.16 0.88
Population size (in billion) 2202 0.04 0.14 0.00 1.33
GDP per capita (in trillion) 2168 0.20 0.74 0.00 12.78
Real GDP growth (in%) 2249 4.14 6.71 –64.05 57.82
Trade openness (in % GDP) 2189 66.66 35.88 0.10 220.41
Government consumption (in million) 2249 15.48 79.07 0.00 728.74
Oil production (in million tons) 2248 22.78 66.02 0.00 496.00
Party-based autocracy 2249 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00
Military autocracy 2249 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00
Personalist autocracy 2249 0.41 0.49 0.00 1.00
Polity IV/Freedom House combined 2137 2.89 2.03 0.00 9.08

Chapter 4
FDI and Citizen Support for Autocratic
Rule
Despite the institutional turn in comparative research on authoritarianism
(Pepinsky, 2014), scholars ascribe mass attitudes a crucial role in regime tra-
jectories (Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán, 2014). How does foreign direct in-
vestment affect citizen support for autocratic rule? Over the last decades, FDI
has been on an astounding rise – in democracies and in autocracies. Tech-
nological advances allowed countries to attract international sources of cap-
ital. And multinational corporations frequently exploited locational advan-
tages outside their home countries to increase revenues (Jensen, 2006; UNC-
TAD, 2009). Simultaneously, autocracies have progressively granted multi-
national corporations access. As such, foreign investment had and continues
to have a tremendous potential to restructure the domestic economy of host
countries. Given that it differs from other forms of economic globalization
through its long-term nature, reallocation should even be stronger than in the
case of international trade (Feenstra and Hanson, 1997; Pandya, 2014b).
4.1 Mass Attitudes in the Literature
In line with the growing importance of FDI, some studies have examined
its political consequences in developed democracies. Scheve and Slaughter
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(2004) find that FDI increases feelings of economic insecurity. Going a step
further, Walter (2010) shows that economic insecurity induced by foreign in-
vestment translates into preferences for redistribution and leads people to
support those parties that tend to provide a generous social security net. In
contrast, individuals benefiting from FDI turn to parties that aim at deepen-
ing international integration. As such, foreign investment shapes democratic
politics.1 As far as autocratic regimes are concerned, however, we know com-
paratively little about its political consequences.
In addition to the lack of research on FDI’s political consequences in au-
tocracies, there is considerable disagreement as to how structural forces – like
economic development or international openness – shape people’s values as
well as to the way such values translate into regime preferences. One strand
of research argues that economic performance caused by modernization am-
plifies citizens’ beliefs in the legitimacy of the current rule, which increases
the stability of autocracies (Bellin, 2010; Chen and Lu, 2011; Gerschewski,
2013; Haggard and Kaufman, 1995; Treisman, 2011; Wintrobe, 1998). Oth-
ers, however, contend that modernization strengthens demands for democ-
racy, for instance by enhancing education levels (Lipset, 1959; Sanborn and
Thyne, 2014), reinforcing self-expression or emancipatory values (Inglehart
and Welzel, 2005; Welzel, 2007), or via demands for income redistribution
(Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006; Boix, 2003). Yet, a third group of scholars
doubts that modernization has the potential to shape regime preferences, as
they argue that people’s demands for specific regimes always go hand in hand
with the regime they currently live in (Dahlum and Knutsen, 2017; Hadenius
and Teorell, 2005; Seligson, 2002).
4.2 Observable Implications of the Argument
In order to assess how FDI affects citizen support for autocratic rule, I argue
that a convincing answer hinges on the distributional consequences of for-
1 Similarly, the political consequences of other forms of economic globalization have been
studied extensively in democracies. For international trade, see Beaulieu (2002), Hays,
Ehrlich, and Peinhardt (2005), Mayda and Rodrik (2005), and Scheve and Slaughter (2001);
for job offshorability, see Margalit (2011), Owen (2018), Rommel and Walter (2017), and
Walter (2017).
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eign direct investment. Although beneficial in the aggregate, citizens do not
benefit from FDI exposure across the board. In applying new insights from
the trade literature (Helpman, Itshoki, and Redding, 2010; Helpman, 2014;
Melitz, 2003) to the study of foreign direct investment, I argue that the distri-
butional implications are even more heterogeneous than previously assumed
(Walter, 2017). Whether an individual gains or stands to lose is contingent on
both skill-level and actual FDI exposure.2 Low-skilled individuals face down-
ward pressure on their economic well-being the more they are exposed to
foreign investment. To the contrary, highly skilled individuals’ wage levels
increase when they work for multinational companies. Concerning market
income, foreign direct investment thus widens the gap between differently
skilled individuals. With regard to economic insecurity, I thus hypothesize:
H4.1: FDI amplifies economic insecurity and grievances among poorly edu-
cated individuals. FDI reduces economic insecurity and grievances for well-
educated individuals.
Furthermore, exposure to FDI translates into regime support through its
effect on political demands. I assume that economic self-interest is one of the
main drivers of policy preferences (see, e.g., Meltzer and Richard, 1981). See-
ing to overcome economic insecurity, low-skilled exposed individuals should
be more likely to oppose the current autocratic regime and support democ-
ratization in order to mitigate the risks from foreign direct investment. Con-
trarily, economic gains from FDI increase the perceived output legitimacy of
the regime, leading the high-skilled exposed citizens to support the incumbent
regime. This line of reasoning suggests the following hypotheses:
H4.2: As opposed to poorly educated individuals, FDI increases the belief in
the legitimacy of autocratic rule among well-educated individuals.
H4.3: As opposed to well-educated individuals, FDI heightens the demand for
democratization among poorly educated individuals.
2 This stands in contrast to the trade models widely used (for example in the theoretical
arguments of Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) and Boix (2003)). Factoral or Heckscher-
Ohlin models posit that skill-level is the only decisive factor (Heckscher, Flam, and Ohlin,
1991; Stolper and Samuelson, 1941). Sectoral or Ricardo-Viner models arrive at predictions
about distributional consequences based on actual exposure (Frieden and Rogowski, 1996;
Ricardo, 1817).
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In the following sections, I test these hypotheses against two sets of
data. The first study uses individual-level survey data from 16 autocratic
regimes in 2007. It examines whether differently skilled individuals exposed
to foreign investment hold opposing views regarding economic insecurity. Fur-
thermore, it investigates support for the current regime on three dimensions:
satisfaction with the government or leader, perceived legitimacy of the func-
tionality of political institutions, and support for autocratic rule as opposed to
democracy. The second study complements this analysis utilizing panel survey
data from the Russian Federation between 2004 and 2013. It analyzes survey
items that directly pertain to perceived and realized economic grievances as
well as citizens’ trust in state institutions.
4.3 Study 1: FDI and Regime Preferences in 16
Autocracies
In the first study, I use individual-level data from a survey administered in
16 autocratic countries by the Pew Global Attitudes Project in 2007.3 The
dataset covers roughly 16000 working-age respondents that have lived under
autocratic rule at the time the survey was conducted (see Table 4.1 for de-
scriptive statistics of the variables). Importantly, the country selection offers
variation across world regions, types of dictatorship, and the level of economic
development, which makes this set of countries particularly useful to show the
generalizability of my argument.
4.3.1 Research Strategy
Dependent Variables I use information on several dependent variables to
examine the pathway from foreign direct investment exposure to citizen sup-
port for autocratic rule. Initially, I investigate perceived feelings of economic
insecurity. I measure this variable with an open-ended question that asks re-
spondents: “What do you think is the most important problem facing you
3 The survey was conducted in the following autocracies: Bangladesh, China, Egypt, Ethiopia,
Ivory Coast, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, Tanza-
nia, Uganda, and Venezuela.
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and your family today?” Respondents’ answers were grouped into 47 dif-
ferent categories.4 As the distributional consequences of foreign investment
directly affect wage development and unemployment, I code respondents to
show realized feelings of economic insecurity, if they mention ‘low wages’ or
‘unemployment’ as the biggest or second biggest problem. Roughly one third
of respondents have experienced changes in personal well-being that lead to
economic insecurity.
In a second step, I examine individual regime support using three dif-
ferent variables. The first question is closely related to satisfaction with the
autocratic government: “Please tell me what kind of influence our national
government is having on the way things are going in [country]. Is the influ-
ence very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad, or very bad?” Higher values
indicate dissatisfaction. Roughly one third of the respondents indicate dissat-
isfaction with the autocratic government.
Next, I measure citizens’ legitimacy beliefs in the incumbent regime with
two questions that display whether respondents feel if the functionality of po-
litical institutions is congruent with their needs. The first question refers to
the de facto situation: “Does the following statement describe our country
very well, somewhat well, not too well or not well at all? Honest elections
are held regularly with a choice of at least two political parties.” The second
question captures respondents’ ideal situation: “How important is it to you to
live in a country where honest elections are held regularly with a choice of at
least two political parties? Is it very important, somewhat important, not too
important or not important at all?” The distance between the answers to the
former and the latter question gives a measure of congruence. A distance of
zero implies that the amount of political participation is exactly in line with the
importance the respective individual places on it.5 Conversely, a distance of
three represents large-scale incongruence and corresponds to lower levels of
legitimacy belief. I repeat this exercise for freedom of expression, where both
4 The broad categories include economic/financial problems, health, education and children,
housing, social relations, work, transportation, crime, government, and terrorism and war.
5 About 10% of the respondents say that the de facto situation is actually better than their
ideal situation. I recoded these to the value of 0, which implies congruence. The results are
robust to using the original scale.
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questions refer to the statement: “You can openly say what you think and can
criticize the government.” Hence, legitimacy belief refers to perceived incon-
gruence on two dimensions: political participation and freedom of expression.
For both variables, higher values indicate stark incongruence.
Lastly, I operationalize preferences for democratization as one alterna-
tive type of regime with the following question: “Some feel that we should rely
on a democratic form of government to solve our country’s problems. Others
feel that we should rely on a leader with a strong hand. Which comes closer to
your opinion?” Although this question does not directly ask about autocratic
rule, it captures the trade-off between strong leadership and democratization.
That is, people have to carefully weigh alternative regime types when answer-
ing this question. Importantly, respondents were also given the opportunity
not to answer, as this might be a highly sensitive question to some respon-
dents. Nevertheless, the response rate is roughly 90%. About 40% would
rather rely on a strong leader, whereas 60% prefer democratization. The vari-
able is coded, such that higher values correspond to the rejection of the incum-
bent autocratic regime. To check the robustness, I use another question that
asks: “If you had to choose between a good democracy or a strong economy,
which would you say is more important?” I code a respondent as a strong
proponent of democracy if he or she supports democratization as opposed to
strong leadership as well as opposed to a strong economy.
Independent Variables My argument implies that the effect of foreign direct
investment exposure on feelings of economic insecurity and citizen support
for autocratic rule differs between poorly and highly skilled individuals. As
such, a valid test requires three independent variables on the individual level:
exposure to foreign investment, skill-level, and an interaction term.
Individuals differ with regard to the degree to which they are exposed
to foreign investment. To capture this variation, I rely on regional differences
in survey recruitment and match this information with data on greenfield in-
vestments. Such investment covers new projects planned by multinational
companies from the ground up.6 The data is provided by fdimarkets.com,
6 As such, it differs from overall FDI exposure, which also includes investments in existing
firms and joint ventures. Unfortunately, such data is not available on a regional basis. Yet,
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a subsidiary of the Financial Times Ltd., which gathers information on the
amount of invested capital and the expected number of jobs created, broken
down by regions. As investment projects usually need some time to unfold
their consequences, I calculate the sum of investments over a five year period
(from 2003 to 2007) in each region and match this with the corresponding
region respondents live in. Regions for which fdimarkets.com provides no
information are coded as non-exposed. This operationalization makes two
assumptions. First, distributional consequences increase monotonically in for-
eign investment. This assumption is generally reasonable. In light of diminish-
ing marginal returns, I however use the logarithm of the amount of invested
capital as a robustness check. Second, labor is mobile within but not across re-
gions, which also implies that labor mobility is lower along regional than sec-
toral or occupational lines. Given that administrative regions are rather large,
the bias arising from within-autocracy migration patterns should be small.
Individuals further differ according to the amount of occupational skills.
I measure individual skill-level using respondents’ educational background.
Of course, individuals can also dispose of skills acquired through on-the-job-
training and individuals with low levels of education can also deliver high-
quality work, but empirical research has shown that educational achievement
is positively related to higher occupational skills and higher levels of pro-
ductivity (Jones, 2001; Spitz-Oener, 2006). Education therefore serves as a
proxy for individual skill-level. In terms of operationalization, I use informa-
tion on the highest level of education a respondent has received. The cod-
ings, however, differ between countries, which is why I standardize them into
six categories following the International Standard Classification of Educa-
tion (ISCED): no formal education/illiterate, incomplete primary education,
primary education completed, lower secondary education completed, higher
secondary education completed, and tertiary education completed.
To capture the expected conditional effect of exposure to FDI and in-
dividual skill-level, I use an interaction term (Ai and Norton, 2003; Brambor,
Clark, and Golder, 2006). My argument makes clear predictions about the
restricting the data to greenfield investment should generally bias against finding empirical
support for my argument.
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nature of this interaction term. Since FDI induces downward pressure on
low-skilled individuals’ economic well-beings, they should be more likely to
express feelings of economic insecurity and more reserved about autocratic
rule. To the contrary, high-skilled individuals face increasing returns the more
they are exposed to foreign direct investment. The dependent variables are
coded such that I expect a negative interaction term in all models.
Model Specification The dichotomous or ordinal nature of the dependent
variables necessitates the use of probit and ordered probit regression models,
respectively. Despite the limited number of countries, I use a random effects
multilevel model where respondents are clustered within countries. The re-
gression models thus account for the fact that respondents living in the same
country share a common context and are not necessarily independent from
each other (Steenbergen and Jones, 2002). The results are robust to using
probit and ordered probit regression models with country fixed effects.
I include a number of other variables that control for alternative ex-
planations. The baseline models only include gender, age in years, and in-
come. Income is measured by a self-classification into income classes. Unfor-
tunately, countries differ to some extent with respect to the number of income
classes provided in the questionnaire. To facilitate cross-national comparabil-
ity, I recode this variable so that it represents the deviation of the respondent’s
income-class from the country-specific median income-class. For reasons of
limited data availability, I include further control variables in separate mod-
els. Here, I additionally control for marital status, the number of children,
whether the respondent has friends or relatives outside the country, regularly
consults international news outlets, and lives in an urban area. The number of
children is a simple count variable. Because of the highly skewed distribution
(few people have more than five children), I restrict the number of children to
five. The remaining variables are coded as dummies.
4.3.2 Empirical Evidence
Does foreign investment alter citizens’ attitudes towards autocratic rule? The
findings indicate that citizens living under autocratic rule take their mate-
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rial situation into account when evaluating the legitimacy of the regime. As
predicted by the argument, the effect of foreign direct investment is highly
dependent on individual skill-level. Exposure to FDI increases demands for
democratization for low-skilled individuals. To the contrary, the highly skilled
are all the more satisfied with autocratic rule and have more trust in the func-
tionality of the political political institutions the more they are exposed to FDI.
Economic Insecurity The first set of models (reported in Table 4.2 in the Ap-
pendix) estimate the probability that a person expresses feelings of economic
insecurity, i.e. that respondents identify either low wages or unemployment as
a major problem, which is the main variable in the causal pathway of my ar-
gument. Exposure to foreign direct investment has a consistently positive and
statistically significant effect. Higher exposure to international markets leads
to severe economic grievances in the form of decreasing wages or unemploy-
ment. Given the interaction term, this effect is however limited to respondents
that have no formal or less than primary education. Most importantly, the in-
teraction term is, as expected, negative and statistically significant. Hence, the
effect of foreign investment exposure decreases in education levels.
Figure 4.1 illustrates the marginal effect of foreign direct investment
over different skill-levels. Exposing individuals with no formal or less than
primary education to foreign investment increases their likelihood to feel eco-
nomically insecure. On the other hand, exposing highly skilled people, i.e.
individuals with higher secondary or tertiary education, to foreign investment
in fact lowers the probability that these people report problems regarding low
wages and unemployment. Interestingly, there is no difference between indi-
viduals holding different educational degrees when FDI exposure is zero; the
effect of education levels is statistically insignificant. Education levels matter
only in the presence of exposure to foreign investment.
These results are robust to the inclusion of more control variables. Be-
cause they are perfectly in line with my theoretical argument about the het-
erogeneous effects of FDI openness on material welfare of individuals, they
lend credence to Hypothesis 4.1. Even more, they cast serious doubt on the-
oretical models that identify winners and losers from economic globalization
purely based on production factors (Heckscher-Ohlin trade models) or sectoral
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Figure 4.1: Study 1 – FDI Exposure and Economic Insecurity
exposure (Ricardo-Viner trade models).
Government Satisfaction In a next step, I analyze whether FDI-induced dis-
tributional consequences translate into differences in regime support. I distin-
guish between three conceptually different dependent variables: satisfaction
with the autocratic government, perceived legitimacy of the functionality of
political institutions, and support for democratization as opposed to auto-
cratic governance. For each variable, I provide a narrow and an extended
model specification.
Regarding government satisfaction, I expect that the beneficiaries of
FDI are significantly less likely to report that the influence of the government
is bad compared to losers of FDI openness. The results reported in Table 4.2
support this claim. The interaction term between skill-level and FDI expo-
sure is consistently negative and statistically significant. Interestingly, there
is variation between skill groups. Whereas foreign investment does not in-
fluence the probability of dissatisfaction with the government if respondents
possess less than primary education, it significantly decreases dissatisfaction
for people holding higher educational degrees (see Figure 4.2).
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Figure 4.2: Study 1 – FDI Exposure and Government Dissatisfaction
Perceived Legitimacy Furthermore, I examine whether citizens that are ex-
posed to foreign direct investment are more or less likely to report that the
functionality of key political institutions is incongruent with their own view,
depending on their skill-level. As such, this proxies for the perceived legit-
imacy of the institutional setup of the authoritarian regime. The results on
two dimensions of institutional support – political participation and freedom
of speech – are reported in Table 4.3.
With regard to political participation, Figure 4.3 shows a negative and
statistically significant interaction effect between FDI exposure and skill-level.
This exemplifies that poorly educated individuals are more likely to report in-
congruence the more they are exposed to FDI. Although they perceive political
participation as an important vehicle to overcome their dire economic situa-
tion, the losers from foreign direct investment say that electoral participation
is essentially meaningless. Thus, FDI reduces the perceived legitimacy of au-
tocratic rule for poorly educated citizens. In contrast, FDI does not change
perceptions of the legitimacy of political institutions among those individuals
that have received at least lower secondary education. In essence, the benefi-
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Figure 4.3: Study 1 – FDI Exposure and Institutional Support
ciaries are, thus, more satisfied with the institutional setup of the regime.
The same holds with regard to civil liberties, as is shown in Table 4.3.
Here too, the interaction term is negative and statistically significant, which
points to the moderating effect of skill-level when people are exposed to inter-
national competition. Once more, foreign direct investment decreases people’s
legitimacy belief only if they are comparatively not well-educated.
Autocratic Rule In a final step, I investigate how foreign direct investment
shapes citizen support for democratization or autocratic rule, respectively. Ta-
ble 4.4 reports models that investigate the determinants, which lead people
to support democratic forms of government at the expense of strong leader-
ship (models 1 and 2), and additionally at the expense of a strong economy
(models 3 and 4). The results suggest that exposure to FDI strengthens calls
for democratization if individuals are comparatively low skilled. As expected,
the interaction term is negative and statistically significant.
Figure 4.4 illustrates the weakening effect of FDI exposure across differ-
ent skill-levels. The main result is that FDI exposure is not statistically signifi-
cant anymore as soon as individuals have received more than lower secondary
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Figure 4.4: Study 1 – FDI Exposure and Democratization
education. This is consistent with my theoretical argument. High-skilled in-
dividuals benefit from economic openness in material terms. Preferences for
continued economic gains thus tend to outweigh demands for democratic par-
ticipation. However, this does not mean that high-skilled citizens strongly
prefer an authoritarian leader, but rather speaks to a status quo bias.
Summing up, across a sample of 16 autocratic regimes, foreign direct
investment increases citizens’ satisfaction with autocratic rule, but only if they
are comparatively well-educated. This is due to the fact that the highly skilled
can sell their skills in markets characterized by soaring FDI inflows. To the
contrary, especially the poorly educated part of the population faces adverse
effects of foreign direct investment. They directly blame the existing political
institutions, which amplifies calls for democracy.
4.4 Study 2: FDI and Regime Preferences in Russia
Whereas the previous analysis leverages data from 16 autocratic regimes,
this section complements these findings with longitudinal survey data from
102 FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND AUTOCRATIC SURVIVAL
the Russian Federation (see, for a similar application to study the effects of
trade, Palmtag, Rommel, and Walter, 2018). Since 1994, the Higher School
of Economics administered a nationally representative panel survey, the Rus-
sian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey. It covers respondents from 33 Russian
regions. Focusing on the working-age population, the following analysis in-
cludes a maximum number of 22500 respondents between 2004 and 2013
(see Table 4.5 for descriptive statistics of the variables).7 Unfortunately, the
dataset covers only very few ‘political’ questions and covers mostly work and
health related issues. Therefore, the analysis focuses more on the direct eco-
nomic consequences of FDI.
4.4.1 Research Strategy
Dependent Variables I concentrate on three dependent variables that mea-
sure subjective and objective economic grievances. First, the adverse con-
sequences of foreign direct investment should induce involuntary unemploy-
ment, which directly relates to realized economic risk by inducing losses in
market income. I operationalize this variable by combining two questions:
whether the respondent is currently unemployed and whether the respondent
wants to find work. Second, I use a question asking respondents whether
they are worried about not being able to afford necessary goods. This item
directly measures economic grievances in the form of threats to respondents’
livelihoods. The answers on a 5-point scale range from ‘not concerned at all’
to ‘very concerned.’ Third, I measure perceived overall economic insecurity
by utilizing a question that asks respondents to evaluate the overall state of
the economy. This question allows to examine whether FDI-related personal
risks translate into more pessimistic sociotropic perceptions of the economy.
Answers range from ‘fully satisfied’ on the positive pole to ‘not at all satisfied’
on the negative pole. All variables are coded such that higher values indicate
higher economic risk.
In addition to this set of dependent variables, which allows investigat-
7 Unfortunately, this dataset suffers from a high degree of attrition. The average observation
time is 3.5 years; some respondents have been interviewed over 10 years and others only in
2004. Therefore, the maximum number of observations is only about 80000. The restriction
to the 2004-2013 period is due to data availability regarding FDI exposure.
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ing the direct material consequences of foreign direct investment, I investigate
three variables that speak to the social consequences of FDI: First, I opera-
tionalize perceived social status with the help of survey items that encourage
respondents to rank themselves on fictional 9-step ladders. Two questions
refer to respondents’ positions in society with respect to economic as well as
power considerations. To come up with the final measure, I take the average of
both variables and reverse the scale, such that higher values indicate a lower
perceived social status. Second, I measure distrust in private business on a 5-
point scale ranging from ‘completely trust’ to ‘completely distrust.’ Although,
this survey item does not directly refer to attitudes regarding multinational
corporations, I assume that people most likely think about large companies
when hearing this question. In that sense, this question measures attitudes
towards the most productive firms in the economy, whether they are foreign
multinationals or thriving domestic firms due to foreign direct investment.
Lastly, I operationalize distrust in state institutions by combining two ques-
tions asking about trust in government and trust in the legislature, i.e. the
State Duma. Distrust in these institutions speaks to a perception of unrespon-
siveness in terms of policy on the one hand, and to less satisfaction with the
functionality of the primary state institutions on the other hand. The vari-
able is coded 1 if respondents rather or completely distrust both the executive
and the legislative branch of government; and 0 otherwise. Unfortunately, the
latter two variables were only included in the survey in 2006 and 2012.
Independent Variables To measure individual FDI exposure, I match the
yearly data on regional FDI inflows of both brownfield and greenfield invest-
ment to the region the respective respondent lives in. As such, FDI exposure
in this part of the analysis covers realized FDI inflows, as opposed to green-
field investment announcements. The data is provided by ICSID (2015) for
the years 2004 to 2013. In addition, I operationalize individual education
levels by using respondents’ highest educational degrees. This variable has
six categories: less than primary, completed primary, lower secondary, higher
secondary, secondary vocational, and completed tertiary education.
My argument about the heterogeneous effects of economic globaliza-
tion implies that exposure to FDI drives a wedge between educational groups.
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Individuals with lower levels of education should be more likely to feel eco-
nomically aggrieved when they are exposed to FDI relative to individuals with
similarly low education levels who live in less economically open regions. In
contrast, living in regions that are open to FDI should decrease economic
grievances among highly educated individuals. This implies an interaction
term between individual education-level and regional globalization exposure.
All dependent variables are coded such that I expect a negative interaction.
Model Specification I analyze this data with the help of random effects mul-
tilevel regression models, in which I nest individual survey years (level 1) in
individuals (level 2). I use a probit specification for involuntary unemploy-
ment and distrust in state institutions, an ordered probit specification for con-
cern about getting necessities, economic dissatisfaction and distrust in private
business as well as a linear specification for perceived social status.
To account for other factors that potentially influence individual eco-
nomic risk, I control for gender, age, income, marital status, whether the re-
spondent has a second job, is self-employed, or works in the public sector. Fur-
thermore, I account for the place where respondents currently live: regional
center (baseline category), city, small town, or village. Income is measured
as the logarithm of the actual household income. Age is measured in years.
All other variables are dummy variables. Each regression model also includes
year fixed effects to account for common shifts in attitudes.
4.4.2 Empirical Evidence
Tables 4.6 and 4.7 in the Appendix present the results from these regression
models. They support the findings from the multi-country survey analysis in
the previous section. That is, low-skilled individuals face more economic risk
the more they are exposed to FDI. Under the same circumstances, high-skilled
individuals fare significantly better in material terms. More importantly, they
tend to trust more in state institutions.
Economic Risk With regard to involuntary unemployment, the effect of ex-
posure to FDI is positive and statistically significant for respondents that have
no formal or have only completed primary education (see model 1 in Table
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Figure 4.5: Study 2 – FDI Exposure and Involuntary Unemployment
4.6). This means that FDI increases the probability of involuntary unemploy-
ment among poorly educated citizens. As Figure 4.5 shows, the effect of FDI
reverses as people receive a better education, however. The interaction term
between FDI exposure and education level is negative and statistically signif-
icant. As a consequence, FDI exposure decreases the probability that an indi-
vidual is involuntarily unemployed among those citizens with at least higher
secondary education. For these individuals, FDI openness in beneficial.8
The results show the same picture with regard to whether people are
concerned with being able to afford necessary goods (see model 2 in Ta-
ble 4.6). Thus, immediate threats to individuals’ livelihoods and economic
grievances increase among the poorly educated, but decrease among the highly
skilled if they are exposed to FDI (see Figure 4.6). The distributional conse-
quences of FDI are not confined to egocentric attitudes alone, but also affect
sociotropic attitudes with regard to satisfaction with the overall state of the
economy (see model 3 in Table 4.6). The beneficiaries of economic globaliza-
tion tend to be much more satisfied with the overall economic situation. Once
8 Palmtag, Rommel, and Walter (2018) find the same effect for international trade.
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Figure 4.6: Study 2 – FDI Exposure and Concern about Livelihood
again, these findings strongly support my argument about the heterogeneous
distributional effects of international economic openness.
Status and Regime Evaluation In addition, the distributional effects of FDI
do not affect individual economic risk alone. As the results in Table 4.7 sug-
gest, they also travel into individuals’ perceived status in society as well as
trust in business and state institutions.
If poorly educated citizens are exposed to FDI, they not only report a
significantly lower social status, they also distrust private business (see mod-
els 1 and 2 in Table 4.7). I argue that this perception is due to direct negative
experiences. Poorly educated individuals have a higher probability of getting
laid-off or face downward pressure on their wages. The negative and sta-
tistically significant interaction terms reveal that the beneficiaries of FDI are
different in this regard. They perceive themselves as holding an improved po-
sition in society, both with regard to economic and power considerations, and
have more trust in private business.
Even more importantly, high-skilled exposed individuals also show a
higher trust in state institutions; in this case, the Russian government and
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Figure 4.7: Study 2 – FDI Exposure and Trust in State Institutions
its legislative branch, the State Duma (see model 2 in Table 4.7 and Figure
4.7). Arguably, this reduces the propensity of dissatisfaction with the current
political situation and increases satisfaction with the policy performance of the
government, thus reducing the incentives to act against the incumbent regime.
In line with Hypothesis 4.2 and 4.3, the findings from this study second the
notion that the middle class beneficiaries of FDI tend to support autocratic
rule on material grounds.
4.5 Implications for Autocratic Regime Survival
With regard to the question how FDI affects autocratic regime survival, my
findings yield two important conclusions: First, in international political econ-
omy scholars disagree about the distributional consequences of economic glob-
alization. My results show the applicability of new new trade theory in au-
thoritarian regimes when it comes to FDI’s material consequences. Individual
economic welfare varies according to both skill-level and actual FDI expo-
sure, which is in line with the results of studies that apply new new trade
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theory in democracies (Walter, 2010, 2017). Foreign direct investment in-
creases economic welfare and consequently the probability of regime support
for high-skilled individuals. To the contrary, exposure to foreign direct in-
vestment leads to heightened economic grievances and, thus, preferences for
democratization if respondents are poorly educated.
This has serious repercussions on a second debate in comparative pol-
itics, especially concerning arguments that put the political demands of soci-
etal groups at the center of attention to explain regime trajectories. These
arguments usually hypothesize that exposure to FDI increases the chances
for democratization, because individual demand for democracy increases in
market income. My results, however, challenge this view and call for a re-
evaluation of the conclusions of redistributivist models of regime change (Ace-
moglu and Robinson, 2006; Boix, 2003). Inequality between skill-groups does
not decrease (as proposed by the factor-proportions theorem), but rather in-
crease (as proposed by new-new trade theory). In addition, increasing market
income from foreign direct investment hardly raises the demand for demo-
cratic participation, as is put forth by neo-modernization theory (Inglehart
and Welzel, 2005; Welzel, 2007). To the contrary, it appeases large parts of
the population by increasing satisfaction with the current regime. In light
of these results, the conclusion drawn from redistributivist models of regime
change should rather be: FDI leads to political complacence among the middle
class and thus contributes to the stabilization of autocratic rule.
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Appendix
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics (Analysis of Regime Support)
N Mean SD Min Max
Economic insecurity 16723 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00
Government satisfaction 16003 2.16 0.92 1.00 4.00
Legitimacy: freedom of speech 12959 0.88 1.00 0.00 3.00
Legitimacy: political participation 12875 0.98 1.07 0.00 3.00
Preferences against autocracy 14941 0.61 0.49 0.00 1.00
Preferences for democracy 15158 0.75 0.43 0.00 1.00
Female 16899 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00
Agen (in years) 16795 36.68 13.30 18.00 97.00
Income 15267 0.52 2.35 –5.00 11.00
Married 16817 0.65 0.48 0.00 1.00
# of children 16572 1.91 1.67 0.00 5.00
Foreign relatives 16816 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00
International news 15737 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00
Urban resident 16020 0.60 0.49 0.00 1.00
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Table 4.2: Study 1 – Economic Insecurity and Government Dissatisfaction
Dependent variable: respondent mentions
economic insecurity government dissatisfaction
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Education level 0.015 0.004 0.041*** 0.024***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
FDI exposure 0.756*** 0.791** 0.157 0.077
(0.29) (0.31) (0.25) (0.27)
FDI * education –0.268*** –0.285*** –0.235*** –0.220***
(0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08)
Female –0.055** –0.043* –0.020 –0.019
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Age –0.006*** –0.005*** –0.002** –0.002**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Income –0.075*** –0.070*** 0.009** 0.008*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Married –0.086*** 0.014
(0.03) (0.02)
# of children –0.027*** 0.012*
(0.01) (0.01)
Foreign relatives –0.176*** 0.111***
(0.03) (0.02)
International news 0.065*** 0.041**
(0.02) (0.02)
Urban resident 0.150*** 0.118***
(0.03) (0.02)
Panel-level variance 0.124*** 0.108*** 0.258*** 0.246***
# respondents 15022 13836 14461 13383
# of countries 16 16 16 16
Prob > Chi2 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
Log-Likelihood –9366.97 –8556.18 –17106.37 –15770.76
AIC 18749.95 17138.36 34232.74 31571.52
Multilevel probit regression models; respondents are nested within countries.
Constants and cutoff points not reported. Standard errors in parentheses.
Significance levels: *** pă0.01, ** pă0.05, * pă0.1.
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Table 4.3: Study 1 – Perceived Incongruence of Political Institutions
Dependent variable: incongruence regarding
freedom of speech political participation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Education level 0.036*** 0.027*** 0.018* 0.010
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
FDI exposure 0.891*** 0.467* 1.021*** 0.833***
(0.27) (0.28) (0.27) (0.28)
FDI * education –0.227*** –0.130* –0.246*** –0.197**
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Female –0.030 –0.027 0.011 0.012
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Age –0.001 –0.001 –0.002** –0.002*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Income 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.008 0.001
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Married 0.009 0.012
(0.03) (0.03)
# of children 0.003 0.000
(0.01) (0.01)
Foreign relatives 0.019 0.095***
(0.03) (0.03)
International news 0.010 0.000
(0.02) (0.02)
Urban resident 0.061** 0.032
(0.03) (0.03)
Panel-level variance 0.215*** 0.211*** 0.169*** 0.171***
# respondents 11414 10693 11488 10760
# of countries 15 15 15 15
Prob > Chi2 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
Log-Likelihood –13673.59 –12774.47 –13454.01 –12578.09
AIC 27367.18 25578.94 26928.02 25186.17
Multilevel ordered probit regression models; respondents are nested within countries.
Constants and cutoff points not reported. Standard errors in parentheses.
Significance levels: *** pă0.01, ** pă0.05, * pă0.1.
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Table 4.4: Study 1 – Support for Autocratic Rule and Democratization
Dependent variable: preferences
against autocracy for democracy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Education level 0.063*** 0.052*** 0.041*** 0.028**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
FDI exposure 1.009*** 0.807** 1.193*** 1.173***
(0.31) (0.32) (0.33) (0.35)
FDI * education –0.181** –0.132 –0.200** –0.177*
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10)
Female –0.078*** –0.066*** –0.073*** –0.068***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Age 0.000 –0.001 –0.001 –0.003**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Income –0.001 0.002 0.009* 0.012**
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Married 0.056* 0.095***
(0.03) (0.03)
# of children 0.011 0.016*
(0.01) (0.01)
Foreign relatives –0.005 0.045
(0.03) (0.03)
International news 0.071*** 0.075***
(0.02) (0.03)
Urban resident 0.065** 0.046
(0.03) (0.03)
Panel-level variance 0.202*** 0.201*** 0.427** 0.418**
# respondents 13708 12783 13857 12957
# of countries 15 15 15 15
Prob > Chi2 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
Log-Likelihood –8455.16 –7827.74 –7192.34 –6604.44
AIC 16926.32 15681.48 14400.68 13234.88
Multilevel probit regression models; respondents are nested within countries.
Constants and cutoff points not reported. Standard errors in parentheses.
Significance levels: *** pă0.01, ** pă0.05, * pă0.1.
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Table 4.5: Descriptive Statistics (Analysis of Regime Support in Russia)
N Mean SD Min Max
Unemployed, but wants work 124153 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00
Concern about necessities 122752 3.77 1.25 1.00 5.00
Economic dissatisfaction 123215 3.66 1.13 1.00 5.00
Lower rank in society 120086 6.00 1.39 1.00 9.00
Distrust in business 18278 3.21 1.05 1.00 5.00
Distrust in institutions 19992 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00
Female 124224 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00
Age (in years) 124220 33.61 11.81 13.00 70.00
Income (ln) 119571 6.93 3.71 0.00 14.63
Married 123906 0.51 0.50 0.00 1.00
Second job 124026 0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00
Self-employed 115585 0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00
Public sector 113010 0.34 0.48 0.00 1.00
Regional center 124224 0.41 0.49 0.00 1.00
City 124224 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00
Small town 124224 0.06 0.25 0.00 1.00
Village 124224 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00
114 FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND AUTOCRATIC SURVIVAL
Table 4.6: Study 2 – Perceived and Realized Economic Insecurity
Dependent variable:
Unemployed, Concern about Economic
but wants work necessities dissatisfaction
(1) (2) (3)
Education level 0.192*** 0.045*** 0.026***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
FDI exposure 0.158*** 0.053* 0.036
(0.05) (0.03) (0.03)
FDI * education –0.067*** –0.031*** –0.014*
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Female –0.002 0.191*** 0.023
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Age 0.010*** 0.021*** 0.023***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Income –0.125*** –0.009*** –0.040***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Married –0.257*** 0.031** –0.154***
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
Second job –0.115*** –0.140***
(0.03) (0.03)
Self-employed –0.228*** –0.381***
(0.04) (0.04)
Public sector –0.042*** –0.044***
(0.01) (0.01)
Regional center
baseline
City –0.150*** 0.297*** 0.092***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Small town –0.185*** 0.217*** 0.164***
(0.06) (0.04) (0.03)
Village 0.285*** 0.531*** 0.326***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Panel-level variance 1.045*** 0.802*** 0.676***
# of observations 51291 79657 79849
# of respondents 17359 22447 22488
Prob > Chi2 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
Log likelihood –22126.34 –105682.77 –106280.56
AIC 44294.69 211419.54 212615.12
Multilevel probit (1) and ordered probit (2 and 3) regression models.
Year or wave dummies, constants, and cutoff points not reported.
Standard errors in parentheses.
Significance levels: *** pă0.01, ** pă0.05, * pă0.1.
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Table 4.7: Study 2 – Social Status and Regime Evaluation
Dependent variable:
Lower Rank Distrust Distrust
in society business institutions
(1) (2) (3)
Education level –0.085*** –0.045*** 0.003
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
FDI exposure 0.046* 0.165*** 0.101
(0.03) (0.06) (0.07)
FDI * education –0.015** –0.029* –0.055***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Female 0.075*** 0.010 0.035
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03)
Age 0.022*** 0.012*** –0.007***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Income –0.024*** –0.009** –0.039***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Married –0.140*** –0.101*** –0.009
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03)
Second job –0.047* –0.121* –0.191**
(0.03) (0.06) (0.09)
Self-employed –0.384*** –0.589*** 0.286***
(0.03) (0.07) (0.09)
Public sector –0.118*** 0.150*** 0.266***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03)
Regional center
baseline
City 0.058*** –0.014 0.274***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Small town 0.145*** 0.019 0.301***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.06)
Village 0.123*** –0.161*** 0.387***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Panel-level variance 0.735*** 0.336*** 0.384***
# of observations 78035 16962 18646
# of respondents 22311 13909 15027
Prob > Chi2 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
Log likelihood –175192.65 –23573.18 –9139.83
AIC 350463.31 47184.36 18311.67
Multilevel linear (1), ordered probit (2), and probit (3) regression models.
Year or wave dummies, constants, and cutoff points not reported.
Standard errors in parentheses.
Significance levels: *** pă0.01, ** pă0.05, * pă0.1.

Chapter 5
FDI and Public Protest
co-authored with Tabea Palmtag and Stefanie Walter
Do FDI-induced grievances and demands translate into politics via pop-
ular protest?1 The results from the previous chapter lend strong support to the
argument that FDI creates far-reaching economic grievances among poorly ed-
ucated individuals. The low-skilled masses in FDI-intensive regions are more
distressed than highly skilled members of the middle class. And they are also
more aggrieved than equally poorly educated individuals in regions that are
less open to FDI. At the same time, a considerable share of the population
actually shows higher levels of satisfaction with their current economic and
political situation. As FDI has spread worldwide and discontent has grown
in tandem, an answer to the question whether FDI enhances or endangers
domestic political stability has become increasingly important. Even more in
autocratic regimes, since protesting is a substitute to voice political demands
in the absence of electoral competition.
In this chapter, we analyze how the distributional consequences of FDI
motivate protest behavior as well as which types of protest FDI is likely to
induce. We leverage regional variation in FDI exposure and protest events in
Russia. As one of the BRIC countries, Russia is an emerging market economy
that has opened up significantly in recent decades. It is not just an important
case in and of itself, but is also representative for many similar emerging mar-
ket economies, in which democratic avenues for the expression of FDI-related
1 The empirical analyses in this chapter rely mostly on a joint paper with Tabea Palmtag and
Stefanie Walter. I have profited immensely from their intellectual contributions.
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grievances are limited. Because Russia is a very large country, whose 83 re-
gions vary significantly both with regard to FDI exposure as well as protest
prevalence, it allows to explore the effect of economic globalization on protest
holding the national political, regulatory, and economic setting constant.
5.1 Public Protest in the Literature
Existing research on the nexus between international economic openness and
public protest is mostly concerned with the effects of economic globalization
in general. Some scholars argue that because economic globalization raises
domestic welfare, it increases domestic political stability. Others contend that
because it only benefits some, but hurts others, it fosters instability. This is
particularly true with research on one important aspect of domestic politi-
cal instability: public protest. Some studies find that economic openness is
associated with fewer protest activities (Dodson, 2015). Others find a desta-
bilizing effect, however. For example, foreign direct investment inflows have
been found to instigate labor protests in developing countries (Robertson and
Teitelbaum, 2011) or changes in international food prices have been found
to increase the likelihood of protests (Hendrix and Haggard, 2015). In addi-
tion to these positive and negative findings, yet another group of studies casts
doubt that economic openness has any effect on domestic social unrest at all
(Bussmann, Scheuthle, and Schneider, 2006; Karakaya, 2016).
A similar debate about the effect of economic globalization with equally
mixed results evolved in the civil war literature. Magee and Massoud (2011)
and Sorens and Ruger (2015) find no effect of economic globalization on civil
war onset. In contrast, a number of studies detect a pacifying effect (Barbieri
and Reuveny, 2005; Blanton and Apodaca, 2007; Flaten and de Soysa, 2012;
Hegre, Gissinger, and Gleditsch, 2003). And a third group of scholars finds a
conflict-enhancing effect (Hartzell, Hoddie, and Bauer, 2010; Nieman, 2011).
Since the empirical studies provide only inconclusive results, the jury is still
out in this debate. This chapter contributes to answering the question how
globalization affects the occurrence of public protests by building on insights
from the newest generation of trade theory, which suggest that economic glob-
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alization has more heterogeneous distributional effects than implied by earlier
models (Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple, 2004; Melitz, 2003). Existing studies
often focus on aggregate effects of trade (e.g., Karakaya, 2016), are agnos-
tic about its distributive effects (e.g., Dodson, 2015), or rely on outdated
trade models (e.g., Bussmann, Scheuthle, and Schneider, 2006; Bussmann
and Schneider, 2007), which means that they do not adequately model the
distributive effects of international trade and FDI.
5.2 Observable Implications of the Argument
Modern models of international trade and multinational production suggest
that the effect of FDI on political discontent is likely to vary considerably
among different individuals. FDI benefits well-educated individuals and hurts
the less educated. Yet, these effects are not uniform within educational groups,
but vary depending on whether individuals are actually exposed to global
competition in their workplace (Jensen, Quinn, and Weymouth, 2017; Walter,
2017). Under these circumstances, people should generally be more likely to
protest, especially because public protest ensures timeliness and public visibil-
ity of demands. Not surprisingly, a number of studies indicate that grievances
increase the likelihood that an individual will participate in protest (Bernburg,
2015; Grasso and Giugni, 2016; Kern, Marien, and Hooghe, 2015).
Yet not every aggrieved individual protests publicly. Protesting is costly;
people have to mobilize, spend time protesting, and sometimes face repression
and punishment for protest behavior (Carey, 2006; Davenport, 1995; Robert-
son, 2010). The decision to engage in protest thus depends on an individual
calculation of the costs and benefits of becoming active. Protesting may ben-
efit individuals by allowing them to publicly express their grievances and by
increasing the chances to bring about change to an undesirable situation. Yet,
the payoffs are not always large and individual costs may be high. This is why
it is not only vital that people have motives to protest, but it also matters in
which circumstances they are mobilized (Tarrow, 2011).
We argue that individuals protest when they feel that their grievances
are not just an individual problem, but when many share the same grievances.
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The individual-level effects of FDI thus only translate into wider societal ef-
fects when they accumulate. The costs of participation for individuals tend
to decrease the more similarly aggrieved individuals join protest activities.
This implies that the number of potential protesters – that is, other individ-
uals with similar concerns – in close proximity matters, turning the regional
situation into an important context.
Depending on the prevalence of highly and poorly educated individu-
als in regions and the average exposure of these regions to FDI, some regions
benefit more from FDI than others. In regions with a high share of FDI win-
ners, for example, average wages are likely to be higher and unemployment is
likely to be lower, leading to greater prosperity in these regions. In contrast,
regions in which exposure to FDI is high but meets a rather poorly educated
workforce are likely to see lower average wages, more unemployment, and
less prosperity. Thus, the effects of FDI on the regional economy depend on
the interaction between exposure to FDI and the average level of education in
the regional workforce.
As a consequence, citizens are most likely to turn to the political sphere
and publicly express their grievances when they live in an in environment,
in which the workforce is on average poorly educated and highly exposed to
international competition. Whereas a small group of highly educated individ-
uals gains from economic openness, the masses lose out. This is a hazardous
situation, as comparison to a few that are better off tends to increase per-
ceived economic grievances and instigate protest (Gurr, 1970). In contrast,
FDI openness has a pacifying effect in contexts in which a majority benefits
from multinational corporations. As the group of FDI winners is large and the
group of FDI losers is small, there are few potential fellow aggrieved individ-
uals with whom to engage in protest activities. Finally, protest levels should
be in between these two extremes in contexts where both groups of FDI losers
and winners are small. For most people in these regions, motives for protest
should not be associated with FDI exposure.
H5.1: FDI induces public protests in low-skilled regions with a high share
of aggrieved citizens. FDI leads to less protest events in regions where the
beneficiaries of FDI predominate.
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5.3 Research Strategy
To test this hypothesis empirically, we focus on regional variation in the Rus-
sian Federation and proceed in two steps. The first set of models examines
whether FDI affects regional economic welfare, which is an integral part of the
theoretical mechanism. We show that FDI increases wages, consumption, and
employment in regions with high education levels, but decreases economic
prosperity in regions with low education levels. The second set of models
then turns to the overall effect of FDI on the likelihood of public protest. The
results show that although FDI exposure by itself has no effect on protest be-
havior, it significantly impacts protest events once the moderating effect of the
regional education level is taken into account. Higher levels of FDI increase
protests in regions in which poorly educated globalization losers dominate,
but decrease protest levels in regions with high average levels of education.
5.3.1 Case Selection
The empirical analysis focuses on Russia over the period from 2007 to 2012.
We build on a quantitative single-case study design for three main reasons:
First, Russia is a large country with 83 regions that vary widely both with
respect to the intensity of public protests and exposure to economic global-
ization, but which are set within the same national political, regulatory, and
economic context. Figure 5.1 shows that the total number of protests in Rus-
sia’s regions between 2007 and 2012 varied considerably (darker shades imply
a higher number of protests). These protests are not clustered in specific parts
of Russia. Regions where protest is generally absent and regions where protest
is more common are spread across the entire country.
We observe a similarly high variation in regional exposure to FDI (see
Figure 5.2). Again, high exposure to FDI inflows is dispersed across the coun-
try. In addition to this cross-regional variation, Russia also exhibits significant
variation over time. Since the turn of the century, Russia has seen a tremen-
dous rise in international economic openness (Bayulgen, 2010). Yet, this in-
crease in international investment has been unevenly spread across regions.
Thus, cross-regional and over-time variation within the Russian Federation
122 FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND AUTOCRATIC SURVIVAL
Note: number of grassroots protest events between 2007 and 2012; darker shades imply a
higher number of protests.
Figure 5.1: Regional Variation in the Number of Grassroots Protest
allows us to examine the effect of FDI on protest behavior within the same
national context. It also allows to rule out important alternative explanations
for protest behavior that may vary on the country level, such as variation in
overall repression levels, the attractiveness of alternative means for expressing
discontent, legal regulations regarding economic openness, and other oppor-
tunity structures or country-level grievances (Robertson, 2007).
Note: FDI inflows over over GRP, 2007-2012 average; darker shades imply more FDI.
Figure 5.2: Regional Variation in Exposure to FDI
Second, Russia has been a hybrid regime since the breakup of the Soviet
Union, hanging in the balance between autocracy and democracy.2 Although
2 Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) code Russia as autocracy since 1993, when Boris Yeltsin
CHAPTER 5: FDI AND PUBLIC PROTEST 123
presidential and legislative elections are regularly held, electoral competition
is plagued by an uneven playing field (Levitsky and Way, 2010). Opposition
parties are allowed to run, but media coverage is strongly biased in favor of
the ruling party, United Russia. Electoral fraud is widespread and distorts
political competition. Freedom of assembly is oftentimes constrained and
non-governmental organizations face difficulties to communicate politically.
Nevertheless, non-system opposition groups are tolerated and active. Incen-
tives to protest are higher in such contexts, because other (electoral) means of
expressing discontent are less effective, while the costs of protests are not in-
tolerably high.3 This enables us to observe the effect of FDI on public protest,
estimating an upper bound of this effect. Importantly, Russia is representative
of many emerging market economies that have recently become much more
economically open. As such, the results provide insights into the dynamics FDI
generates for political stability.
Finally, Russia is a suitable case for our analysis for a practical reason:
the available data facilitates not only a close examination of the effect of FDI
on protest behavior, but also an exploration of the theoretical mechanism un-
derpinning the argument on the regional level.
5.3.2 Operationalization
In the first step of the analysis, which probes the theoretical mechanism, we
explore how FDI influences regional economic welfare. We use three different
dependent variables to operationalize regional welfare levels: wage levels,
unconstitutionally dissolved the Congress of People’s Deputies with military power, enforced
the establishment of the State Duma, and banned eight parties from competing in sub-
sequent elections. Freedom House (2015) reports that civil liberties and political rights
are severely curtailed. Although Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010) also code autoc-
racy, they indicate that Russia could be considered democratic if government turnover were
to occur. Polity IV paints the most optimistic picture, emphasizing that there are certain
democratic principles in place, such as multi-party elections. Its coding alternates between
democracy and anocracy (Marshall and Gurr, 2011).
3 In very closed autocracies, where repression is extraordinarily high, few people are likely
to protest openly, because engaging in protest almost always gets punished and, as such,
goes along with tremendous costs (Linz, 2000). In stable democracies on the other hand,
the effectiveness of elections in transmitting political demands and the responsiveness of
governments to convert demands into policies is higher and may discourage people from
the use of protest (Robertson, 2010). Accordingly, incentives to engage in protest are lower
in both closed autocracies and in full democracies.
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personal consumption expenditures, and employment rates. Regional aver-
age wage levels are based on data provided by ICSID (2015), covering the
years 2004 to 2013, and are standardized with the gross regional product
and log-transformed because the resulting variable is highly skewed. Personal
consumption expenditures per capita (in 1000 USD) and overall regional em-
ployment rates (number of employed persons divided by population size) are
taken from Mirkina (2014) and are available from 2004 to 2009. If globaliza-
tion benefits a region, wages, consumption, and employment should increase,
implying an increase in regional economic welfare, and vice versa.
In the second step of the analysis, we examine how FDI affects the fre-
quency of regional political protests. To measure the dependent variable,
regional public protest, we focus on grassroots protests.4 We operational-
ize grassroots protests using regional data provided by Reuter and Robertson
(2015), who rely on weekly reports on the website of the Institute of Collec-
tive Action (IKD) to count the number of protest events. In total, the IKD has
reported 5667 events between 2007 and 2012. We use the total number of
protests in a given year in each region.5 These grassroots protests are typi-
cally organized by non-system actors, i.e. social groups without direct access
to Russia’s political institutions who have to appeal to shared grievances to
incentivize people to participate and therefore closely resonate with individ-
ual interests and demands. Even if protesters do not share organizational or
other social ties, they have material interests and policy preferences in com-
mon. Therefore, these protests focus on economic concerns and demands for
improvement of challenging material situations. Involved workers oftentimes
protest wage arrears or low wages, they object the difficulties of finding a new
job when currently being unemployed, or they voice their difficulties with
making a living (Robertson, 2010, 59). Protesters are consequently motivated
to join by their grievances and the appearance of a sizable number of other
individuals with similar concerns. In further analyses, we utilize the protest
4 See Table 5.2 in the Appendix for the descriptive statistics of all variables.
5 Reuter and Robertson (2015) provide their data on a monthly basis. Information on grass-
roots protest is available from January 2007 to March 2012. Because protest events from
January to March make up about 25% of all protests in 2007 to 2011, We multiply the num-
ber of protests in 2012 by 4 to arrive at the yearly number of protests. The results are robust
to using only those years for which complete information is available.
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issues coded by Reuter and Robertson (2015) to limit the analyses to those
protests that match our argument closest: protests about wages, labor rights,
and policies to change the material welfare distribution. Solely economically
motivated protests make up 37% of all grassroots protests. Thus, a consid-
erable share of all protest instances is exclusively about addressing material
concerns by taking related demands to the local streets.
Apart from grassroots protest, we also examine the effect of FDI on elite-
led protest, which tend to be pre-organized by Russia’s main opposition party,
the Communist Party of the Russian Federation. Their non-parliamentary
activities include strikes, marches, and demonstrations (Reuter and Robert-
son, 2015).6 Because grassroots protests rely to a large extent on common
grievances, whereas elite-led protests depend more on the mobilization of
pre-existing ties that need not be connected with shared concerns emanating
from regional trends in welfare (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, 2009; McCarthy
and Zald, 1977; Tarrow, 2011) and tend to be dominated by partisan issues,
we expect FDI to only affect grassroots, but not elite-led protest. As such, FDI
does not affect large-scale and opposition-driven political discontent. Elite-led
protests are operationalized as protests organized by the KPRF, as published
in their news reports on the official website (Reuter and Robertson, 2015).
Between 2007 and 2012, the KPRF initiated a total of 3898 protests.
Our argument suggests that regional FDI exposure in conjunction with
regional education levels should be associated with the variance in protest
events over time and across regions. We focus on the most important di-
mensions of economic globalization: foreign direct investment. We measure
regional exposure to foreign direct investment using FDI inflows into Rus-
sian regions, divided by the gross regional product. Data is available for
75 regions (ICSID, 2015). Furthermore, we take the natural logarithm. In
theoretical terms, a log-transformation corresponds to decreasing marginal
returns, which reflects our expectation that the effect of an increase in FDI
6 Information on elite-led protest is available from July 2007 to June 2012. In years with
complete information (2008 to 2011), around 50% of all protests take place in the first
half of the year. Hence, we multiply protest events in 2007 and 2012 by 2 to account for
the missing months. The results are robust to using only those years for which complete
information is available.
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exposure on protest should decrease the higher the overall exposure already
is. In methodological terms, taking a logarithm is an efficient way to deal with
highly skewed data, which is the case for FDI inflows.
Average regional education levels are operationalized as the share of in-
dividuals with at least a secondary education degree (Mirkina, 2014). Because
the data unfortunately does not cover the time period from 2010 onwards, we
take the average of the share of people with secondary and tertiary education
between 2007 and 2009, the years for which data on protests is available, and
extrapolate the missing years. We thus assume that the average regional edu-
cation level remains constant. As trends over time suggest a rather steady and
uniform picture, extrapolating over three years is a reasonable approximation
for regional education levels.7 We subtract the minimum share of average
education levels, such that we can directly interpret the effect of FDI at the
minimum of the empirically observable regional education level.
Because our argument suggests that the effect of FDI on protest behav-
ior is conditional on the average education level of the regional workforce,
we include a multiplicative interaction term between each of the measures
of globalization and regional education levels (Brambor, Clark, and Golder,
2006). Reflecting the expectation that FDI exposure in regions with a poorly
(well) educated workforce should decrease (increase) economic welfare in
these regions and increase (decrease) protest activity, we expect a positive in-
teraction term for regional welfare as the dependent variable and a negative
interaction term when analyzing grassroots protest.
5.3.3 Model Specification
We use different model specifications for regional welfare and regional public
protest. The indicators of regional prosperity – wage levels, personal con-
sumption, and employment share – are continuous. We analyze these de-
pendent variables using OLS regression models with panel-corrected standard
errors (Beck and Katz, 1995). In light of the very short time series and in con-
junction with a significantly higher number of units (up to 76 regions), fixed
7 The results are robust to using averages over a longer time span to extrapolate regional
education levels.
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effects panel estimators are rather inefficient. The main explanatory variables
are FDI exposure, regional education levels, and the interaction between both
variables. The models also control for population size, the share of people
living in urban areas, distance to Moscow and road density. All explanatory
variables are lagged by one year.
For regional public protest, we employ count regression models to an-
alyze the effect of FDI. Count models are suitable for discrete, non-negative
variables, such as the number of protests. Due to the presence of over-dispersion,
we rely on negative binomial regression as opposed to Poisson regression mod-
els (Hilbe, 2014) and include random effects dispersion parameters on the
regional level (Guimaraes, 2008).
In the baseline specification, we control for other factors that affect do-
mestic unrest (Chenoweth and Ulfelder, 2017; Kern, Marien, and Hooghe,
2015; Reuter and Robertson, 2015; Robertson and Teitelbaum, 2011; Solt,
2015), using data provided by ICSID (2015). Protest may be more likely in
regions characterized by a large population size and in regions with a higher
mobilization capacity, operationalized as share of urban residents. Per capita
gross regional product proxies for the overall welfare of each region. The
growth rate of the gross regional product as well as the regional unemploy-
ment rate control for economic grievances and tend to be important deter-
minants of public protest. Newspaper coverage controls for the probability
that people are informed about regional developments and the level of trans-
parency granted by local officials, which may lower the costs of participating
in protests. Finally, we use the distance of the regional capital to Moscow and
the density of the road infrastructure.
In an extended specification, we also include international trade ex-
posure. We measure this variable with the natural logarithm of the sum of
regional imports and exports of goods, standardized by each region’s gross re-
gional product. Data is provided by ICSID (2015) for about 80 regions, based
on reports by Rosstat, the Russian Federation’s Federal State Statistics Ser-
vice. Because trade should exhibit similar effects on protest, we also include
the interaction term between trade exposure and regional education shares.
Moreover, we additionally include natural resource rents that emanate from
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oil and gas extraction, regional freedom of the press as a measure for repres-
sion, and the mandate share of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation
in regional parliaments, which proxies for political cooptation of the main op-
position (the three variables are taken from Reuter and Robertson, 2015). The
main results are robust to these additional control variables. All explanatory
variables are lagged by one year.
5.4 Empirical Evidence
5.4.1 Regional Economic Welfare
How does FDI affect regional welfare? This section presents analyses that
examine the mechanism connecting FDI and public protest. Our argument
centers on the material effects of international openness. We argue, that these
benefit highly educated individuals but hurt less-educated individuals. These
effects accumulate on the regional level. FDI should increase regional wel-
fare in regions in which many highly educated individuals live, but decrease
welfare in low-education regions, suggesting a positive interaction term be-
tween secondary education level and FDI. As such, the effect of FDI should be
mediated by the regional share of well-educated citizens.
We test this argument with data on three different indicators of regional
prosperity: wage levels, consumption levels, and employment shares. The re-
sults reported in Table 5.1 support our argument that FDI exposure is asso-
ciated with variation in regional economic welfare. FDI exposure depresses
wages (model 1) in regions in which only a small fraction of people holds a
secondary education degree. However, the positive and statistically significant
interaction term shows an increasingly positive effect of FDI on regional wage
levels as the average education of the regional workforce improves. The same
pattern holds for personal consumption (model 2) and employment (model
3). Although FDI has no effect in poorly educated regions regions, the in-
teraction terms are again positive and statistically significant. Hence, regions
with a highly educated labor force prosper under FDI.
These results provide support for the underlying mechanism suggested
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Table 5.1: Impact of FDI on Regional Welfare
Dependent variable:
Regional Personal Employment
wage-level consumption share
(1) (2) (3)
Regional FDI exposure –0.283*** 0.053 –0.004
(0.09) (0.16) (0.01)
FDI * education share 0.039*** 0.038** 0.001*
(0.01) (0.02) (0.00)
Secondary education share 0.010 –0.004 –0.000
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Population size –0.520*** 0.405*** –0.006***
(0.01) (0.05) (0.00)
Urban population –0.005** 0.025*** 0.002***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Distance to Moscow –0.130*** –0.044 0.002***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.00)
Road density –0.167*** –0.416*** 0.001*
(0.02) (0.05) (0.00)
Constant 0.086 2.591*** 0.287***
(0.38) (0.57) (0.01)
# of observations 641 351 351
# of regions 76 74 74
R squared 0.75 0.50 0.23
Prob >Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000
OLS regression models with pairwise deletion.
Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses.
Significance levels: *** pă0.01, ** pă0.05, * pă0.1.
by our argument. In regions that fare poorly under FDI, the group of poten-
tially aggrieved individuals is likely to be much larger than in regions that
benefit from economic openness, contributing to the heterogeneous effect of
FDI on protest behavior. These results also highlight the importance of taking
the sub-national context into account.
5.4.2 Public Protest in Russian Regions
How does FDI affect domestic public protest? Grassroots protest should occur
most frequently in poorly educated contexts strongly exposed to globalization,
and least often in strongly exposed regions characterized by high average ed-
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ucation levels. Protest incidents should be of an intermediate frequency in
regions relatively sheltered from international trade and FDI. This argument
suggests that the interaction term between regional FDI exposure and regional
education levels is negative.
Table 5.3 reports the findings of the analysis of grassroots protest. Model
1 shows the unconditional effect of FDI on grassroots protests. It suggests
that FDI does not unfold any substantially or statistically significant effect on
the number of protests, echoing the results from previous studies that do not
find any effect of economic openness on domestic social unrest (Bussmann,
Scheuthle, and Schneider, 2006; Karakaya, 2016). Our argument, however,
suggests that the effect of FDI exposure on protest is not uniform, but depends
on the level of education among the workforce, which determines whether FDI
will predominantly create winners or losers in a region. To test this argument,
model 2 interacts FDI inflows with the share of people that have completed
at least secondary education. This fundamentally changes the picture: Not
only does a likelihood-ratio test indicate that the interaction model performs
significantly better than the unconditional model, we now also find that in
line with the theoretical expectations, FDI increase the number of grassroots
protests in contexts with low education levels (see Figure 5.3).
Note: results from negative binomial regression models (2-4), reported in Table 5.3; control
variables not shown; 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 5.3: Impact of FDI on Regional Public Protest
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The interaction term between FDI and education levels is negative and
statistically significant in all specifications examining grassroots protests, even
when controlling for international trade. To facilitate the interpretation of
these results, we present a marginal effects plot of the interaction term in
Figure 5.4, which shows how the effect of exposure to FDI changes as the
share of highly educated individuals increases. FDI does not have a uniform
effect on protests, as rising education levels reverse the relationship between
exposure to international investment and grassroots protest. Whereas FDI
increases protest incidence in regions with low average education levels, it is
associated with less protest activities in all regions where more than half of
the population completed secondary education.
Note: results based on model 2 in Table 5.3; control variables held at their means; 95%
confidence intervals.
Figure 5.4: Marginal Effect of FDI on Regional Public Protest
As for the control variables (see Table 5.3), we find that protest is con-
sistently more wide-spread in poorer and more populated regions. Regional
economic growth deters protest. Regions that are farther away from Moscow
experience higher levels of social unrest. In contrast, urbanization, the un-
employment rate, the number of newspapers, road density, as well as natural
132 FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND AUTOCRATIC SURVIVAL
resource rents and press freedom do not have a statistically significant effect
on protest incidence.8
The models in Table 5.4 present additional analyses. Here, the depen-
dent variable is restricted to those grassroots protests that concentrate on eco-
nomic issues. Although FDI exhibits a protest-facilitating effect on its own in
model 1, the remaining models once again make clear that regional education
levels mediate the effect of FDI exposure. As soon as the conditional effect
of the regional education level is taken into account, FDI matters in the way
predicted. Protests regarding labor rights, wages, or changes in the material
distribution of welfare are much more frequent in regions in which a poorly
educated workforce is exposed to FDI, whereas such protests rarely occur in
regions in which a highly educated workforce is exposed to FDI.
In contrast to grassroots economic protest, the models in Table 5.5 ex-
amine elite-led political protest. As expected, FDI has no effect on the fre-
quency of opposition protests, i.e. protests pre-organized by the Communist
party KPRF. This is the case in both the unconditional as well as the conditional
model.9 Hence, these events are much less driven by material motives, but oc-
cur more frequently in more populated and richer regions that are farther
away from Moscow, provide a better infrastructure in terms of road density,
and where news coverage is high. This suggests that in contrast to grassroots
protests, which are clearly linked to FDI-related grievances, protests organized
by groups or organizations that already have privileged access to political in-
stitutions, such as the KPRF, are much more strongly affected by factors influ-
encing mobilization capacity rather than shared economic grievances.
In sum, these findings provide evidence for our argument that expo-
sure to FDI influences domestic protest levels, but that the effect strongly de-
pends on the educational context. FDI feeds domestic conflict when labor is
poorly educated, but mitigates protests in contexts in which a well-educated
population benefits. These analyses thus suggest that the effect of FDI on
8 Despite the fact that FDI directly influences the gross regional product and unemployment,
the inclusion of both variables does not change the findings.
9 The coefficients of FDI are generally smaller and not statistically significant. There is also no
statistically significant difference in the log-likelihoods of the conditional and unconditional
models, suggesting that in contrast to the models on grassroots protests, the interaction term
does not add explanatory power.
CHAPTER 5: FDI AND PUBLIC PROTEST 133
protest behavior – and domestic political stability more generally – are more
nuanced than previous studies have acknowledged. Nevertheless, the protest-
enhancing effect emanating from economic grievances does not translate into
political upheaval that has the potential to destabilize the autocratic regime.
5.5 Implications for Autocratic Regime Survival
What implications do these findings have for autocratic regime survival? This
analysis shows that FDI can have both negative and positive effects, depend-
ing on the regional context and the prevailing distributive consequences. Be-
cause poorly educated individuals lose out from FDI, they develop economic
grievances. When this group of FDI losers is large enough, they turn to the
political sphere and publicly protest to voice these grievances. In contexts in
which more people benefit from FDI than are hurt by it economic openness has
a pacifying effect. As less people lose out and the overall regional economic
situation improves, the likelihood of public protests declines.
These results have implications for our understanding of autocratic pol-
itics. First, they can explain the null findings in the previous literature, as
positive and negative effects of FDI cancel each other out when the specific dis-
tributive effects are not modeled properly. Overall, this chapter demonstrates
that it is crucial to take the specific distributive effects of globalization into
account when examining FDI’s political consequences in autocratic regimes.
Second, this chapter shows that grassroots protests on economic issues are an
ordinary feature of autocratic politics. Because democratic means for voicing
economic grievances are often circumscribed, people use other channels to
publicly express their discontent. Yet, FDI-related grievances do not cascade
into large-scale uprisings that aim at overthrowing the incumbent regime. In
contrast, FDI might even generate new support groups for autocratic regimes.
FDI’s effect is not uniform, but varies widely among regions. And members of
the middle class not only have an above-average level of education, they also
frequently live in regions where FDI boosts welfare and, in turn, lowers the
incentives of the middle class to engage in protest.
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Appendix
Table 5.2: Descriptive Statistics (Analysis of Public Protest)
N Mean SD Min Max
Grassroots protest 417 14.39 42.08 0.00 406.00
Economic grassroots protest 417 5.42 16.41 0.00 173.00
Elite-led protest 417 10.92 9.80 0.00 62.00
Wage level (ln) 641 –2.79 0.92 –5.65 –0.38
Personal consumption 351 3.80 1.41 1.99 12.33
Employment share 351 0.47 0.06 0.19 0.59
Regional trade exposure (ln) 417 3.18 0.78 0.65 5.10
Regional FDI exposure (ln) 417 0.64 0.57 0.00 3.55
Secondary education share 417 12.92 5.78 0.83 29.93
Population size 417 1.93 1.75 0.15 11.92
Urban population share 417 71.47 11.01 27.10 100.00
GRP per capita (ln) 417 12.16 0.52 11.10 14.10
GRP growth 417 0.14 0.20 –0.43 0.83
Unemployment rate 417 7.10 2.57 0.80 21.70
Newspaper coverage (ln) 417 6.64 0.73 4.58 8.94
Distance to Moscow (ln) 417 6.96 1.61 0.00 9.38
Road density (ln) 417 4.51 1.28 0.96 7.68
Natural resource rents 417 7.19 11.79 0.00 55.70
Press freedom 417 2.06 0.66 1.00 3.00
KPRF mandate share 417 10.20 6.04 0.00 33.00
CHAPTER 5: FDI AND PUBLIC PROTEST 135
Table 5.3: Impact of FDI on Regional Grassroots Protest
Dependent variable: Grassroots protest
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Regional FDI exposure 0.087 0.730*** 0.650*** 0.579**
(0.10) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24)
FDI * education share –0.054*** –0.047** –0.042**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Regional trade exposure 0.433* 0.441*
(0.24) (0.25)
Trade * education share –0.041** –0.041**
(0.02) (0.02)
Secondary education share –0.077*** –0.042** 0.078 0.078
(0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.06)
Population size 0.454*** 0.470*** 0.515*** 0.495***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Urban population 0.003 0.006 0.017 0.019
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
GRP per capita –0.640*** –0.695*** –0.699*** –0.710***
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14)
GRP growth –0.453** –0.430** –0.431** –0.451**
(0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21)
Unemployment rate –0.034 –0.029 –0.035 –0.032
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Newspaper coverage –0.103 –0.094 –0.039 –0.055
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Distance to Moscow 0.217*** 0.199*** 0.206*** 0.183**
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Road density –0.169 –0.186* –0.177* –0.108
(0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Natural resources 0.010
(0.01)
Press freedom 0.046
(0.09)
KPRF mandate share –0.020*
(0.01)
Constant 8.369*** 8.462*** 5.998*** 5.977***
(1.90) (1.91) (2.18) (2.22)
# of observations 417 417 417 417
# of regions 74 74 74 74
Prob >Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Log likelihood –1228.20 –1224.02 –1221.01 –1218.31
AIC 2482.41 2476.03 2474.02 2474.61
Negative binomial regression models with regional-level random effects.
Standard errors in parentheses.
Significance levels: *** pă0.01, ** pă0.05, * pă0.1.
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Table 5.4: Impact of FDI on Regional Economic Protest
Dependent variable: Economic grassroots protest
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Regional FDI exposure 0.247** 0.912*** 0.745** 0.703**
(0.30) (0.30) (0.31)
FDI * education share –0.056** –0.043* –0.043*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Regional trade exposure 0.655** 0.656**
(0.29) (0.29)
Trade * education share –0.048** –0.047**
(0.02) (0.02)
Secondary education share –0.071*** –0.039* 0.107* 0.110*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.07) (0.07)
Population size 0.517*** 0.536*** 0.565*** 0.550***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
Urban population –0.001 0.002 0.010 0.011
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
GRP per capita –1.095*** –1.176*** –1.185*** –1.313***
(0.16) (0.17) (0.17) (0.19)
GRP growth –0.611** –0.595** –0.575** –0.639**
(0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27)
Unemployment rate –0.079** –0.074** –0.074* –0.069*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Newspaper coverage –0.043 –0.036 0.041 0.062
(0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14)
Distance to Moscow 0.221** 0.210** 0.194** 0.168*
(0.0*) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Road density –0.275** –0.295** –0.313*** –0.237**
(0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Natural resources 0.023**
(0.01)
Press freedom 0.083
(0.11)
KPRF mandate share –0.007
(0.01)
Constant 13.769*** 14.136*** 11.267*** 12.154***
(2.47) (2.50) (2.71) (2.81)
# of observations 417 417 417 417
# of regions 74 74 74 74
Prob >Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Log likelihood –895.62 –892.80 –890.10 –887.23
AIC 1817.24 1813.61 1812.20 1812.46
Negative binomial regression models with regional-level random effects.
Standard errors in parentheses.
Significance levels: *** pă0.01, ** pă0.05, * pă0.1.
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Table 5.5: Impact of FDI on Regional Elite-Led Protest
Dependent variable: Elite-led protest
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Regional FDI exposure –0.003 –0.021 –0.003 0.021
(0.06) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
FDI * education share 0.001 0.000 –0.002
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Regional trade exposure –0.111 –0.096
(0.18) (0.18)
Trade * education share 0.006 0.005
(0.01) (0.01)
Secondary education share 0.014 0.013 –0.006 –0.004
(0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04)
Population size 0.139*** 0.139*** 0.140*** 0.152***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Urban population 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.006
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
GRP per capita 0.283*** 0.284*** 0.287*** 0.312***
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
GRP growth 0.036 0.036 0.040 0.054
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Unemployment rate 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.013
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Newspaper coverage 0.172** 0.172** 0.168** 0.166**
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Distance to Moscow 0.124** 0.124** 0.132** 0.145**
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Road density 0.210*** 0.210*** 0.218*** 0.178***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Natural resources –0.008
(0.01)
Press freedom –0.065
(0.06)
KPRF mandate share 0.007
(0.01)
Constant –5.314*** –5.305*** –5.062*** –5.141***
(1.23) (1.23) (1.34) (1.37)
# of observations 417 417 417 417
# of regions 74 74 74 74
Prob >Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Log likelihood –1252.49 –1252.48 –1252.28 –1250.11
AIC 2530.98 2532.96 2536.56 2538.21
Negative binomial regression models with regional-level random effects.
Standard errors in parentheses.
Significance levels: *** pă0.01, ** pă0.05, * pă0.1.

Chapter 6
FDI and Autocratic Regime Survival
How does foreign direct investment affect the survival of autocratic regimes
and the prospects for democratization? In this chapter, I examine the main
hypothesis of the theoretical argument of this dissertation. FDI not only re-
allocates resources within the domestic economy, but exhibits sizable effects
on political developments in autocracies as well and, thus, affects autocratic
regime survival. From the previous chapters we know quite a bit about how
FDI affects politics in autocratic regimes on other dimensions. A consider-
able share of the population is adversely affected and shows signs of eco-
nomic grievances. The masses voice these grievances in the form of grass-
roots protests. And even though the masses would in principal prefer regime
change and favor democratization, they lack the associational resources to do
so. Members of the middle class, on the other hand, are much more satis-
fied with the incumbent regime and have only few incentives to engage in
attempts to challenge autocracy. Moreover, regime elites have the opportunity
to fine-tune FDI openness to their advantage.
6.1 Observable Implications of the Argument
My argument stresses the role of societal groups to understand autocratic
regime survival and breakdown, respectively. Autocratic rule depends on the
support of societal actors, especially from the regime elite and the middle
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class. For these groups, FDI unfolds both a legitimacy-enhancing as well as a
cooptation-enabling effect. If an autocratic regime relies mainly on the sup-
port of the regime elite, they gain the necessary political power to shield the
most productive sectors from foreign competition. Under these circumstances,
multinational corporations face entry barriers, but are nevertheless allowed in
a specific subset of domestic sectors. In addition, investment in these sec-
tors creates economic revenues that the regime can use to buy off potentially
adversely affected members of the regime elite.
Apart from the regime elite, FDI raises market income and economic
well-being for the members of the middle class. This group of actors profits
from increasing wages and employments prospects. Material gains tip the bal-
ance in favor of supporting the incumbent regime. Attempts to overthrow the
incumbent regime become unattractive, because they are costly, their success
and outcome is uncertain, and they go along with short-term economic deteri-
oration. Foreign direct investment thus lowers the incentives of either societal
group to engage in actions to topple the autocratic regime, for instance via
elite coups or popular uprisings. In essence, FDI aligns the interests of the
essential members of the support coalition towards supporting the stability of
political conditions.
H6.1: The higher the inflows of foreign direct investment are, the lower is the
probability of autocratic regime breakdown, and the longer is the duration of
autocratic rule.
Apart from this general effect, I expect differences between autocratic
regimes. These differences hinge on the power concentration within the auto-
cratic support coalition. Power concentration not only implies that the prob-
ability of diverging interests among the support coalition is small, but also
facilitates regime institutionalization either in the form of regime parties, as
far as the elite is concerned, or in the form of civil society organizations, as far
as the middle class is concerned. On top of that, power concentration leads
to higher inflows of foreign direct investment. Because reneging on preferred
policies endangers the regime’s hold on power, powerful societal groups addi-
tionally serve as an insurance device for international investors. As such, both
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the form and the level of FDI openness are tailored towards the dominant so-
cietal group, which then is able to reap even higher profits from FDI. In line
with this notion, I hypothesize:
H6.2: The autocracy-stabilizing effect of foreign direct investment is greater,
the more power is concentrated in favor of the regime elite or the middle class.
6.2 Research Strategy
This section presents the research design to test these hypotheses with statis-
tical methods. In what follows, I discuss the case selection, present the opera-
tionalization of the key variables, and justify the methodological approach to
analyze the data.
6.2.1 Case Selection and Regime Breakdowns
The universe of cases on which I build my analysis includes all sovereign au-
tocratic regimes. I use a negative definition of autocracy, i.e. regimes that
do not fulfill a minimalist and procedural definition of democracy in terms of
electoral participation and contestation (Coppedge, 2012; Dahl, 1971; Schum-
peter, 1950). Because both dimensions are necessary conditions for democ-
racy, an autocracy is identified if either free and fair elections are not the only
means by which political leaders are chosen or only one party is allowed to
compete for office. The uninterrupted period in which this is the case is de-
fined as an authoritarian spell (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, 2014).
The focus on spells alone loses sight of the fact that dictatorships come
in very different facets and show very different faces. One possible way to fur-
ther disentangle spells is to focus on political regimes. A political regime is “a
set of basic formal and informal rules for choosing leaders and policies” (Ged-
des, 1999, 116). Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014, 314) identify autocratic
breakdowns as instances “when basic rules about the identity of the leadership
group change”.1 As can be seen in Figure 6.1, there is tremendous variation
within authoritarian spells. About half of all authoritarian spells contain more
1 In addition, I do not take into account time periods, in which a country was under foreign
intervention, warlordism, or a provisional government was in place.
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Figure 6.1: Number of Autocratic Regimes per Autocratic Spell
than one autocratic regime and, therefore, have faced at least one autocratic
regime breakdown.
To arrive at the final set of cases, I further adapt this sample: First,
the period under investigation is 1970 to 2010. Although data on autocratic
regimes is generally available since 1946, data on FDI is not. Second, I only
include countries with more than one million inhabitants as of 2009, because
Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) do not provide data on small countries.2
Third, autocratic regimes that lasted less than one year are dropped from
the sample, because the empirical models used in this study are not able to
incorporate them.
The unit of analysis is the autocratic regime-year. I use data from Ged-
des, Wright, and Frantz (2014) to identify regime breakdowns and the survival
time of autocratic regimes. The analysis covers 182 autocratic regimes in 104
2 There are other datasets that provide data on small countries. However, they either do not
conceptualize autocratic regime breakdown in a meaningful way (Cheibub, Gandhi, and
Vreeland, 2010) or do not use a clear-cut criterion to distinguish between democracies and
autocracies (Wahman, Teorell, and Hadenius, 2013). Dropping small countries from the
sample should bias the results against my theoretical argument, since small economies are
usually more open to international markets (Katzenstein, 1985).
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countries. 127 autocratic breakdowns occurred during the investigation pe-
riod. 57 autocratic regimes are still in place, i.e. they are right-censored. 74
autocratic regimes in the sample were installed before 1970, i.e. they are left-
truncated. To include these into the sample, I have to make two assumptions:
First, FDI flows had to be zero before 1970. This assumption is reasonable,
given the fact that foreign direct investment only became a prominent feature
of international economics beginning in the 1990s. Second, these autocratic
regimes should be a random sample of all autocratic regimes that were in
place before 1970. This means that they are not characterized by some ob-
servable or unobservable factors systematically influencing their probability
of survival. Since this assumption is probably violated, I check the robustness
of the main models by excluding left-truncated regimes. 16 autocratic regimes
are both right-censored as well as left-truncated.
6.2.2 Empirical Model
I employ survival models to investigate the impact of foreign direct invest-
ment on autocratic regime survival. Survival models take into account both
the time until and if an event occurs. The underlying logic is a failure-time
process (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004). Observations enter the study
at some natural starting point. In the present case, this is marked by the es-
tablishment of an autocratic regime or the year 1970, respectively. Once an
observation entered the study, it is at risk of experiencing an event – here,
the breakdown of the regime. If the event occurs, the observation leaves the
risk set. Thus, the status of an observation is constant until an event occurs,
while the covariates influencing the probability of an event are time-variant.
Because countries sometimes experience multiple autocratic breakdowns, the
instauration of a subsequent autocratic regime after a breakdown constitutes
a new observation.
Survival models rest on the assumption that every observation will, for
some reason, fail at some point in time, although it may not have failed dur-
ing the observation period. These right-censored observations do not allow to
calculate basic statistical moments, such as the mean, without either making
assumptions about the survival time of these observations or deleting them
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from the set of units at risk, which would bias the results in favor of more un-
stable regimes. This is the fundamental rationale for employing survival mod-
els instead of logit estimators (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004). Survival
estimates are unbiased if we assume non-informative censoring, i.e. there is
no unobserved factor influencing the end of the investigation period. Since
the year 2010 is a rather arbitrary threshold, this assumption should hold.
A variety of models fall into the category of survival models. They differ
according to the assumptions they make about the nature of the failure-time
process. Figure 6.2 compares three different models. The solid line depicts
the Kaplan-Meier estimate of the survival curve. Kaplan-Meier estimates are
non-parametric and make no assumption about the specific form of the failure-
time process, but yield a descriptive picture of the estimate of the survival
time of each unit. Because this estimate is non-parametric, no generalizable
inferences can be drawn. However, Kaplan-Meier survival curves constitute
an important baseline for evaluating parametric survival models.
The assumptions of parametric models – like the exponential or the
Weibull model – are reflected in the functional form of the baseline hazard.
Figure 6.2: Comparison of Survival Models
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Yet, models differ with regard to the specific assumption they make about
the baseline hazard. The exponential model assumes a constant hazard over
time; the Weibull model allows for either constant, increasing, or decreasing
hazards. Therefore, the Weibull model estimates two parameters instead of
one. Figure 6.2 compares the fit of the exponential and Weibull model to the
Kaplan-Meier estimate of the survival curve. The graphical inspection reveals
that the Weibull model (dotted line) fits the data better than the exponen-
tial model (dashed line). This is also reflected in the statistically significant
gamma-term. A gamma estimate smaller than 1 implies decreasing hazards.
Hence, the baseline hazard for autocratic regimes to break down decreases
with higher duration, which is reasonable as autocratic regimes become more
and more institutionalized. But, a look at Figure 6.2 also reveals that the
Weibull model does not fit the data very well either. Up to about 30 years it
constantly overestimates the survival function, above 30 years it systematically
underestimates the Kaplan-Meier survival curve.
Given that the duration dependency of autocratic regimes does not seem
to follow one specific form, I employ semi-parametric models in the form of
Cox proportional hazard models that leave the specific form of the failure-time
process unattended (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004). In practical terms,
this implies that these kinds of models do not need to estimate a baseline
hazard. To this effect, Cox proportional hazard models are much more flexible
when fitting the data.
It is important to note that the dependent variable in survival models is
not whether an event occurs, but rather the time a unit spends in one specific
state. The estimates of a Cox model relate directly to the hazard of breakdown
obtained from the duration of a unit. I report coefficients, instead of hazard
ratios. Positive coefficients imply that a one-unit increase in the covariate
increases the probability of an event and, thus, decreases the survival time.
Because it is possible that a country experienced several autocratic regimes, I
have to control for unobserved heterogeneity. This is usually done by including
country fixed effects. However, this is not possible because some countries
experienced only one autocratic regime. Instead, I include region fixed effects
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that capture regional clustering of autocratic regime breakdown.3 To check
the robustness of this model, I also estimate Cox survival models with shared
frailties by world region. In addition, I include decade fixed effects to account
for common trends in FDI and autocratic breakdowns. The results are also
largely robust to year fixed effects.
6.2.3 Independent Variables
My argument implies that exposure to foreign direct investment facilitates
autocratic regime survival. I measure this exposure with foreign direct invest-
ment inflows, standardized by a country’s population size in a given year.4
Because FDI inflows are right-skewed, I log-transform this variable. One ob-
stacle in this regard is that negative FDI flows, i.e. large-scale divestment,
would be omitted. To overcome this caveat, I use the log-transformation pro-
posed by Busse and Hefeker (2007) in Equation 6.1. This approach transforms
negative FDI flows and keeps the direction at the same time.
(6.1) lnFDIit “ ln
ˆ
FDIit `
b
pFDI2it ` 1q
˙
According to Hypothesis 6.1, more foreign direct investment should in-
crease the duration of autocracies. Combining this with the model specifica-
tion, I expect FDI inflows to show a negative effect on the hazard of break-
down. In addition, I expect differences between autocratic regimes regarding
the effect of foreign direct investment on autocratic regime survival, depend-
ing on the power of societal groups in the support coalition (Hypothesis 6.2).
I use the societal group power indexes introduced in Chapter 3 to measure
autocratic diversity. I model this conditional effect by estimating interaction
terms between the power of either the regime elite or the middle class and FDI
inflows (Brambor, Clark, and Golder, 2006). Because my argument suggests
a reinforcing effect of power concentration in the support coalition, I expect a
negative interaction term for both societal groups.
3 Eastern Europe and post Soviet Union, Latin America, North Africa and Middle East, Sub-
Saharan Africa, Western Europe and North Africa, East Asia, South-East Asia, and South
Asia.
4 The results are robust to using FDI stocks or standardizing by a country’s level of GDP.
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6.2.4 Control Variables
In this analysis I employ an empirical selection-on-observables design to es-
timate the effect of foreign investment on autocratic survival by controlling
for possible confounding variables. In order for these variables to be good
controls, they have to fulfill two criteria (Angrist and Pischke, 2009): First,
they need to be correlated with both the dependent and independent variable.
Second, control variables should not be caused by the independent variable,
because this induces post-treatment bias. Controlling for post-treatment vari-
ables inflates or reduces the effect of the independent variable. The direction
of this bias is however not assessable in advance (Gelman and Hill, 2007).
The selection of control variables is based on Pepinsky (2009) who es-
timates the effect of capital account restrictions on regime survival (data on
control variables is taken from Heston, Summers, and Aten (2012), unless in-
dicated otherwise). In the baseline model, I include the size of the population
in millions, economic development measured as the level of gross domestic
product in billions, and trade openness as another important component of
international economic openness.5 In addition to Pepinsky’s (2009) speci-
fication, I further control for the start year of the regime and the number
of previous regimes (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, 2014). Both variables are
rather technical in nature. The former ensures that autocratic regimes that
were established at different points in time are not in the same risk set. This
is necessary, because FDI has grown considerably in recent decades, and mini-
mizes the problem of non-stationarity. The latter variable stratifies the hazard
rates of autocratic breakdown by the number of previous regimes, because
countries that experienced previous regime failures have a higher probability
of subsequent regime failure. Additionally, I control for government expen-
ditures as measure for overall financial cooptation, oil production as another
source of foreign income (Ross and Mahdavi, 2015), and ethnic fractionaliza-
tion as an important source of cleavage in autocratic regimes (Alesina et al.,
2003) in separate models.
5 Contrary to Pepinsky (2009), I do not control for the democratic quality of political institu-
tions using Polity IV, because this variable induces post-treatment bias. I also do not control
for the age of the regime, because Cox proportional hazard models already take this factor
into account.
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Extended model specifications also include institutional characteristics
proxied by the autocratic regime type. According to Geddes (1999, 2003) au-
tocratic regimes differ, because control over access to power and influence on
political decision vary. She distinguishes between three main regime types:
party-based, military, and personalist regimes.6 Figure 6.3 shows the Kaplan-
Meier estimate of the survival curves for each autocratic regime type. Institu-
tional features alone seem to explain a great deal of variation. The survival
curve of party-based regimes decreases at the slowest rate. Consequently, the
median survival time is highest, amounting to 34 years. At the other end of
the spectrum are military regimes with a median duration of 6 years. Person-
alist regimes occupy the middle ground; the median survival time is 14 years.
Consequently, this model allows to test whether the combination of foreign
direct investment and the power of societal groups makes a difference, even
when accounting for broad institutional characteristics of autocratic rule.
Figure 6.3: Differences in the Durability of Autocratic Regime Types
6 In the current dataset, she also introduces monarchies, which I collapse with personalist
regimes. The main results are robust to including monarchies as a separate regime type.
She further distinguishes between several hybrid regime types. I collapse these into the
main types in accordance with Roller (2013).
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Lastly, I control for the growth of GDP in separate models. Foreign
direct investment is likely to contribute to higher growth rates. Controlling
for economic growth therefore closes an important channel through which
FDI affects autocratic survival.
6.3 Empirical Evidence
This section presents the empirical findings obtained from the Cox regression
models.7 I proceed in three steps. First, I present models that estimate the
overall effect of foreign direct investment on autocratic regime survival (Hy-
pothesis 6.1). Second, I present models that condition this effect by the the
power of societal groups in autocratic regimes to test differences in the impact
of FDI (Hypothesis 6.2). Third, I test whether the results from the study of au-
tocratic breakdown also hold for a specific outcome of autocratic breakdown
– democratization – and for specific modes of autocratic breakdown – elite
coups and popular uprisings.
Table 6.2 presents the first set of models. The dependent variable is the
hazard of autocratic regime breakdown. Model 1 shows the baseline speci-
fication including the start of the autocratic regime, the number of previous
regimes, population size, economic development, and trade openness. Model
2 further includes government expenditures, oil production, and ethnic frac-
tionalization. Model 3 controls for the type of autocratic regime. Across these
model specifications, FDI inflows reveal an autocracy-stabilizing effect. The
coefficient of FDI inflows is consistently negative and and statistically signifi-
cant, even though the effect reduces in statistical significance to the 10% level
the more control variables are added to the model.8 Apart from the statistical
significance, the effect of FDI is sizable. Across all regime types, a one stan-
dard deviation increase in FDI, increases the probability of survival by about
20%. Considering the rise of foreign direct investment in recent decades, this
corresponds to a substantial effect that is in line with Hypothesis 6.1 and sup-
ports my theoretical argument.
7 See Table 6.1 for summary statistics of the variables.
8 I use Schoenfeld residuals to test the proportional hazards assumption. The test did not
indicate violations of this assumption.
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The effect of FDI on the hazard of autocratic breakdown is substantially
smaller and loses statistical significance when controlling for economic growth
in model 4. Given that the effect of FDI inflows runs to a large extent through
economic growth, this is however not surprising. Growth rates themselves are
negatively and statistically significantly correlated with the hazard rate. Much
like FDI inflows, economic growth increases the duration of autocratic rule. If
we assume that this variable – at least partially – captures the effect of FDI,
the substantial interpretation stays the same. The other control variables are
mostly insignificant. Model 3, however, highlights differences in the survival
rate of autocratic regime types. Compared to party-based regimes, military
and personalist regimes exhibit a positive and statistically significant effect on
the hazard of experiencing autocratic breakdown. Hence, both regime types
are less durable than party-based regimes. This result is in line with the de-
scriptive analysis. In addition, the difference between military and personalist
regimes is statistically significant; with the latter having a higher survival time
than the former.
The analysis so far shows an autocracy-stabilizing effect of foreign direct
investment across the board that is in line with Hypothesis 6.1. Yet, there is
one unexpected result. While increasing power of the regime elite prolongs
autocratic rule, increasing power of the middle class is consistently conducive
to autocratic regime breakdown. To fathom this finding, I test in a second step
whether there are differences regarding the effect of FDI, conditional on the
power of each societal group. Table 6.3 reports the results from those models.
The interaction between either regime elite power or middle class power
and FDI inflows is negative and statistically significant in all models. This im-
plies that FDI unfolds an even stronger autocracy-preserving effect the more
influential one societal group is in the autocratic support coalition. Figure 6.4
depicts this effect for both societal groups. The marginal effect of FDI inflows
is negative across all levels of societal group power. Yet, FDI only makes a deci-
sive difference when members of the support coalition are sufficiently strong.
Importantly, the autocracy-destabilizing effect of the middle class fades away.
Hence, the autocracy-destabilizing effect of middle class power is confined to
those autocratic regimes that receive only little FDI. As such, in regimes that
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Figure 6.4: Conditional Effect of FDI on Societal Group Power
cannot satisfy the material needs of the middle class by attracting FDI, this
group of actors most likely searches for alternatives and engages in attempts
to overthrow the incumbent regime. In contrast, if an autocratic regime is
highly attractive for multinational corporations, middle class power is con-
ducive to autocratic regime survival.
As for the control variables, the picture is consistent with the uncon-
ditional models. Population size, economic development, trade openness,
government expenditures, oil production, and ethnic fractionalization do not
seem to influence the hazard of autocratic breakdown. Once again, party-
based regimes are more durable than military or personalist regimes. Further-
more, economic growth facilitates a dictator’s hold on power.
Taken together, the empirical analysis suggests an autocracy-stabilizing
effect of FDI. This effect is especially pronounced in autocratic regimes where
the power of one societal group concentrates. In the last step of this analy-
sis, I show that these effects also hold for specific subsets of autocratic regime
breakdowns. The models in Table 6.4 focus on those breakdowns that led to
democracy, as opposed to a subsequent autocratic regime. Again, the results
point to a autocracy-stabilizing effect of FDI. Increasing FDI exposure does
make autocratic breakdown that induces democratization less likely. Yet, the
models also suggest that the power of societal groups does not reinforce this
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effect. The interaction between FDI and either regime elite or middle class
power are negative, but not statistically significant. Because the mediating
effect of FDI does not materialize, this finding is consequential for the effect
of middle class power. If the middle class chooses to topple the incumbent au-
tocratic regime, the likely outcome is democracy. Nevertheless, these results
do not lend credence to theoretical arguments postulating that increasing in-
ternationalization and political democracy go hand in hand.
In Table 6.5, I analyze the impact of FDI inflows on two specific forms
of autocratic breakdown, elite coups and popular uprisings. The results show
the familiar picture. Although foreign direct investment does not affect the
occurrence of successful elite coups across the board, it decreases the incen-
tives of the regime elite to act against the autocratic regime, provided that this
group of actors has sufficient decision-making influence. With regard to suc-
cessful popular uprisings, I find that increasing FDI openness makes attempts
to overthrow autocracy similarly less likely.
All in all, the analyses in this section support my hypothesis that for-
eign direct investment helps autocratic regimes to survive. The autocracy-
stabilizing effect is even stronger in regimes where the power of societal
groups in the autocratic support coalition concentrates. Moreover, FDI does
not only deter autocratic breakdown in general, but reduces the probability of
elite coups and popular uprisings; and hinders democracy.
6.4 Endogeneity and Instrumental Variables
The results presented so far suffer from one important shortcoming. Multina-
tional investors might anticipate autocratic breakdown and, as a consequence,
divest. Under such circumstances, the withdrawal of foreign capital would not
cause autocratic breakdown in itself, but merely accelerate the process. Sim-
ilarly, as foreign investors capitalize on political stability, they self-select into
politically more stable autocracies. Even though the interaction between soci-
etal group power and FDI inflows captures this possibility to some extent, the
autocracy-stabilizing effect of FDI may still be biased. To show that my results
are robust to these concerns, I employ an instrumental variables approach.
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A valid instrument for FDI needs to be exogenous to political devel-
opments within the autocratic regime (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). I argue
that foreign policy alignment between countries is an important factor for the
investment decisions of multinational corporations. Closer alignment with
democracies increases the reputation of an autocracy as a reliable host coun-
try. Furthermore, good political relations on the international level form an
insurance device for foreign investors in case of investment disputes. Changes
in foreign policy alignment between countries should, therefore, be associ-
ated with changes in the probability that investors from one country invest
in another. Based on Rommel and Schaudt (2017), I argue that a major re-
orientation of foreign policy occurs most frequently if the political leadership
in either country changes. Leadership turnover opens the door for large-scale
policy re-alignment, since the pursuit of foreign policy objectives is usually
characterized as the executive branch’s prerogative. Both internal constraints
imposed by the domestic support group loosen (Mattes, Leeds, and Carroll,
2015) and personal relationships between country leaders change (Dreher
and Jensen, 2013). Thus, changes in political leadership constitute prede-
termined breaking points for a country’s foreign policy agenda, especially if
a newly elected leader of an economically and politically powerful country
comes into power. Under such circumstances, autocracies face an external
shock emanating from one-sided position changes, to which they cannot adapt
immediately.9
Hence, I use the conditional foreign policy alignment after leadership
turnover in home countries to predict foreign direct investment inflows into
autocratic host countries. The identifying variation stems from changes in for-
eign policy alignment between economically and politically powerful democ-
racies and autocratic regimes and is only due to leadership turnover in democ-
racies. This variation is exogenous to any developments within autocracies,
because both the timing of elections and the probability of leadership turnover
in democracies are subject to developments in these countries alone. The ex-
clusion restriction of this instrument might not hold, unfortunately. On the
9 See, Rommel and Schaudt (2017) for an empirical application of this argument to the case
of development aid.
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one hand, the same identifying variation could affect other types of capital
flows – such as development aid – that, in turn, induce similar patterns like
foreign direct investment. On the other hand, rapid changes in foreign pol-
icy alignment could similarly alter the probability of democracies to actively
interfere with domestic politics of autocratic regimes – for example, through
interventions. Despite these concerns, I argue that this instrumental variables
approach is able to mitigate the selection effect of foreign investors with re-
spect to pre-existing political turmoil or stability, since it mutes the channel
that connects political developments within autocracies with the decision to
invest. Furthermore, I control for other sources of foreign policy dependent
capital to close this channel.
The dependent variable of the first stage regression are bilateral foreign
investment outflows from each G7 country10 to each autocratic regime be-
tween 1985 and 2010.11 Similarly to Rommel and Schaudt (2017), I use data
from the updated Archigos dataset (Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza, 2009)
to identify the heads of executive of the G7 countries. I code a change in lead-
ership if the leader of country i in year t differs from the leader of country
i in year t ´ 1. If several leaders had been in power in a country in a given
year, I focus on the leader that has spent the highest fraction of days in office
during that year, assuming that more days in office increase the probability
to shape foreign policy in a given year. To proxy foreign policy alignment
between countries, I use voting alignment in the United Nations General As-
sembly (UNGA). Votes in the UNGA cover a wide array of issues and a “record
of how the state wants to be seen by others, the international norms it finds
acceptable, and the positions it is willing to take publicly” (Mattes, Leeds, and
Carroll, 2015, 283). I operationalize foreign policy realignment as the differ-
ence in the percentage of common yes and no votes (Thacker, 1999; Faye and
Niehaus, 2012) any two countries in one administration dyad vote in line with
each other between t´ 1 and t. The data is provided by Voeten (2013). Most
importantly, I employ an interaction term between leadership turnover in G7
countries and foreign policy realignment (Brambor, Clark, and Golder, 2006).
10 Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, and the United States.
11 Unfortunately, the OECD (2016) provides bilateral FDI flows only from 1985 onwards.
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In the empirical model (see also, Rommel and Schaudt, 2017), I regress
FDI outflows at time t of each G7 country g to host autocracy h on G7 leader
change and the foreign policy signal (see Equation 6.2). The coefficient of
interest is the interaction between the G7 leader change and foreign policy
realignment, i.e. the corresponding change in voting alignment in the UNGA
from t ´ 1 (the year of the last leader in a G7 country) to t (the first year of
the newly elected leader in a G7 country). I expect a positive and statistically
significant interaction effect of θ implying that positive signals following a
change in leadership increase FDI flows, while negative signals decrease FDI
flows. φ controls for past mean alignment of the previous administration dyad,
to capture the overall relations between the two countries. αgh are home-
host-country fixed effects capturing unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity
for each country dyad. In addition, γt are year fixed effects to control for any
global shocks that simultaneously affect alignment, leader change and FDI
outflows across all countries. All variables are lagged by one year.
FDIght “ β ¨G7changegt ` δ ¨ signalght ` θ ¨G7changegt ¨ signalght
` φ ¨meanalignmentgh ` αgh ` γt ` ght
(6.2)
In a next step, I use the results from this stage to obtain the model-
based predictions of FDI outflows from the G7 countries. To arrive at an in-
strumented estimate of FDI inflows into autocratic countries, I sum up the
predicted values over all G7 countries. Note that these FDI inflows are not
only exogenous, but also originate from democratic countries only. In general,
this procedure should therefore bias against finding an autocracy-stabilizing
effect of FDI. In the second stage regression, I use these estimates to reestimate
the Cox proportional hazard models from Table 6.2 and 6.3.
The results are reported in Table 6.6. Column 1 shows the results from
the first stage regression. Leadership turnover and foreign policy signaling do
not exhibit a statistically significant effect on the amount of FDI outflows from
large democracies into autocracies. Importantly, the interaction term between
these variables θ is positive and statistically significant. Leader change in one
of the G7 democracies that exogenously shifts foreign policy alignment to-
wards a higher level of accordance increases FDI flows from the respective G7
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country; political hardship decreases the amount of money provided by multi-
national companies from the respective democracy. The instrument, thus, has
power to explain FDI outflows.
Columns 2 and 3 show the second stage regressions. As expected, the
coefficient of the predicted FDI inflows is negative implying that foreign di-
rect investment increases the chances of autocratic survival. It is statistically
significant across all regimes, and when interacted with societal group power.
Nevertheless, power concentration within the support coalition does not in-
tensify the effect of FDI. Given that my instrumental variables design should
mitigate the effect of the domestic structure of autocratic rule, this strength-
ens the results, however. Importantly, both models control for development
aid, which is the most prevalent factor that threatens the exclusion restriction.
Even more than in case of firm decisions, foreign policy realignment might
change development strategies, since they constitute actual foreign policy de-
cisions (Rommel and Schaudt, 2017). In light of this, foreign aid is both an
additional source of non-tax resources for autocratic countries, which might
help them to stay in power (Morrison, 2009), as well as a widely used foreign
policy instrument. Controlling for foreign aid closes the effect of other chan-
nels that connect foreign policy realignment emanating from leader changes
in the G7 countries and autocratic regime survival. Importantly, the autocracy-
preserving effect of FDI comes about, even when controlling for foreign aid.
Summing up, the findings from this instrumental variables approach
are in line with the results obtained from the simple survival models in the
previous section. Both analyses lend support to the main hypothesis of this
dissertation: foreign direct investment impedes autocratic regime breakdown
and prolongs autocratic rule.
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Appendix
Table 6.1: Descriptive Statistics (Analysis of Autocratic Breakdown)
N Mean SD Min Max
Autocratic breakdown 2570 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00
Democratization 2570 0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00
Elite coup 2570 0.02 0.13 0.00 1.00
Popular uprising 2570 0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00
FDI inflows (ln) 2570 2.07 2.25 –6.99 7.99
Middle class power 2570 0.51 0.16 0.03 0.88
Regime elite power 2570 0.55 0.14 0.20 0.85
Start year of regime 2570 1969 18 1889 2008
# of previous regimes 2570 2.63 2.05 1.00 11.00
Population size 2570 35.07 131.95 0.43 1333.81
Economic development 2570 100.87 523.22 0.00 5684.22
Trade openness 2570 62.97 38.18 3.59 354.11
Government expenditures 2548 13.63 73.25 0.00 728.74
Oil production 2556 21.07 62.15 0.00 496.00
Ethnic fractionalization 2503 0.55 0.26 0.00 0.93
Party-based autocracy 2570 0.45 0.50 0.00 1.00
Military autocracy 2570 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00
Personalist autocracy 2570 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00
Economic growth 2327 4.22 6.76 –64.05 57.82
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Table 6.2: Effect of FDI on Autocratic Regime Breakdown
Hazard of autocratic breakdown
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FDI inflows (per capita) –0.092** –0.090* –0.092* –0.056
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
Middle class power 9.071** 8.100** 8.872** 9.253***
(3.59) (3.87) (3.94) (3.25)
Regime elite power –7.819*** –8.084*** –6.635*** –5.854**
(2.27) (2.48) (2.54) (2.32)
Start year of regime 0.099*** 0.101*** 0.091*** 0.092***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
# of previous regimes 0.079* 0.070 0.040 0.045
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Population size –0.002 –0.001 –0.001 –0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Economic development 0.000 –0.000 –0.000 –0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Trade openness 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Government expenditures 0.003 0.003 0.002
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Oil production –0.003 –0.003 –0.003
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Ethnic fractionalization 0.376 0.461 0.458
(0.47) (0.51) (0.55)
Party-based autocracy
baseline
Military autocracy 1.094*** 1.120***
(0.31) (0.35)
Personalist autocracy 0.378* 0.283
(0.21) (0.23)
Economic growth –0.052***
(0.01)
# of observations 2570 2480 2480 2294
# of autocratic regimes 182 177 177 162
# of breakdowns 127 123 123 110
Prob > Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Log-Likelihood –465.62 –448.78 –442.92 –381.61
Decade fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cox proportional hazard models with world region fixed effects.
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by world region.
Significance levels: *** pă0.01, ** pă0.05, * pă0.1.
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Table 6.3: Conditional Effect of FDI on Autocratic Regime Breakdown
Hazard of autocratic breakdown
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FDI inflows (per capita) –0.171 –0.177 –0.162 –0.060
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14)
FDI * middle class –9.372** –8.340* –8.933** –10.427***
(4.10) (4.33) (4.40) (3.09)
FDI * regime elite –9.639*** –9.310*** –9.585*** –8.932***
(3.30) (3.40) (3.22) (2.82)
Middle class power 13.448*** 11.758** 12.987** 15.987***
(4.46) (4.94) (5.35) (3.34)
Regime elite power –3.226 –3.584 –1.983 –0.983
(2.54) (2.64) (2.59) (2.29)
Start year of regime 0.094*** 0.098*** 0.087*** 0.089***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
# of previous regimes 0.086** 0.077 0.047 0.063
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Population size –0.002 –0.001 –0.002 –0.001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Economic development 0.000 –0.000 –0.000 –0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Trade openness –0.001 –0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Government expenditures 0.004 0.003 0.003*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Oil production –0.004 –0.004 –0.003
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Ethnic fractionalization 0.300 0.386 0.338
(0.46) (0.49) (0.53)
Party-based autocracy
baseline
Military autocracy 1.133*** 1.118***
(0.32) (0.38)
Personalist autocracy 0.441** 0.290
(0.20) (0.22)
Economic growth –0.046***
(0.01)
# of observations 2570 2480 2480 2294
# of autocratic regimes 182 177 177 162
# of breakdowns 127 123 123 110
Prob > Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Log-Likelihood –460.52 –444.37 –438.21 –376.69
Decade fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cox proportional hazard models with world region fixed effects.
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by world region.
Significance levels: *** pă0.01, ** pă0.05, * pă0.1.
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Table 6.4: Effect of FDI on Democratization
Hazard of democratization
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FDI inflows (per capita) –0.089* –0.117* –0.099* –0.108*
(0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
FDI * middle class –0.058 –1.148
(2.27) (2.33)
FDI * regime elite –1.136 –1.608
(2.11) (2.16)
Middle class power 14.516*** 14.259*** 15.453*** 16.997***
(3.41) (4.31) (3.56) (4.78)
Regime elite power –10.600*** –8.773* –8.055*** –5.513
(2.25) (4.52) (2.27) (4.26)
Start year of regime 0.160*** 0.161*** 0.149*** 0.147***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
# of previous regimes 0.141** 0.128** 0.122* 0.111
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08)
Population size 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Economic development 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Trade openness 0.001 0.001 0.000 –0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Government expenditures –0.001 –0.002 –0.006 –0.007
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Oil production –0.012 –0.013 –0.012 –0.012
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Ethnic fractionalization –0.523 –0.449 –0.228 –0.205
(0.51) (0.51) (0.56) (0.56)
Party-based autocracy
baseline
Military autocracy 1.784*** 1.845***
(0.49) (0.48)
Personalist autocracy 0.343 0.442
(0.38) (0.39)
# of observations 2480 2480 2480 2480
# of autocratic regimes 177 177 177 177
# of breakdowns 65 65 65 65
Prob > Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Log-Likelihood –181.66 –181.29 –173.50 –173.17
Decade fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cox proportional hazard models with world region fixed effects.
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by world region.
Significance levels: *** pă0.01, ** pă0.05, * pă0.1.
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Table 6.5: Effect of FDI on Coups and Uprisings
Hazard of Hazard of
elite coup popular uprising
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FDI inflows (per capita) 0.047 0.080 –0.274** –0.292**
(0.14) (0.16) (0.12) (0.13)
FDI * middle class –14.972** –1.066
(7.24) (7.48)
FDI * regime elite –12.509* –1.655
(7.45) (5.73)
Middle class power 13.035* 20.822*** 15.051*** 15.324***
(7.29) (6.40) (3.30) (4.20)
Regime elite power 13.554 23.412* –11.625*** –10.912***
(13.32) (13.35) (2.41) (3.44)
Start year of regime 0.077*** 0.084*** 0.150*** 0.149***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04)
# of previous regimes 0.070 0.082 0.083 0.083
(0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
Population size –0.002 –0.003 0.001 0.001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Economic development 0.001 0.002 –0.001** –0.001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Trade openness 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.002
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Government expenditures –0.052 –0.063 0.007* 0.007*
(0.04) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00)
Oil production –0.000 –0.001 –0.010 –0.010
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Ethnic fractionalization 0.770 0.593 –0.258 –0.269
(0.98) (0.90) (0.57) (0.57)
# of observations 2480 2480 2480 2480
# of autocratic regimes 177 177 177 177
# of breakdowns 41 41 63 63
Prob > Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Log-Likelihood –154.26 –149.59 –191.01 –190.94
Decade fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cox proportional hazard models with world region fixed effects.
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by world region.
Significance levels: *** pă0.01, ** pă0.05, * pă0.1.
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Table 6.6: Instrumental Variables Approach
1st: FDI 2nd: Hazard of
outflows autocratic breakdown
(1) (2) (3)
G7 leader change –0.062
(0.04)
UNGA voting alignment 0.157
(0.19)
Change * alignment 1.047**
(0.50)
Mean voting alignment –0.695
(0.57)
Predicted FDI inflows –0.111*** –0.126***
(0.04) (0.05)
FDI * middle class 0.167
(0.60)
FDI * regime elite –1.103
(1.05)
Middle class power 15.461*** 15.163***
(3.24) (3.28)
Regime elite power –3.922 –3.577
(3.14) (3.16)
Development aid 0.033 0.036
(0.11) (0.11)
Start year of regime 0.101 0.092
(0.07) (0.07)
# of previous regimes 0.038 0.037
(0.07) (0.07)
log GDP (in bn) –0.113 –0.122
(0.14) (0.15)
log Population (in mil) 0.129 0.124
(0.16) (0.16)
Population size 0.001 0.001
(0.00) (0.00)
Economic development 0.001 –0.000
(0.00) (0.00)
Trade openness 0.002 0.002
(0.00) (0.00)
Government expenditures –0.007 0.001
(0.01) (0.01)
Oil production –0.012 –0.012
(0.01) (0.01)
Ethnic fractionalization 0.223 0.203
(0.67) (0.65)
Party-based autocracy
baseline
Military autocracy 1.423*** 1.397***
(0.41) (0.41)
Personalist autocracy 0.455 0.472
(0.32) (0.32)
# observations 5424 1450 1450
# dyads 423
Prob > F 0.000
Dyad + year FE Yes
# autocratic regimes 121 121
# of breakdowns 73 73
Prob > Chi2 0.000 0.000
Log-Likelihood –202.44 –201.65
Decade FE Yes Yes
Cox proportional hazard models with world region fixed effects.
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by world region.
Significance levels: *** pă0.01, ** pă0.05, * pă0.1.
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Table 6.7: List of Autocratic Regimes
Afghanistan 29-73 Congo-Brazzaville 97-NA Kazakhstan 91-NA Paraguay 54-93
Afghanistan 73-78 Congo-Brazzaville 68-91 Kenya 63-02 Peru 68-80
Afghanistan 78-92 Congo-Kinshasa 60-97 Korea, North 48-NA Peru 92-00
Afghanistan 96-01 Congo-Kinshasa 97-NA Korea, South 61-87 Philippines 72-86
Algeria 62-92 Dominican Republic 66-78 Kyrgyzstan 05-10 Poland 44-89
Algeria 92-NA Ecuador 70-72 Kyrgyzstan 91-05 Portugal 26-74
Angola 75-NA Ecuador 72-79 Laos 75-NA Russia 93-NA
Argentina 66-73 Egypt 52-NA Lesotho 70-86 Rwanda 62-73
Argentina 76-83 El Salvador 48-82 Lesotho 86-93 Rwanda 73-94
Armenia 94-98 El Salvador 82-94 Liberia 44-80 Rwanda 94-NA
Armenia 98-NA Eritrea 93-NA Liberia 80-90 Saudi Arabia 27-NA
Azerbaijan 93-NA Ethiopia 1889-1974 Liberia 97-03 Senegal 60-00
Bangladesh 71-75 Ethiopia 74-91 Libya 69-NA Serbia 91-00
Bangladesh 75-82 Ethiopia 91-NA Madagascar 60-72 Sierra Leone 68-92
Bangladesh 82-90 Gabon 60-NA Madagascar 72-75 Sierra Leone 92-96
Belarus 91-94 Gambia 65-94 Madagascar 75-93 Somalia 69-91
Belarus 94-NA Gambia 94-NA Malawi 64-94 South Africa 10-94
Benin 69-70 Georgia 92-03 Malaysia 57-NA Spain 39-76
Benin 72-90 Ghana 72-79 Mali 68-91 Sri Lanka 78-94
Bolivia 69-71 Ghana 81-00 Mauritania 05-07 Sudan 69-85
Bolivia 71-79 Greece 67-74 Mauritania 08-NA Sudan 85-86
Bolivia 80-82 Guatemala 66-70 Mauritania 60-78 Sudan 89-NA
Botswana 66-NA Guatemala 70-85 Mauritania 78-05 Swaziland 68-NA
Brazil 64-85 Guatemala 85-95 Mexico 15-00 Syria 63-NA
Bulgaria 44-90 Guinea 08-10 Mongolia 21-93 Tajikistan 91-NA
Burkina Faso 66-80 Guinea 58-84 Morocco 56-NA Tanzania 64-NA
Burkina Faso 80-82 Guinea 84-08 Mozambique 75-NA Thailand 57-73
Burkina Faso 82-87 Guinea Bissau 74-80 Myanmar 62-88 Thailand 76-88
Burkina Faso 87-NA Guinea Bissau 80-99 Myanmar 88-NA Togo 67-NA
Burundi 66-87 Haiti 57-86 Namibia 90-NA Tunisia 56-NA
Burundi 87-93 Haiti 86-88 Nepal 02-06 Turkey 80-83
Burundi 96-03 Haiti 88-90 Nepal 51-91 Turkmenistan 91-NA
Cambodia 70-75 Haiti 91-94 Nicaragua 36-79 Uganda 66-71
Cambodia 79-NA Haiti 99-04 Nicaragua 79-90 Uganda 71-79
Cameroon 60-83 Honduras 63-71 Niger 60-74 Uganda 80-85
Cameroon 83-NA Honduras 72-81 Niger 74-91 Uganda 86-NA
Central African Rep 03-NA Hungary 47-90 Niger 96-99 Uruguay 73-84
Central African Rep 65-79 Indonesia 66-99 Nigeria 66-79 Uzbekistan 91-NA
Central African Rep 79-81 Iran 25-79 Nigeria 83-93 Venezuela 05-NA
Central African Rep 81-93 Iran 79-NA Nigeria 93-99 Vietnam 54-NA
Chad 60-75 Iraq 68-79 Pakistan 58-71 Yemen 78-NA
Chad 75-79 Iraq 79-03 Pakistan 75-77 Zambia 67-91
Chad 82-90 Ivory Coast 00-NA Pakistan 77-88 Zambia 96-NA
Chad 90-NA Ivory Coast 60-99 Pakistan 99-08 Zimbabwe 80-NA
Chile 73-89 Ivory Coast 99-00 Panama 68-82
China 49-NA Jordan 46-NA Panama 82-89

Chapter 7
Conclusion
This dissertation has investigated autocratic politics in times of economic glob-
alization. I have argued theoretically and demonstrated empirically that for-
eign direct investment – as of now, the most important component of economic
globalization – bolsters autocratic rule and hinders democratization. Auto-
cratic rule is constantly contested and rests on support by societal groups. FDI
helps to coopt the regime elite and, at the same time, intensifies the belief
of the middle class in the legitimacy of autocratic rule. Because both soci-
etal groups see no reason to act against the incumbent regime on material
grounds, FDI weakens pressures for regime change among the essential mem-
bers of the autocratic support coalition. In essence, autocratic regimes are
less likely to experience elite coups and popular uprisings and are, thus, more
likely to maintain power.
This argument runs counter to the widely held belief that integration
into the global economy reinforces pressure for democracy. Because my ar-
gument departs from previous work, which links international developments
with domestic politics in autocracies, I substantiate it with a detailed and
comprehensive analysis of its mechanism. Each of the empirical chapters ad-
dressed one of the following research questions:
1. Why and how much do autocracies liberalize FDI?
2. How does openness to FDI affect individuals in autocracies materially
and does it shape citizen support for autocratic rule?
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3. Do FDI-induced demands and grievances translate into politics via pop-
ular protest?
4. How does FDI affect the survival of autocratic regimes and the prospects
for democratization?
7.1 Summary of Findings and Implications
My findings suggest that foreign direct investment matters a great deal for pol-
itics in autocracies. FDI has not only become the new pacemaker of economic
globalization, but portrays sizable and lasting political consequences.
Chapter 3 investigated the domestic sources of FDI openness. FDI does
not appear from nowhere; multinational corporations need permission to trans-
fer capital into countries. I have argued that autocratic regimes hardly suc-
cumb automatically to general trends regarding economic liberalization. They
consciously choose the level and form of exposure to FDI. Because the es-
sential members of the autocratic support coalition hold opposing views with
regard to FDI openness, the domestic regulatory regime for international in-
vestment hinges on the relative political power of the regime elite and the
middle class. I demonstrated empirically that as the power of the regime elite
increases, so do entry restrictions for multinational corporations. In contrast,
the more an autocratic regime is dependent on the middle class, the laxer are
domestic barriers for foreign companies. As such, FDI openness serves as an
essential tool to satisfy the material needs of the support coalition.
Chapter 4 turned to the individual level and scrutinized how FDI open-
ness affects mass attitudes in autocracies. In combining economic models
of multinational production and newest advances in trade theory, I argued
that the impact of FDI on material well-being is more heterogeneous than
previously assumed. FDI heightens economic insecurity for poorly educated
citizens, but boosts wages among well-educated members of the autocratic so-
ciety. The empirical studies showed that changes in individual well-being are
indeed contingent on both individual skill-level and exposure to FDI. More im-
portantly, the material consequences of FDI translate into political preferences
and demands. While highly aggrieved individuals call for democratization,
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the beneficiaries of FDI develop beliefs in the legitimacy of autocratic rule. As
a consequence, the members of the middle class hold a much more favorable
view of the incumbent regime than the disenfranchised masses.
Chapter 5 has built on joint work with Tabea Palmtag and Stefanie Wal-
ter (see, Palmtag, Rommel, and Walter, 2018) and examined political reac-
tions due to FDI inflows. While a significant part of the population in autoc-
racies does not profit from the entry of multinational investors, they cannot
express their demands at the ballot box. Because elections are ineffective and
frequently tampered with, we argued that individuals that are adversely af-
fected by FDI engage in protest events. Nonetheless, motives are not sufficient
for actual participation; it is necessary to take developments on the regional
level into account. Individuals make their demands visible, but only where
there are many similarly aggrieved individuals. Focusing on protest behavior
in the Russian Federation, we have found that grassroots protests are more
frequent in regions where a low-skilled workforce faces substantial inflows of
FDI, compared to regions that are similarly exposed but have more educated
populations. As such, grievances indeed provoke political action. Yet, FDI only
affects grassroots protest, but does not spark large-scale political upheaval.
Chapter 6 has built on these insights and tested whether foreign direct
investment affects autocratic regime survival. I focused on autocratic regime
survival, instead of democratization. Authoritarian rule ends either because of
coups initiated by the regime elite or because of popular uprisings emanating
from the middle class. Hence, autocratic regimes have to satisfy both societal
groups to hold on to power. The main finding was that FDI attenuates both
threats at the same time. International investment generates revenues to buy
off the regime elite and it provides market-based income gains for the mid-
dle class. Thus, FDI lowers the probability of autocratic regime breakdown.
The autocracy-stabilizing effect is not only confined to all forms of autocratic
breakdown, but FDI also made breakdowns that actually led to democracy less
likely. Furthermore, FDI reduces the probability of regime failure due to elite
ousters and mass uprisings.
These findings have implications for several debates in political science.
In comparative politics, scholars debate the link between international eco-
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nomic openness and regime change (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006; Boix,
2003; Li and Reuveny, 2009; Teorell, 2010). While most research operates un-
der the notion that economic globalization and democracy go hand in hand,
my dissertation provides a different, yet unambiguous answer: FDI bolsters
autocratic rule. This dissertation also sheds new light on the theoretical mech-
anism that connects changes in the international economic environment and
domestic politics. With this approach, I have been able to show not only if, but
also how FDI matters for autocratic politics. My insights are, therefore, rele-
vant for the public debate. With regard to democracy promotion, advocating
international economic openness as a foreign policy objective – like William
J. Clinton and George W. Bush did – may have unintended consequences. Im-
portantly, this is not a plea to cut down economic ties. Rather, it is important
to raise awareness of globalization’s detrimental effects.
With regard to the research on political regimes, my dissertation con-
tributes to the way we conceptualize and think about autocracies. Autocratic
regimes are a subject matter in their own right. Autocratic survival is not
the inverse of democratization; an autocratic regime often succeeds another.
Yet, these regimes differ from one another not only with regard to their in-
stitutional setup (Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland, 2010; Geddes, Wright, and
Frantz, 2014; Wahman, Teorell, and Hadenius, 2013), but according to the
way they incorporate societal groups into their support coalition. Thinking of
autocratic diversity in terms of the political power of societal groups is espe-
cially fruitful for explaining policy-making in autocratic regimes when differ-
ent societal groups hold opposing views.
Apart from research on autocratic regimes, my dissertation speaks to
our understanding of the distributional consequences of economic globaliza-
tion in autocracies. Factoral or sectoral models of international trade still fea-
ture prominently in international political economy (see, among many others,
Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006; Ahlquist and Wibbels, 2012; Boix, 2003; Han-
kla and Kuthy, 2013; Hwang and Lee, 2014; Li and Zeng, 2017; Meseguer and
Escribà-Folch, 2011; Nooruddin and Simmons, 2009; Nooruddin and Rudra,
2014; Pandya, 2010; Pond, 2017; Wibbels and Ahlquist, 2011; Wu, 2015).
In line with research that focuses on democracies, I model the distributional
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consequences of foreign direct investment using the newest advances in the-
ories on multinational production and international trade integration (Melitz,
2003; Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple, 2004; Helpman, Itshoki, and Redding,
2010). Doing so paints a more fine-grained picture and allows a more het-
erogeneous description of the individual-level impact of FDI (see the seminal
work by Stefanie Walter, 2010, 2017). Modeling the distributional conse-
quences of economic globalization in that way also helps to explain some
empirical patterns. For instance, while the Heckscher-Ohlin as well as the
Ricardo-Viner view predict lower income inequality within society, this ap-
proach suggests the opposite. This notion is in line with empirical research
that detects increasing income inequality in developing countries (Goldberg
and Pavcnik, 2007; McCaig and Pavcnik, 2015).
Irrespective of the direct economic consequences of FDI, my findings
also speak to research in political behavior that investigates how increasing
market income shapes political preferences. Previous research is split be-
tween the modernization and the legitimation approach. Proponents of the
former connect personal well-being with stronger preferences for democracy
(Lipset, 1959; Welzel and Inglehart, 2009; Welzel, 2013). Advocates of the
latter link individual well-being with performance-induced legitimacy of au-
tocracy (Bellin, 2010; Treisman, 2011; Wintrobe, 1990). I have argued and
shown that the long-term gains from FDI correspond to perceptions of satis-
faction with government performance, beliefs in the legitimacy of the political
institutions, and muted demands for regime change. While contributing to an
overall improvement of economic conditions, FDI is not the motor of politi-
cal change and does not transform its beneficiaries into agents of democracy.
Quite the contrary, foreign direct investment puts the brake on political change
and transforms its beneficiaries into advocates of the autocratic status quo.
Lastly, in conflict research, the results of Palmtag, Rommel, and Wal-
ter (2018) remedy so far inconclusive findings regarding the effect economic
globalization on social unrest. FDI does not unidirectionally induce or pre-
vent domestic political discontent (Dodson, 2015; Robertson and Teitelbaum,
2011; Hendrix and Haggard, 2015); it exhibits both effects at the same time.
This is due to the fact that economic globalization not only affects individuals
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differently, but also shapes regional differences in economic performance. The
regional context is imperative to understand political protest, because it affects
the pool of individuals that share common motives to engage in protest. Only
when the number of aggrieved citizens is large enough, does protest become
a viable option to raise issues and make demands visible.
7.2 Limitations and Further Research
Even though this dissertation provides a comprehensive analysis of the con-
nection between foreign direct investment and political developments in auto-
cratic regimes, there are reasons to treat these findings with due caution. For
one, this dissertation relies solely on observational data. As such, the empir-
ical analyses are associational, not causal. If we truly cared about estimating
causal effects, we would need entirely different datasets, however. Such data
either does not exist or is extremely difficult to gather; especially with regard
to survey data in autocratic regimes, as conducting survey research on politi-
cal attitudes is more often than not truly dangerous. Despite this caveat, I am
confident that my findings are not driven by spurious correlations. I find sup-
port for my argument on several levels of analysis using different data, various
estimation techniques, and diverse model setups.
Second, some limitations pertain to data availability and quality. Com-
parative data on autocratic regime breakdown is not available for less popu-
lated countries. Survey data in autocratic regimes is scarce. Additionally, po-
litical attitudes are oftentimes biased or not included at all. Apart from that,
data on foreign direct investment is plagued by generally low data quality. The
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) collects the
best national-level data on FDI; fdimarkets.com provides the best FDI data
on the regional level. Despite their best efforts, there are sometimes heavy
discrepancies between datasets that are made available at different points in
time. For example, I downloaded the first version of the UNCTAD FDI data in
2013. In this dataset, Sudan had average FDI inflows of roughly 500% of its
GDP; every year. If this were in fact the case, Sudan must nowadays be the
richest country around the globe, given that last year’s FDI contributes to next
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year’s GDP. In a subsequent version, which I am using in this dissertation, this
average shrank to about 1.5% of GDP.1 In addition to quality, missing data is
problematic across the board. I approach this problem by reporting both par-
simonious models, including a large set of observations, and more extensive
models, including a wider set of control variables. Besides, research on the so-
called “advanced democracy bias” (Lall, 2016, 416) has shown that missing
data is especially problematic when comparing democracies with autocracies.
Given that my analyses only include autocratic countries, missing data might
still pose some problems, but the bias arising from missing data is at least less
pronounced.
Even though there are limitations with regard to data quality, we need
further research to fully understand the connection between autocratic rule
and economic globalization. While the empirical part of this dissertation tests
a multitude of observable implications of the theoretical argument, it also ne-
glects some components of autocratic politics. For one, this dissertation pro-
vides a new approach to grasp autocratic regime diversity by focusing on the
political power of societal groups. Nonetheless, the distinction between three
groups of actors – the regime elite, the middle class, and the disenfranchised
masses – is rather crude. Given that most of the research on political regimes
still operates with these three groups of actors, this is generally less of an issue.
It might, however, become problematic as soon as economic and political in-
terests among these groups are less cohesive than in the case of foreign direct
investment. Further research should, thus, concentrate on two areas. First,
provide a better measurement of the political power of various societal groups
based on more fine-grained indicators. Second, to facilitate the utility of my
society-based approach to autocratic decision-making, future studies should
also investigate other policy areas than foreign direct investment liberaliza-
tion that similarly exhibit conflicting demands among the major players in the
autocratic support coalition.
To leverage the theoretical mechanism even more, additional analyses
should look more closely into the macro-level and micro-level trajectories of
1 My hunch is that this discrepancy can only arise from a coding error with regard to the units.
UNCTAD usually gathers the original data in million USD. Sudan most likely reported some
of its FDI in thousand USD.
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autocratic regime maintenance. On the macro-level, I have provided evidence
that FDI reduces the probability of autocratic regime failure initiated by elite
coups and mass uprisings. Yet, I do not test whether FDI affects uprisings
and coups in general, but have focused solely on successful uprisings and
coups. My argument suggests that FDI should likewise reduce attempted ac-
tions aimed at overthrowing the incumbent regime. In conjunction with that, I
have not examined the validity of the spending channel concerning the regime
elite, but have focused more on evidence regarding the market-based income
redistribution channel concerning the middle class. On the micro-level, fur-
ther research should dig deeper into the effect of FDI on local economic de-
velopment. Doing so would contribute to a better understanding of the conse-
quences of FDI as well as to the importance of the local and regional context
for collective action in autocratic regimes.
Finally, this dissertation is confined to the international economic causes
of autocratic regime breakdown. Autocratic regimes and their international
economic environment might, however, feature further inter-linkages, which
have not yet been recognized and examined systematically. Investigating not
only the international causes of regime breakdown, but also the international
economic consequences of different forms of autocratic breakdown should
thus prove to be a promising and rewarding subject matter.
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